Michael Crudder v. Peoria Unified School District , 468 F. App'x 781 ( 2012 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT FEB 22 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
MICHAEL CRUDDER, No. 11-15164
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:09-cv-00435-HRH
v.
MEMORANDUM*
PEORIA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT
NO. 11; PEORIA UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT NO. 11, Governing Board;
DENTON SANTARELLI, Ed. D., District
Superintendent; UNKNOWN
SANTARELLI, Named as Jane Doe
Santarelli - His Wife; DENNIS
WILLIAMS, Director of Human
Resources; MICHELLE HAEUSSLER;
UNKNOWN HAEUSSLER, Named as
John Doe Haeussler - her Husband;
UNKNOWN WILLIAMS,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
H. Russel Holland, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 16, 2012
San Francisco, California
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Before: GRABER, BERZON, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Michael Crudder appeals the district court’s adverse summary
judgment on his employment discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, in favor of Crudder’s
employer, appellee Peoria Unified School District No. 11 (“the district”). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Crudder argues that the district’s failure to promote him to principal while it
investigated sexual harassment claims against him constitutes disparate treatment
under Title VII and § 1981. The analysis is the same for both. See Fonseca v.
Sysco Food Srvs. of Ariz., Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 850 (9th Cir. 2004). Title VII
disparate treatment claims are analyzed under the framework set out in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Hawn v. Exec. Jet Mgmt., Inc.,
615 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining the application of the McDonnell
Douglas test). To succeed on a Title VII claim under McDonnell Douglas, the
plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See Noyes v.
Kelly Servs., 488 F.3d 1163, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007). If the plaintiff states a prima
facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a “legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the challenged action.” Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis,
Bd. of Trs., 225 F.3d 1115, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2000). If the employer meets this
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burden, the plaintiff must then show a triable issue of material fact as to whether
the defendant’s stated reason is “mere pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Hawn,
615 F.3d at 1155. This burden is difficult to meet in cases where the same actor
was responsible for both a plaintiff’s promotion and subsequent adverse
employment action. See Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270–71
(9th Cir. 1996); see also Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co. LLC, 413 F.3d 1090, 1097
(9th Cir. 2005) (requiring plaintiff to make an “extraordinarily strong showing of
discrimination” to overcome the same-actor inference).
Assuming that Crudder states a prima facie case of discrimination, as the
parties seem to concede, the district still prevails on its motion for summary
judgment because it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for delaying
Crudder’s promotion to principal. The district maintains that it had a duty to
investigate sexual harassment claims raised against Crudder after he was
recommended for the principal position. Crudder has produced no evidence to
dispute the district’s stated belief that the investigation was necessary, see
Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002), and he
has not produced enough evidence to defeat the same-actor inference.
To show pretext, Crudder argues that the district’s actual investigation was
not conducted within five working days in accordance with district policy. But the
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policy actually states that an investigation is to be completed within five working
days “when possible.” Given that the issue arose over a holiday break period and
many individuals had to be interviewed, the investigation was completed
expeditiously. No policy was violated. Further, even if this allegation is true, it
would still fail to show that the district’s investigation was pretext for racial
discrimination, especially in a case raising the same-actor inference.
As an alternative theory of recovery for his disparate treatment claim,
Crudder argues that another employee used Santarelli as a “cat’s paw” for her
racial animus toward Crudder. Assuming that it applies, this theory also fails. The
record shows only that Haeussler reported the allegations to Santarelli and other
administrators. Although she provided names of colleagues whom she believed
might share her views of Crudder, she had nothing else to do with the fact-finding
portion of the investigation. See Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1183 (9th Cir.
2007) (“[I]f an adverse employment action is the consequence of an entirely
independent investigation by an employer, the animus of the retaliating employee
is not imputed to the employer.”). Thus, the district court properly granted
summary judgment to the district on Crudder’s disparate treatment claims.
The district court also properly granted summary judgment dismissing
Crudder’s retaliation claims. To state a prima facie case for retaliation, a plaintiff
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must demonstrate: (1) that he engaged in a protected activity; (2) that he was
subject to an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link between the
protected activity and the adverse employment action. See Nilsson v. City of Mesa,
503 F.3d 947, 953–54 (9th Cir. 2007). If the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case,
the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason
for its actions. Id. at 954. The plaintiff must then produce evidence that the
employer’s reason was a pretext. Id.First, the district court properly concluded that the district’s one-week delay
in approving Crudder’s promotion in May 2008, as well as the district’s failure to
publish a press release announcing Crudder’s promotion, were not “adverse
employment actions.” See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761
(1998) (“A tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in
benefits.”). Second, we hold that the district had a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for imposing the policy on Crudder. On this record, Crudder was the only
administrator promoted despite a record of complaints from female subordinates.
Warning Crudder that further complaints against him would not be tolerated, even
though some prior complaints had not been sustained, was a legitimate action by
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the district for a newly promoted administrator. Crudder has produced no evidence
that the district’s legitimate reason was a pretext for a retaliatory motive. See
Keyser v. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., 265 F.3d 741, 753 n.5 (9th Cir.
2001) (“Mere opinions and beliefs that [the employer’s] actions were retaliatory,
based on no specific or substantial evidence, are not enough to create a genuine
issue of material fact on the issue of pretext.”).
Finally, Crudder's § 1983 claim fails for the same reasons we explained
above. See Keyser, 265 F.3d at 754 (noting that, although the burden-shifting
framework does not apply, “both disparate treatment and § 1983 claims require a
showing of intentional discrimination” so that “summary judgment decisions with
regard to § 1983 claims are remarkably similar to their Title VII counterparts”);
FDIC v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471–72 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding summary
judgment for the employer on a § 1983 claim of intentional race discrimination
where there was no showing that the employer’s legitimate, non-discriminatory
reasons for its actions were pretextual).
AFFIRMED.
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