Reb Properties, LLC v. William Towler ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             APR 29 2011
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    REB PROPERTIES, LLC, an Arizona                  No. 09-17724
    limited liability company,
    D.C. No. 3:09-cv-08072-DKD
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM *
    WILLIAM L. TOWLER, husband;
    JACQUELINE KAY JOHNSON, wife;
    MATT RYAN, Chairman of the Board of
    Supervisors of Coconino County; STEVE
    PERU, County Manager of Coconino
    County; COCONINO COUNTY, a
    political Subdivision of the State of
    Arizona,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    David K. Duncan, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
    Submitted April 14, 2011 **
    San Francisco, California
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Before: GOODWIN and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and BLOCK, District
    Judge.***
    REB Properties, LLC, appeals the district court’s order on the parties’ cross-
    motions for partial summary judgement. Although the order did not resolve all
    claims, it included a denial of Appellant’s request for injunctive relief. We
    therefore have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1292
    (a)(1) to review the merits of
    that request. See TransWorld Airlines, Inc. v. American Coupon Exchange, Inc.,
    
    913 F.2d 676
    , 680 (9th Cir. 1990). We affirm.
    The issue on appeal is the applicability of Arizona Revised Statutes
    §§ 11-830(A)(2) and 11-865(A)(1), which create agricultural and other exemptions
    to county land-use regulations. As the Arizona Supreme Court has not addressed
    this issue, we look to decisions from the Arizona Court of Appeals for guidance.
    See Nelson v. City of Irvine, 
    143 F.3d 1196
    , 1206-07 (9th Cir. 1998).
    “On-site housing for full-time farm workers can be said to be ‘incidental’ to
    farming because housing the workers on the farm is a subordinate accommodation
    to their primary role as employees . . . .” Braden Trust v. County of Yuma, 
    69 P.3d 510
    , 513 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). While the Braden Trust court was willing to apply
    the exemption from regulation to the construction of housing for full-time farm
    ***
    The Honorable Frederic Block, Senior United States District Judge for
    the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    2
    workers, it noted “that the agricultural use exemption from county regulation
    should not ‘be manipulated and twisted into a protection for virtually any use of
    the land as long as some agricultural activity [is] maintained on the property.’” 
    Id. at 514
     (quoting County of Kendall v. Aurora Nat’l Bank Trust No. 1107, 
    524 N.E.2d 262
    , 267 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)).
    Here, the potential purchasers of tenancies-in-common would not be full-
    time farm workers. They would not be required to perform any set amount of work
    hours, need not even be capable of farm labor, and could hire others to fulfill their
    indeterminate work requirements. Residential building on agricultural or ranching
    land in this case would not be incidental to agricultural activity, and is therefore
    not exempt from regulation.
    Nor does the de minimis ownership arrangement of the proposed
    development scheme save Appellant. That potential purchasers would each share a
    small fraction of one percent of profits and losses from agricultural and ranching
    operations does not prevent the project from twisting the regulatory exemptions
    away from their purpose of protecting agricultural and ranching lands and
    activities, and creating an unintended loophole that would allow widespread
    residential development of those lands.
    3
    Finally, Appellant’s contention that Arizona law requiring zoning ordinances
    be construed against the county should likewise be applied to state statutes is also
    unavailing. See Phoenix City Council v. Canyon Ford, Inc., 
    473 P.2d 797
    , 800
    (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970). The statutes at issue have been clearly interpreted in Braden
    Trust and are not ambiguous.
    AFFIRMED.
    4