United States v. Edgar Lobos ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 13 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 17-50080
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:16-cr-00651-R-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
EDGAR ALEXANDER LOBOS, AKA Lil
Degon, AKA Payaso, AKA Pelon, AKA
Smokey,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 11, 2018**
Pasadena, California
Before: FISHER,*** WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Edgar Lobos appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence relating
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable D. Michael Fisher, United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
to his possession of a gun in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we AFFIRM.
Lobos first contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying
him an evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress. We are not persuaded. “An
evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress need be held only when the moving
papers allege facts with sufficient definiteness, clarity, and specificity to enable the
trial court to conclude that contested issues of fact exist.” United States v. Howell,
231 F.3d 615, 620 (9th Cir. 2000). Lobos’s bare contention that he “did not waive
[his] Miranda rights during questioning” is a legal conclusion and is insufficient to
demonstrate that a factual dispute exists. See United States v. Rodriguez, 518 F.3d
1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e review the district court’s factual findings
concerning the words a defendant used to invoke his Miranda rights for clear error
and whether the words actually invoked those rights de novo.”); cf. Orr v. Bank of
America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 783 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that, to
demonstrate a material fact dispute “[t]o defeat summary judgment, [a party] ‘must
respond with more than mere . . . legal conclusions’” (quoting Kaiser Cement
Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1104 (9th Cir. 1986))).
Lobos next argues that the district court should have suppressed the evidence
that he was in possession of a gun and his statement that he owned the gun because
the Government lacked probable cause to arrest him. We disagree. A woman
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alleged she was raped and provided a precise and accurate description of Lobos.
That description together with her later photo identification of Lobos were enough
to assure a prudent person that there was a “fair probability” that Lobos was the
rapist. United States v. Gonzales, 749 F.2d 1329, 1337 (9th Cir. 1984). This is so
even assuming the identification process was suggestive. Once the victim
confirmed that the person shown in the photos of Lobos was her assailant, and
given that he matched her prior description, the officers had probable cause to
arrest him.
AFFIRMED.
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