United States v. Clive Wilson ( 2021 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       DEC 27 2021
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    19-10404
    Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No.
    2:19-cr-00091-MTL-1
    v.
    CLIVE MILTON WILSON,                            MEMORANDUM*
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    Michael T. Liburdi, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted December 9, 2021
    San Francisco, California
    Before: WARDLAW, BRESS, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
    Dissent by Judge BUMATAY
    Clive Wilson pleaded guilty to illegally reentering the United States as a
    previously removed alien, in violation of 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (a), (b)(1). At sentencing,
    Wilson and the government submitted a sentence bargain plea agreement, stipulating
    to a maximum sentence of twelve months. The district court rejected that agreement,
    and sentenced Wilson to fifteen months in prison and three years of supervised
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    release. Wilson now appeals and argues, inter alia, that the district court did not
    give sufficient reasons for rejecting his plea agreement. We have jurisdiction under
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we vacate Wilson’s conviction and sentence and remand for
    further proceedings.
    Wilson argues that under In re Morgan, 
    506 F.3d 705
     (9th Cir. 2007), the
    district court erred in rejecting his plea agreement. In Morgan, we explained that
    Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 “clearly vests district courts with the
    discretion to accept or reject plea agreements, including those that contain a
    stipulated sentence term.” 
    Id.
     at 709 (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(3)(A)). But “the
    broad discretion granted by Rule 11 is not unbounded.” 
    Id. at 710
    . In particular,
    courts may not engage in “the categorical rejection of a sentence bargain
    independent of any consideration of the specific circumstances giving rise to the
    bargain.” 
    Id. at 712
    ; see also 
    id.
     (explaining that the “categorical rejection of
    sentence bargain plea agreements is error”). Instead, “district courts must consider
    individually every sentence bargain presented to them and must set forth, on the
    record, the court’s reasons in light of the specific circumstances of the case for
    rejecting the bargain.” 
    Id.
    Based on our review of the sentencing transcript, some of the district court’s
    statements could be construed as rejecting Wilson’s plea agreement at least in part
    because Wilson and the government stipulated to a below-Guidelines sentence. For
    2
    example, the district court in rejecting the plea agreement stated that “the plea
    agreement should have encompassed the sentencing range for this offense level and
    criminal history category,” and that the parties agreeing in a plea agreement “to
    deviate downward or vary downward from what Mr. Wilson would be expected to
    get based on this,” including based on his glaucoma, was not “a reason why you
    should tie my hand as the judge.” To the extent the district court imposed a
    categorical rule rejecting plea agreements in those circumstances, that would have
    been error under Morgan, as the government acknowledged at oral argument.
    The government argues that the better interpretation of the district court’s
    rejection of the plea agreement is that the court reasoned, in light of Wilson’s
    particular crime and the circumstances relating to his glaucoma, that the stipulated
    sentence was too lenient and not in the public interest. Although the court may have
    intended to express that sentiment at sentencing, on this record it is not clear whether
    the court rejected the plea agreement for reasons unrelated to Wilson’s specific
    circumstances.1 See Morgan, 
    506 F.3d at 712
    . For that reason, we vacate Wilson’s
    conviction and sentence and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
    decision. See United States v. Smith, 
    60 F.3d 595
    , 600 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining
    1
    Our fine dissenting colleague is thus incorrect in stating “the district court gave
    more than sufficient reason for this court to defer to its ruling.” Neither the
    sentencing transcript considered as a whole nor a faithful application of Morgan
    readily permits that conclusion.
    3
    that errors under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 require vacatur of a
    conviction unless the error was minor or technical).2
    VACATED and REMANDED.
    2
    Because we vacate Wilson’s conviction and remand for further proceedings, we
    do not reach the issue of whether the district court properly imposed a term of
    supervised release. See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) & cmt. n.5; Valdavinos-Torres, 
    704 F.3d 679
    , 693 (9th Cir. 2012). The district court may consider supervised release as
    part of any resentencing.
    4
    FILED
    DEC 27 2021
    United States v. Wilson, No. 19-10404
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    Bumatay, J., dissenting:                                                U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    It is a well-established precedent of our court that “we assume the district
    judge knew the law.” United States v. Diaz, 
    884 F.3d 911
    , 916 (9th Cir. 2018). In
    this case, we ignore that assumption and vacate a conviction. And we do so for no
    good reason.
    Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, district courts enjoy “broad
    discretion” to accept or reject plea agreements. In re Morgan, 
    506 F.3d 705
    , 710
    (9th Cir. 2007).    As with most matters of discretion, that authority is “not
    unbounded.” 
    Id.
     We have said that district courts may not adopt “categorical rules
    to reject sentence bargains.” 
    Id. at 711
    . So a district court may not reject a plea
    agreement as being “unwise as a matter of policy.” 
    Id. at 708
    . Nor may a court
    reject a plea “in a vacuum, detached from the particular facts and circumstances of
    the case before it.”      
    Id. at 711
    .   But so long as the district court provides
    “individualized reasons for rejecting the agreement, based on the specific facts and
    circumstances presented,” this court will show considerable deference to its
    decision. 
    Id.
    In this case, the district court gave more than sufficient reason for this court
    to defer to its ruling.     First, the probation office strenuously objected to the
    stipulated plea agreement, noting that the instant offense was Wilson’s fourth
    immigration conviction and that the stipulated sentence would not appropriately
    1
    deter him from further criminal activity. The district court expressly overruled
    objections to the presentence report’s conclusion.
    Second, the district court later articulated that it was rejecting the stipulated
    plea because it “would have been more appropriate for the parties to file a joint
    request for a variance or a deviation or to ask for a lower sentenc[e]” based on
    Wilson’s “glaucoma situation,” which the court noted was “tragic.” The district
    court also expressed sympathy for Wilson’s medical condition but believed that his
    medical situation alone was not sufficient reason to “tie my hands as the judge.”
    Instead, the district court reasoned that such mitigating factors “should be
    presented at a [sentencing] hearing[,] . . . and that’s why I ultimately rejected the
    agreement.” In other words, the district court rejected the plea agreement because
    it didn’t find Wilson’s medical situation warranted the stipulated plea. This is
    precisely the type of judgment call we rely on district courts to make.
    Nowhere did the district court hold that it was rejecting the plea agreement
    because “Wilson and the government stipulated to a below-Guidelines sentence,”
    as the majority contends. Indeed, the district court’s reasoning for rejecting the
    plea agreement is a far cry from In re Morgan, where we held the district court
    abused its discretion because it summarily rejected the stipulated plea as
    “unreasonable as a matter of law, not necessarily unreasonable as a matter of fact.”
    2
    
    Id. at 708
    . Given the specific facts cited by the district court, its decision to the
    reject the plea agreement was entitled to deference by this court.
    For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-10404

Filed Date: 12/27/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/27/2021