Linda Garmong v. Maupin, Cox & Legoy ( 2021 )


Menu:
  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    DEC 22 2021
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    In re: LINDA L. GARMONG,                         No.   20-17520
    Debtor,                                D.C. No. 3:19-cv-00490-RCJ
    ______________________________
    GREGORY O. GARMONG,                              MEMORANDUM*
    Appellant,
    v.
    MAUPIN, COX & LEGOY,
    Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Nevada
    Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted December 10, 2021
    San Francisco, California
    Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and IKUTA and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
    Concurrence by Judge VANDYKE
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    Gregory Garmong appeals the district court’s order affirming the bankruptcy
    court’s order denying Garmong’s motion to remand his state court action, and
    dismissing that action with prejudice. We have jurisdiction to determine our own
    jurisdiction. In re Gugliuzza, 
    852 F.3d 884
    , 889 (9th Cir. 2017).
    Garmong’s state court action is not a civil proceeding arising under, arising
    in, or related to a case under title 11, because his complaint alleges only state law
    claims against Maupin, Cox & Legoy (MCL), and the parties do not allege that the
    outcome of the action would have any effect on Linda Garmong’s estate or require
    any interpretation of the Linda Garmong bankruptcy plan. See 28 U.S.C
    § 1334(b); In re Fietz, 
    852 F.2d 455
    , 457 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Wilshire Courtyard,
    
    729 F.3d 1279
    , 1289 (9th Cir. 2013). Therefore, the bankruptcy court lacked
    jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1334
    (b) over Garmong’s state action. Because a
    party may remove a claim from state court under 28 U.S.C § 1452 only if the
    district court “has jurisdiction of such claim or cause of action under section
    1334,” the district court here lacked removal jurisdiction over Garmong’s state
    court action. Even assuming the bankruptcy court retained jurisdiction over a
    settlement agreement between Garmong and MCL, cf. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life
    Ins. Co. of Am., 
    511 U.S. 375
    , 376–77 (1994), such retention does not confer
    removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1452, and the parties fail to identify any
    2
    other statutory basis for removal, see Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 
    482 U.S. 386
    ,
    392 (1987) (holding that under the well-pleaded complaint rule, the plaintiff is the
    “master of the claim” and can generally avoid federal jurisdiction if a federal
    question does not appear on the face of the complaint).
    We therefore reverse and remand with instructions that the district court
    grant Garmong’s motion to remand the case to state court.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    3
    In re: Linda Garmong, et al v. Maupin, Cox & Legoy, No. 20-17520      FILED
    VANDYKE, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment.                   DEC 22 2021
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    I concur in the result only.
    1
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20-17520

Filed Date: 12/22/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/22/2021