Gary Kendall v. Department of Veterans Affairs ( 2009 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             DEC 30 2009
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    GARY OWEN KENDALL,                              No. 08-35560
    Plaintiff - Appellant,             D.C. No. 07-cv-00103-EJL-LMB
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS
    AFFAIRS; et al.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Idaho
    Edward J. Lodge, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted December 15, 2009 **
    Before:     GOODWIN, WALLACE, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
    Gary Owen Kendall appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
    dismissing pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. 1915(e) his action
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    GT/Research
    against the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) and VA officials alleging
    improper denial of benefits and infliction of emotional distress. We have
    jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Barren v.
    Harrington, 
    152 F.3d 1193
    , 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order), and we affirm in part,
    and vacate and remand in part, with instructions to the district court to enter
    judgment of dismissal without prejudice.
    The district court properly dismissed Kendall’s claims concerning the
    denials of benefits by the VA because the district court lacked subject matter
    jurisdiction as to those claims. See 38 U.S.C. § 511(a); Tietjen v. U.S. Veterans
    Admin., 
    884 F.2d 514
    , 515 (9th Cir. 1989) (order) (affirming dismissal for lack of
    subject matter jurisdiction where the district court “properly examined the
    substance of [the plaintiff’s] action to ascertain whether it challenge[d] a decision
    . . . concerning a benefit provided by a law administered by the Veterans
    Administration”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Rosen v. Walters, 
    719 F.2d 1422
    , 1424 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[W]e are aware of no cases which permit review,
    collaterally or otherwise, of a VA decision to deny benefits.”).
    However, because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction,
    Kendall’s claims concerning the denials of benefits should have been dismissed
    GT/Research                                2                                      08-35560
    without prejudice. See Kelly v. Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 
    377 F.3d 1034
    , 1036 (9th
    Cir. 2004).
    The district court properly dismissed the medical malpractice claim without
    prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Kendall did not allege in
    his complaint that he filed an administrative claim with the VA before filing suit.
    See Jerves v. United States, 
    966 F.2d 517
    , 519 (9th Cir. 1992) (“A tort claimant
    may not commence proceedings in court against the United States without first
    filing [a] claim with an appropriate federal agency. . . . We have repeatedly held
    that this claim requirement . . . is jurisdictional in nature and may not be waived.”)
    (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
    Kendall’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
    We deny Kendall’s “motion for order summary judgment and motion for
    order of remand to trial.”
    The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
    AFFIRMED in part, and VACATED and REMANDED in part, with
    instructions to the district court to enter judgment of dismissal without
    prejudice.
    GT/Research                                3                                    08-35560