Anchorage School District v. M.P. ( 2011 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOV 01 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANCHORAGE SCHOOL DISTRICT, No. 10-36065
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 3:09-cv-00189-TMB
v.
MEMORANDUM *
M.P., a student with a disability and M.P.,
his parent,
Defendants - Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska
Timothy M. Burgess, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 11, 2011
Seattle, Washington
Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, PAEZ, Circuit Judge, and BURNS, District
Judge.**
M.P., by and through his parents, appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of the Anchorage School District (“the ASD”) and its
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable Larry A. Burns, District Judge for the U.S. District
Court for Southern California, sitting by designation.
dismissal of M.P.’s claims that the ASD violated the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (“IDEA”).
The district court concluded that the ASD did not deny M.P. a FAPE
because M.P.’s parents failed to cooperate with the ASD in the preparation of a
new individualized educational program (“IEP”) for M.P. In so concluding, the
district court did not address whether M.P. actually received a FAPE. That was
error. Neither the IDEA nor its implementing regulations qualifies any duty
imposed on a state or local educational agency as contingent upon parental
cooperation. Further, the ASD does not cite any binding case law, and we are not
aware of any, that supports such a proposition.
Although the district court did not address whether the ASD provided M.P.
with a substantively adequate FAPE, there is no need to remand this issue. The
record was fully developed before the hearing officer, our review is de novo, and
whether M.P. received a FAPE is ultimately a legal question because the ASD
challenges the hearing officer’s legal conclusions. See Gregory K. v. Longview
Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1310 (9th Cir. 1987).
Providing a substantively adequate FAPE requires that the state or local
educational agency develop an IEP “through the [IDEA’s] procedures reasonably
calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.” Bd. of Educ. of
2
Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 (1982). We
give considerable weight to the hearing officer’s decision because she conducted a
thorough and careful analysis. R.B. ex rel F.B. v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist.,
496 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 2007). We agree with the hearing officer’s analysis
and conclude that the ASD deprived M.P. of a FAPE because the outdated IEP
does not satisfy the Rowley “educational benefit” standard.1
The district court also concluded that it would deny M.P.’s parents
reimbursement for private tutoring expenses regardless of whether the ASD denied
M.P. a FAPE. That was an abuse of discretion. C.B. ex rel Baquerizo v. Garden
Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 635 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2011). An award of
tutoring expenses is well-supported by the hearing officer’s decision. Therefore,
M.P.’s parents are entitled to reimbursement for tutoring expenses in math and
reading incurred from January 1, 2008 to December 2008. M.P.’s parents are also
entitled to submit for review by the IEP team and the ASD those tutoring expenses
incurred from January 1, 2009 through May 2009, in accordance with the hearing
officer’s decision.
1
Because the ASD denied M.P. a substantively adequate FAPE, we do
not address M.P.’s procedural claims.
3
Because M.P. has prevailed on the central issue in this case, we vacate the
district court’s order directing that the parties bear their own costs and attorney’s
fees. On remand, M.P., as the prevailing party, may file a motion for an award of
attorney’s fees under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I). Although we express no
opinion on whether M.P. is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees, we note that the
district court has only narrow discretion to deny an award of attorney’s fees to
parents who have successfully litigated claims under the IDEA. Park ex rel. Park
v. Anaheim Union High Sch. Dist., 464 F.3d 1025, 1034 (9th Cir. 2006).
REVERSED IN PART, VACATED, AND REMANDED.
4