Mohammed Islam v. Merrick Garland ( 2021 )


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  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       DEC 23 2021
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    MOHAMMED FAKRUL ISLAM,                          No.    20-70493
    Petitioner,                     Agency No. A077-318-159
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted November 8, 2021**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: COLLINS and LEE, Circuit Judges, and BAKER,*** Judge.
    Mohammad Islam, a native and citizen of Bangladesh, seeks review of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) order denying his motion to reopen his
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable M. Miller Baker, Judge for the United States Court of
    International Trade, sitting by designation.
    deportation proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    . We deny the
    petition for review.
    1.   Islam forfeited his right to reopen his deportation proceedings under 8
    U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) by reentering the country illegally. Cuenca v. Barr, 
    956 F.3d 1079
    , 1084 (9th Cir. 2020); 
    8 U.S.C. § 1231
    (a)(5). Because Islam’s removal order
    was reinstated, it “is not subject to being reopened or reviewed,” and Islam “is not
    eligible and may not apply for” reopening. 
    Id.
     § 1231(a)(5). Section 1231(a)(5)
    “institute[es] a permanent jurisdictional bar” and “is a consequence of having
    reentered unlawfully.” Cuenca, 956 F.3d at 1082, 1084. Since Islam points to no
    other statutory provision “that confers upon him the right to reopen his prior removal
    proceeding despite § 1231(a)(5)’s plain command,” id. at 1086–87, we reject Islam’s
    argument that the BIA erred by not considering his ineffective assistance of counsel
    claim.
    2.   We do not have jurisdiction to consider Islam’s remaining arguments.
    First, Islam misreads the “gross miscarriage of justice” exception. At most, a
    petitioner may collaterally attack “the underlying removal order during review of the
    reinstatement order if the petitioner can show that he has suffered a ‘gross
    miscarriage of justice’ in the initial deportation proceeding.” Id. at 1087 (quoting
    Garcia de Rincon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
    539 F.3d 1133
    , 1138 (9th Cir. 2008)
    (emphasis added)). We therefore reject Islam’s argument that the BIA’s failure to
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    address his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a miscarriage of justice. There
    is no established “gross miscarriage of justice” exception to § 1231(a)(5)’s
    reopening bar. See id.
    Second, Islam forfeited any argument that he did not receive notice of the
    reinstated order. Any such challenge is time-barred. See Islam v. Sessions, No. 17-
    72766 (9th Cir. Mar. 27, 2018). We also see nothing in the record that suggests he
    used the appropriate avenue to challenge notice. See Cuenca, 956 F.3d at 1086
    (noting that 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) provides a potential avenue of relief for
    aliens seeking “rescission of a removal order entered in absentia based on a claim of
    lack of notice”).
    Third, Islam recasts the Immigration Judge and BIA’s exercise of discretion
    as a due process violation. But “[a]buse of discretion challenges to discretionary
    decisions, even if recast as due process claims, do not constitute colorable
    constitutional claims.” Vargas-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 
    497 F.3d 919
    , 923 (9th Cir.
    2007) (citing Torres-Aguilar v. INS, 
    246 F.3d 1267
    , 1271 (9th Cir. 2001)). We
    therefore decline to review the agency’s discretionary decisions to recertify the case
    under 
    8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1
    (c) and 1003.7. See Idrees v. Barr, 
    923 F.3d 539
    , 542–43
    & n.3 (9th Cir. 2019).
    Finally, this petition is not the appropriate vehicle for opposing removal based
    on credible fear. See Ortiz-Alfaro v. Holder, 
    694 F.3d 955
    , 957 (9th Cir. 2012)
    3
    (explaining the process to pursue a claim of persecution or torture). The BIA
    instructed Islam on how to pursue such a claim, yet nothing in the record suggests
    that he has taken the necessary steps to do so.
    PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN
    PART.
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