Venkata Jillella v. International Solutions Group ( 2013 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 08 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
VENKATA RAM MOHAN JILLELLA, No. 10-56821
an individual,
D.C. No. 2:10-cv-06982-R-SS
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM *
INTERNATIONAL SOLUTIONS
GROUP, INC., a Virginia Corporation and
RAVI PULI, an individual,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 5, 2013 **
Pasadena, California
Before: CALLAHAN, IKUTA, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Venkata Ram Mohan Jillella alleges that he was hired in India by
International Solutions Group, Inc. (“ISG”) to be a computer program analyst in
the United States. Jillella filed this action claiming that ISG and its president, Ravi
Puli, sent him to California to work for the WellPoint Companies (“WellPoint”),
that he provided WellPoint with over 800 hours of service over a period of five
months, and that ISG refused to pay him for his services. Jillella appeals from the
district court’s grant of the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Because Jillella has shown that his claims arise out of ISG’s
substantial connection with California, we vacate the dismissal and remand for
further proceedings.1
A dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction is reviewed de novo. See
Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir.
2010). “California’s long-arm statute is co-extensive with federal standards, so
that a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction if doing so comports with
federal constitutional due process.” Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1015
(9th Cir. 2008). We apply a three-part test to determine whether the exercise of
specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is appropriate: (1) whether the
1
Because the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history,
we restate them here only as necessary to explain our decision.
2
defendant has purposely directed its activities toward the state or purposefully
availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum; (2) whether the
claim arises out of the defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) whether the
exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. Id. at 1016. In addition, in applying the
“purposeful direction” test to cases claiming tortious conduct, such as this one,
where Jillella alleges fraud, we use the “Calder-effects” test. This requires the
defendant to have “(1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the
forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in
the forum state.” Brayton, 606 F.3d at 1128.
We find that Jillella has met the first two prongs of the three-part specific
jurisdiction test.2 The first prong is met because Jillella’s complaint meets all three
factors of the Calder-effects test with respect to defendant ISG. ISG, by allowing
its admitted employee to work for a third party in California for five months and
then allegedly refusing to pay him, committed an intentional act expressly aimed at
California, which it knew would likely cause harm in California. The second
2
Appellees’ motion to strike part of Jillella’s opening brief and part of
the excerpts of record is denied. The underlying documents in question were
submitted to the district court and were presumably available to the district court
when it considered the motion to dismiss. See 20 Moore’s Federal Practice, §§
310.02(2)(c), 310.10(5)(a) (3d ed. 2012).
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prong is met because Jillella’s claim arises out of ISG’s forum-related activities:
employing Jillella and sending him to work at WellPoint in California.
Where, as here, a plaintiff meets the first two prongs, the burden shifts to the
defendants under the third prong to show that the exercise of specific jurisdiction
would not be reasonable. Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1016. We have identified seven
non-exclusive factors to determine reasonableness. Ziegler v. Indian River County,
64 F.3d 470, 474-5 (9th Cir. 1995). In this case, the balance of these factors favors
the exercise of specific jurisdiction. ISG purposely placed Jillella in California.
Although ISG’s records are in Virginia, WellPoint is in California, and the records
of Jillella’s actual work are in California. California has a greater interest in
having persons who work in California paid than Virginia has in ensuring that a
Delaware corporation headquartered in Virginia pays its employee in California.
Thus, under the applicable standard set forth in Boschetto, the district court had
personal jurisdiction over ISG and erred in granting ISG’s motion to dismiss.
Ravi Puli also asserts that the district court lacks personal jurisdiction over
him because he works and lives in Virginia and has insufficient contacts with
California. We decline to determine whether the district court has personal
jurisdiction over Puli. The district court based its finding of a lack of personal
jurisdiction over Puli on its determination that “ISG did not commit any acts
4
directed toward California that would establish personal jurisdiction.” As we have
determined that ISG did commit acts directed toward California that establish the
district court’s jurisdiction over ISG, we remand the question of whether the
district court has personal jurisdiction over Puli to the district court to apply the
specific jurisdiction test to Puli individually.
The district court’s order dismissing Jillella’s action is VACATED, and this
matter is REMANDED to the district court.
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