Mario Catalan v. Anthony Hedgpeth ( 2013 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 18 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARIO CATALAN, No. 09-56726
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:08-cv-07831-GAF-
RNB
v.
ANTHONY HEDGPETH, Warden, MEMORANDUM*
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Gary A. Feess, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 8, 2013**
Pasadena, California
Before: BENAVIDES,*** BYBEE, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Fortunato P. Benavides, Senior Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Mario Catalan appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, and
we affirm.
Catalan was tried jointly with Jose Ledesma in connection with two
murders. Both defendants were implicated in the first murder, but only Ledesma
was implicated in the second murder. After testifying at a pre-trial hearing, a
witness to the second murder was murdered. Ledesma had previously solicited the
witness’s murder. At trial, the prosecution was allowed to present evidence of
Ledesma’s solicitation of the witness’s murder, but was not allowed to present
evidence of the witness’s murder. The jury heard the witness’s testimony from the
pre-trial hearing and was told only that the witness was “unavailable.”
During jury deliberations, Juror No. 12 informed the trial court that Juror
No. 3 had learned of the witness’s murder on the Internet and had told Juror No. 12
about it. Juror No. 3 had also told Juror No. 4 about the murder. Juror No. 3 was
dismissed for misconduct, and Juror No. 12 was dismissed because he did not think
he could be impartial after learning of the witness’s murder. Over defense
counsel’s objection, Juror No. 4, who averred that she could still be impartial, was
allowed to remain on the jury.
2
Catalan first claims that the California Court of Appeal’s decision that there
was no constitutional error in the trial court’s failure to presume that Juror No. 4
was prejudiced and dismiss her accordingly was contrary to, or an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
There is no Supreme Court case, however, that clearly establishes any principle
dictating that the trial court was obliged to presume that Juror No. 4 was prejudiced
in these circumstances. The only Supreme Court cases that Catalan cites in support
of this argument are insufficiently on-point for us to conclude that the California
Court of Appeal was objectively unreasonable in not applying those cases in these
circumstances to find constitutional error based on the trial court’s failure to
presume prejudice. See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785–86 (2011).
This is particularly true given that the Supreme Court has emphasized the
circumstance-specific nature of presumed-prejudice inquiries. See, e.g., Marshall
v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312 (1959) (per curiam).
Catalan also claims that the California Court of Appeal’s failure to find
constitutional error was based on an unreasonable determination of fact. See 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Specifically, he claims that it was unreasonable for the
California Court of Appeal to conclude that Juror No. 4 remained unbiased after
learning of the witness’s murder. This assertion rests only on (1) the nature of the
3
information learned, and (2) the fact that Juror No. 12 was admittedly biased after
learning this same information. But different people may react differently to the
same information, and it is not impossible to believe that a juror could set aside
knowledge of a witness’s murder and remain unbiased. At most, “[r]easonable
minds reviewing the record might disagree about” whether Juror No.4 could
remain unbiased upon learning of the witness’s murder, which is insufficient to
satisfy the demands of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301
(2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Since Catalan has failed to demonstrate that the California Court of Appeal
ran afoul of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the district court was correct in denying Catalan’s
habeas petition.
AFFIRMED.
4