United States v. Craig Carr , 463 F. App'x 639 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              DEC 22 2011
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 10-30371
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 2:10-cr-00222-RAJ-1
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    CRAIG THOMAS CARR,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted December 19, 2011 **
    Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
    Craig T. Carr appeals from the sentence imposed following his guilty plea to
    one count of sexual exploitation of a child in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 2251
    (c)(1)
    and (c)(2)(A). We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . The matter is ripe for
    review. See United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 
    441 F.3d 767
    , 771–72 (9th Cir.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    2006); United States v. Williams, 
    356 F.3d 1045
    , 1051 (9th Cir. 2004). We dismiss
    the appeal.
    Whether a defendant has waived the right to appeal is a question of law
    reviewed de novo. United States v. Watson, 
    582 F.3d 974
    , 981 (9th Cir. 2009). In
    his plea agreement, Carr waived “to the full extent of the law” “[a]ny right . . . to
    appeal the sentence” so long as the custodial sentence was “within or below the
    Sentencing Guidelines range.” This waiver was effective as to the terms of
    supervised release1 even if Carr failed to foresee that those terms may have
    included plethysmograph testing.2
    Carr argues that the waiver is inapplicable because the sentence was
    unconstitutional in light of the district court’s failure to consult a psychologist or
    plethysmography expert before issuing it and to adequately justify the
    plethysmograph testing requirement on the record. We disagree. We need not
    1
    See Watson, 
    582 F.3d at 986
     (stating that a waiver of “‘any aspect of
    the sentence’ unambiguously encompassed supervised release terms.”).
    2
    United States v. Johnson, 
    67 F.3d 200
    , 203 (9th Cir. 1995); United
    States v. Pacheco-Navarette, 
    432 F.3d 967
    , 971 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Watson,
    
    582 F.3d at 986
    .
    2
    decide whether justification of plethysmograph testing is constitutionally required 3
    because the district court gave sufficient on-the-record consideration to the
    available alternatives4 and to “whether the testing is sufficiently likely to yield
    useful results ‘given the defendant’s specific characteristics,’” 5 despite the fact that
    it did not consult a psychologist or plethysmography expert in so doing.6
    DISMISSED.
    3
    United States v. Weber, 
    451 F.3d 552
    , 563 n.14 (9th Cir. 2006);
    United States v. Williams, 
    356 F.3d 1045
    , 1053 n.9 (9th Cir. 2004); United States
    v. T.M., 
    330 F.3d 1235
    , 1241 n.6 (9th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Rudd,
    No.10-50254, __ F.3d __, 
    2011 WL 5865897
    , at *4–5 (9th Cir. Nov. 23, 2011).
    4
    See Weber, 
    451 F.3d at 568
    ; see also United States v. Kennedy, 
    643 F.3d 1251
    , 1259 (9th Cir. 2011).
    5
    United States v. Cope, 
    527 F.3d 944
    , 954 (9th Cir. 2008); see also
    Weber, 
    451 F.3d at 567, 569
    .
    6
    See Weber, 
    451 F.3d at 569
    .
    3