Anthony Barbieri v. Timeshare Liquidators LLC ( 2021 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       DEC 21 2021
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ANTHONY RUBEN ALDO BARBIERI,                    No. 21-15644
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:18-cv-00355-JAD-EJY
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    TIMESHARE LIQUIDATORS LLC; STAN
    MULLIS,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Nevada
    Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted December 14, 2021**
    Before:      WALLACE, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
    Anthony Ruben Aldo Barbieri appeals pro se from the district court’s
    judgment dismissing his Title VII employment discrimination action. We have
    jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review for plain error the district judge’s
    decision not to recuse. United States v. Spangle, 
    626 F.3d 488
    , 495 (9th Cir.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    2010). We affirm.
    In his opening brief, Barbieri fails to raise, and has therefore waived, any
    challenge to the district court’s judgment dismissing his action. See Indep. Towers
    of Wash. v. Washington, 
    350 F.3d 925
    , 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e will not
    consider any claims that were not actually argued in appellant’s opening brief.”);
    Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 
    7 F.3d 139
    , 144 (9th Cir. 1993) (issues not supported by
    argument in pro se appellant’s opening brief are waived).
    The district judge did not plainly err in choosing not to recuse herself
    because no reasonable person would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might
    reasonably be questioned. See Mayes v. Leipziger, 
    729 F.2d 605
    , 607 (9th Cir.
    1984) (standard for recusal); see also 
    28 U.S.C. § 455
    . We reject as meritless
    Barbieri’s contentions that the district judge was required to recuse because she
    briefly presided over a case in which Timeshare Liquidators, LLC was a defendant
    and made rulings against Barbieri in the present case.
    AFFIRMED.
    2                                      21-15644