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NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT OCT 31 2011 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS RODNEY DEON HOLLIE, No. 10-55331 Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. 2:08-cv-02950-JVS-DTB v. MEMORANDUM* ANTHONY HEDGPETH, Warden; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Respondents - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted October 12, 2011 Pasadena, California Before: PREGERSON and D.W. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and LYNN, District Judge.** * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. ** The Honorable Barbara M. G. Lynn, District Judge for the U.S. District Court for Northern Texas, sitting by designation. Petitioner Rodney Deon Hollie (“Hollie”), a California state prisoner, appeals the district court’s denial of his habeas petition under
28 U.S.C. § 2254. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2253and we affirm. 1. Hollie is not entitled to habeas relief on his claim that the state court’s denial of his motion for a separate jury trial on Counts 1 and 2 (“motion to sever charges”), violated his constitutional right to due process. Under
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), a federal court may only grant a state prisoner habeas relief if the state court’s denial of the prisoner’s claim contravenes “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” See
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Supreme Court has never held that a trial court’s failure to provide separate trials on different charges implicates a defendant’s right to due process. See Collins v. Runnels,
603 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting petitioner’s argument that United States v. Lane,
474 U.S. 438(1986), provides “clearly established federal law” governing a state court’s denial of a motion to sever).1 1 Because Hollie does not claim that the state court’s denial of his motion to sever his charges was based on an erroneous factual finding, Section 2254(d)(2) does not apply to this claim. See
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (permitting habeas relief when the state court’s rejection of a claim was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”). 2 2. The state court’s denial of Hollie’s motion to suppress his confession was not “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.”
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Hollie has not pointed to an obvious defect in the state court’s fact finding process. Cf. Taylor v. Maddox,
366 F.3d 992, 1005 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding state court factual finding unreasonable where state court failed to “consider, or even acknowledge” the testimony of a key defense witness). AFFIRMED. 3
Document Info
Docket Number: 10-55331
Citation Numbers: 456 F. App'x 685
Judges: Lynn, Nelson, Pregerson
Filed Date: 10/31/2011
Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 8/5/2023