Christopher Williams v. James Schomig ( 2009 )


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  •                                                                                FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                                DEC 17 2009
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                           U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    CHRISTOPHER GARTH WILLIAMS,                      No. 08-16644
    Petitioner - Appellant,             D.C. No. 2:03-CV-00298-RCJ-RJJ
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    JAMES SCHOMIG,
    Respondent - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Nevada
    Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted December 8, 2009
    San Francisco, California
    Before: O’SCANNLAIN, RAWLINSON, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
    Appellant Christopher Williams (Williams) challenges the district court’s
    denial of his habeas petition, contending that his constitutional rights were violated
    because the jury instructions on first-degree murder did not define “willful” and
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    1
    “deliberate.” Because Williams’s habeas petition was filed after 1996, his claim is
    governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). See
    Byrd v. Lewis, 
    566 F.3d 855
    , 859 (9th Cir. 2009).
    “Under AEDPA, [Williams’s] petition can be granted only if the state court
    determination resolving his claims was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
    application of, clearly established Federal law . . .” 
    Id. (citation and
    internal
    quotation marks omitted). It is clearly established federal law as set forth by the
    Supreme Court, that an instructional error on an element of the offense may
    constitute a constitutional violation and that harmless error analysis is appropriate.
    See Hedgpeth v. Pulido, — U.S. —, 
    129 S. Ct. 530
    , 532 (2008); Neder v. United
    States, 
    527 U.S. 1
    , 8 (1999); In re Winship, 
    397 U.S. 358
    , 364 (1970). In
    “determining whether a constitutional error is harmless,” the test “is whether it
    appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute
    to the verdict obtained.” 
    Neder, 527 U.S. at 15
    (citations and internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    The trial court erred in giving the Kazalyn1 instruction to the jury. Nika v.
    State, 
    198 P.3d 839
    (Nev. 2008). However, the Nevada Supreme Court’s denial of
    1
    The instruction given was derived from Kazalyn v. State, 
    825 P.2d 578
    (Nev. 1992), and made no distinction among the first-degree murder elements of
    premeditation, deliberation and willfulness.
    2
    Williams’s instructional error claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable
    application of governing Supreme Court precedent. Overwhelming evidence in the
    record convinces us beyond a reasonable doubt that use of the Kazayln instruction
    did not affect the verdict. See 
    Neder, 527 U.S. at 19-20
    (concluding that
    instructional error is harmless where the record contained no evidence that could
    rationally lead to a contrary finding).
    Because Williams is unable to make the requisite showing, we decline to
    expand the certificate of appealability. See Mendez v. Knowles, 
    556 F.3d 757
    , 770-
    71 (9th Cir. 2009).
    AFFIRMED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-16644

Judges: , O'Scannlain, Rawlinson

Filed Date: 12/17/2009

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024