Wayne Schulte v. City of Los Angeles , 361 F. App'x 748 ( 2010 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 05 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WAYNE SCHULTE, No. 08-56056
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:07-cv-03431-JFW-JTL
v.
MEMORANDUM *
CITY OF LOS ANGELES; JAIME
MEJIA; GERALD HOLTZ,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 8, 2009
Pasadena, California
Before: PREGERSON, NOONAN and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Wayne Schulte appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to Defendants-Appellees Jamie Mejia (“Mejia”), Gerald Holtz
(“Holtz”) and the City of Los Angeles (“City”) in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Nolan v. Heald
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Coll., 551 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 2009). We have jurisdiction over the district
court’s final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
In analyzing Schulte’s § 1983 claims against Mejia and Holtz, we employ
the familiar analysis mandated by the Supreme Court in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194 (2001), namely to determine whether (a) the facts that the plaintiff has alleged
make out a constitutional violation, and (b) if so, whether the constitutional right at
issue was clearly established at the time of the violation. Id. at 201. Under
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. ----, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009), we are “permitted to
exercise [our] sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified
immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the
particular case at hand.” Id. at 818.
We agree with the district court that, under the circumstances, Mejia and
Holtz could have reasonably believed in light of all the circumstances that they
confronted that their conduct did not violate the Constitution. See Saucier, 533
U.S. at 202 (“The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is
clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his
conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”). The officers are thus
entitled to qualified immunity, and we need not address whether Schulte has
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alleged sufficient facts to make out a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.
Thus, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the officers.
Turning to Schulte’s claims under Monell that the City maintained
unconstitutional policies and customs and failed to properly train, supervise or
discipline its employees, see Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690
(1978), we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The only
evidence that Schulte presented demonstrating the City’s customs or policies with
respect to warrantless entries was Mejia’s testimony that he was acting pursuant to
his LAPD training when he entered Schulte’s home. Even if such evidence were
sufficient to demonstrate that Mejia did not receive proper training, evidence of a
single officer’s training is insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to the
Monell liability of a municipality. Alexander v. City and County of San Francisco,
29 F.3d 1355, 1368 (9th Cir. 1994).
AFFIRMED.
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