Eloy Meza Garcia v. Merrick Garland ( 2021 )


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  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       DEC 13 2021
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ELOY MEZA GARCIA,                               No.    20-71880
    Petitioner,                     Agency No. A088-258-508
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Argued and Submitted August 30, 2021
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
    Petitioner Eloy Meza Garcia seeks review of the decision by the Board of
    Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his motion to reopen his proceedings. Meza
    asked the BIA to reopen his case using its sua sponte authority and remand to
    allow him to apply for cancellation of removal under Section 240A(a) of the
    Immigration & Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C § 1229b(a)(1–3).
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    Meza obtained lawful permanent resident status in 2008. Shortly thereafter,
    the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) placed him in removal proceedings
    and charged him with knowingly aiding and abetting the illegal entry of another
    noncitizen into the United States. DHS alleges that after visiting family for a few
    hours in Mexico, Meza drove his sister-in-law and niece through a vehicle
    inspection point and claimed they were his wife and daughter, who are both lawful
    permanent residents.
    The BIA issued a final order of removal in 2013. After the Supreme Court
    held a Notice to Appear (NTA) must contain a date and time to be valid, Pereira v.
    Sessions, 
    138 S. Ct. 2105
     (2018), Meza filed a motion with the BIA to reopen his
    proceedings sua sponte. Because the NTA he received did not include this
    information, he contends it did not stop the accrual of his continuous residence,
    making him eligible for cancellation of removal. To be eligible, permanent
    residents must have seven years of continuous residence, subject to a “stop-time”
    rule specifying when the accrual of residence stops. 8 U.S.C § 1229b(d)(1).
    The BIA denied Meza’s motion for two reasons, concluding that his
    continuous residence ended either in 2008, when he received a subsequent Notice
    of Hearing (NOH) with date and time information, or in 2013, when the BIA
    issued a final order of removal. Both reasons are premised on legal error.
    We have jurisdiction to review the denial of Meza’s motion under Bonilla v.
    2
    Lynch, 
    840 F.3d 575
     (9th Cir. 2016). This Court generally lacks jurisdiction to
    review the BIA’s discretionary denials of exercising its sua sponte authority, but
    we retain limited jurisdiction to review when the denial rests on legal or
    constitutional error. See 
    id. at 581, 584
    . This limited jurisdiction allows us to
    ensure that the BIA “made its discretionary decision on the correct understanding
    of the applicable legal principles.” 
    Id. at 584
    .
    1. The BIA erred by concluding Meza’s defective NTA could be cured by a
    subsequent NOH with the required information. Pursuant to Pereira v. Sessions,
    
    138 S. Ct. 2105
     (2018), and Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 
    141 S. Ct. 1474
     (2021), the
    government must supply all statutorily required information in a single document
    to invoke the stop-time rule and end continuous residence (for permanent
    residents) or continuous presence (for nonpermanent residents). The subsequent
    NOH Meza received was insufficient to cure the defective NTA, and it did not stop
    his continuous residence.
    2. Nor is a final order of removal a valid basis for denying Meza’s motion
    for sua sponte relief. The BIA reasoned that even if the NOH did not cure the
    defective NTA, “an alien’s physical presence or residence only continues to accrue
    until the entry of a final administrative decision of removal.” But a final removal
    order does not trigger the stop-time rule; to hold otherwise would be at odds with
    the rule’s unambiguous statutory text. Cantor v. Garland, 
    17 F.4th 869
    , 870 (9th
    3
    Cir. 2021).
    Our review is limited to the reasons given on “the face of the BIA’s
    decision.” Lona v. Barr, 
    958 F.3d 1225
    , 1234 (9th Cir. 2020). We may not supply
    a different rationale for the BIA. Because both reasons given by the BIA rest on
    legal error, we grant the petition and remand.
    PETITION GRANTED AND REMANDED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20-71880

Filed Date: 12/13/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2021