Felipe Espino-Castillo v. Eric Holder, Jr. , 770 F.3d 861 ( 2014 )


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  •                 FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    FELIPE ESPINO-CASTILLO,                  No. 13-70756
    Petitioner,
    Agency No.
    v.                       A205-414-449
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney
    General,                                  OPINION
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Argued and Submitted
    September 11, 2014—San Francisco, California
    Filed October 29, 2014
    Before: J. Clifford Wallace, Mary M. Schroeder,
    and William A. Fletcher, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Schroeder
    2                 ESPINO-CASTILLO V. HOLDER
    SUMMARY*
    Immigration
    The panel denied Felipe Espino-Castillo’s petition for
    review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision finding
    that his state law forgery conviction qualified as a crime
    involving moral turpitude.
    The panel held that petitioner’s conviction under Arizona
    Revised Statutes § 13-2002 constituted a categorical crime
    involving moral turpitude because the statute criminalizes
    conduct that constitutes fraud. The panel held that the
    exception in Beltran-Tirado v. INS, 
    213 F.3d 1179
     (9th Cir.
    2000), to the clearly established rule that a fraud conviction
    is a CIMT did not apply to this offense, where the underlying
    conduct involved the use of false information to obtain
    employment.
    COUNSEL
    Hugo F. Larios (argued), Hugo F. Larios Law, PLLC, Tempe,
    Arizona, for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division,
    Blair T. O’Connor, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration
    Litigation, Edward C. Durant and Jonathan Robbins (argued),
    United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. for
    Respondent.
    *
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    ESPINO-CASTILLO V. HOLDER                     3
    OPINION
    SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:
    In this petition for review of a Board of Immigration
    Appeals’ (“BIA”) order of removal, the novel question is
    whether Congress has exempted state fraud convictions from
    characterization as crimes involving moral turpitude, when
    the underlying conduct involved fraud in an application for
    employment. We hold Congress has not.
    Petitioner relies on our decision in Beltran-Tirado v. INS,
    
    213 F.3d 1179
     (9th Cir. 2000), where we considered an
    amendment to the social security laws that granted immunity
    from prosecution for longstanding resident aliens who used
    a false social security number to obtain employment. We
    held the amendment expressed congressional intent that such
    conduct did not establish moral turpitude for immigration
    purposes. We have never applied Beltran-Tirado’s holding
    outside the social security context. We therefore deny the
    petition.
    BACKGROUND
    Petitioner Felipe Espino-Castillo is a native and citizen of
    Mexico who entered the United States in approximately 1992
    without admission or parole. He has lived in this country
    continuously since that time. In 2012, he was convicted in
    the Superior Court of Maricopa County, Arizona, of two
    counts of forgery in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes
    § 13-2002. Petitioner was promptly charged in immigration
    proceedings with being an alien who has been convicted of a
    crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”) under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1182
    (a)(2)(A)(i)(I). He admitted his removability under a
    4              ESPINO-CASTILLO V. HOLDER
    different provision, but denied that he had been convicted of
    a CIMT and argued he was therefore eligible for cancellation
    of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (barring aliens
    convicted of a CIMT from cancellation of removal).
    The Immigration Judge denied the application for
    cancellation in November 2012, finding that he was ineligible
    for such relief because his forgery conviction constituted a
    CIMT. The BIA affirmed, and this petition for review
    followed. Whether a conviction is a CIMT is a question of
    law which this court has jurisdiction to review de novo. See
    Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 
    558 F.3d 903
    , 911 (9th Cir.
    2009).
    Petitioner was convicted under section 13-2002 of the
    Arizona Revised Statutes, which provides in relevant part:
    [A] person commits forgery if, with intent to
    defraud, the person:
    1. Falsely makes, completes, or alters a
    written instrument; or
    2. Knowingly possesses a forged instrument;
    or
    3. Offers or presents, whether accepted or not,
    a forged instrument that contains false
    information.
    
    Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2002
    (A) (2014) (emphasis added). The
    statute criminalizes conduct that constitutes fraud. Petitioner
    does not now dispute the proposition that fraud is generally
    a CIMT. We have repeatedly recognized the “longstanding
    ESPINO-CASTILLO V. HOLDER                    5
    rule that crimes that have fraud as an element . . . are
    categorically crimes involving moral turpitude.” Planes v.
    Holder, 
    652 F.3d 991
    , 997–98 (9th Cir. 2011); see, e.g.,
    Goldeshtein v. INS, 
    8 F.3d 645
    , 647 (9th Cir. 1993). The only
    issue on appeal is whether, under this court’s decision in
    Beltran-Tirado, petitioner’s conviction should not be
    considered a CIMT because the underlying conduct involved
    the use of false information to obtain employment.
    DISCUSSION
    In Beltran-Tirado, the petitioner had been convicted in
    federal court of using a false social security number in
    violation of the predecessor to 
    42 U.S.C. § 408
    (a)(7)(B).
    
    213 F.3d at 1182
    . For nineteen years she had used a social
    security card, found on a bus, to establish credit and obtain
    employment, until her income brought her to the attention of
    federal authorities. 
    Id.
     When faced with deportation
    proceedings in 1993, Beltran sought to apply for relief under
    the registry statute, 
    8 U.S.C. § 1259
    . 
    Id.
     That statute was
    enacted to provide relief to persons who had resided in the
    United States for a long period of time and possessed “good
    moral character.” 
    Id. at 1183
    . The BIA denied the
    application on the ground that her fraud conviction was a
    CIMT that prevented her from showing good moral character.
    
    Id.
    On review of the BIA order, this court held that Beltran’s
    conviction was not a CIMT. 
    Id. at 1184
    . We did so by
    looking at a 1990 amendment to § 408 that exempted a
    category of aliens from prosecution for the crime of using a
    false social security number. Id. at 1183–84; 
    42 U.S.C. § 408
    (e) (2012) (previously numbered § 408(d)). Those
    exempted were persons who had been granted permanent
    6              ESPINO-CASTILLO V. HOLDER
    resident status under longstanding amnesty or registry
    statutes. Id. at 1183–84. The legislative history of the 1990
    amendment indicated that Congress intended the exemption
    to include persons who used a false social security number in
    order to obtain employment. Id.
    Although the amendment did not exempt Beltran herself
    from prosecution, because she could not meet the deadline for
    registration, we concluded that the amendment was indicative
    of a somewhat broader congressional intent. Id. at 1184. We
    said “that § 408(d) and the accompanying legislative history
    express Congress’s intent that the crimes of which Beltran
    was convicted do not establish ‘moral turpitude.’” Id. at
    1184.
    Beltran-Tirado is grounded in the history and purpose of
    § 408, the specific federal social security statute under which
    Beltran had been convicted. We have never overruled
    Beltran-Tirado, but we have never cited its holding for any
    purpose beyond the application of that specific statute. Both
    before and after Beltran-Tirado, we have expressly and
    repeatedly rejected the argument that fraud crimes are not per
    se CIMTs. See, e.g., Planes, 
    652 F.3d at
    997–98; Navarro-
    Lopez v. Gonzales, 
    503 F.3d 1063
    , 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2007)
    (en banc) (Reinhardt, J., concurring for a majority), overruled
    on other grounds by United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca,
    
    655 F.3d 915
     (9th Cir. 2010).
    Other circuits have refused to follow Beltran-Tirado in
    any context. See Lateef v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
    592 F.3d 926
    , 930–31 (8th Cir. 2010) (declining to follow Beltran-
    Tirado because its holding extended § 408(d) beyond its plain
    statutory terms); Serrato-Soto v. Holder, 
    570 F.3d 686
    , 692
    (6th Cir. 2009) (declining to follow Beltran-Tirado in holding
    ESPINO-CASTILLO V. HOLDER                    7
    that a state conviction for using false social security number
    a CIMT); Hyder v. Keisler, 
    506 F.3d 388
    , 393 (5th Cir. 2007)
    (“We decline to follow Beltran-Tirado in exempting social
    security number misuse from CIMT status . . . . [I]n Beltran-
    Tirado, the Ninth Circuit appears to have expanded a narrow
    exemption beyond what Congress intended.”).
    Moreover, we doubt we could now expand the reasoning
    of Beltran-Tirado beyond its original scope, even if we
    wanted to. That is because the inquiry in which petitioner
    asks us to engage involves examination of the circumstances
    surrounding petitioner’s particular conviction. Because a
    conviction under 
    Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2002
    (A) requires
    intent to defraud, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
    Descamps v. United States, 
    133 S. Ct. 2276
     (2013), forecloses
    any such inquiry.
    To determine whether a petitioner’s conviction is a
    CIMT, the court applies the categorical and modified
    categorical approaches articulated by the Supreme Court in
    Taylor v. United States, 
    495 U.S. 575
    , 599–602 (1990).
    Blanco v. Mukasey, 
    518 F.3d 714
    , 718 (9th Cir. 2008). A
    court must apply the categorical approach unless the statute
    in question is divisible and proscribes multiple alternative
    elements, some of which would qualify as a CIMT and some
    of which would not. See Descamps, 
    133 S. Ct. at
    2284–85.
    A court may not apply the modified categorical approach “if
    the statute proscribes only conduct that involves moral
    turpitude.” Mendoza v. Holder, 
    623 F.3d 1299
    , 1303 (9th
    Cir. 2010). In Descamps, the Supreme Court emphasized the
    necessity of looking to the elements of the crime under the
    categorical approach, rather than to the underlying
    circumstances or motivations. See id. at 2285. The Court
    said that a “circumstance-specific review is just what the
    8               ESPINO-CASTILLO V. HOLDER
    categorical approach precludes.” Id. at 2292. Because the
    petitioner here was convicted under a statute that proscribes
    only morally turpitudinous conduct, we cannot look to the
    underlying circumstances of his crime.
    Accordingly, because Beltran-Tirado’s holding depended
    upon the history of the specific statutory provision involved
    in that case, and not a garden-variety state fraud statute like
    the one involved here, Beltran-Tirado is by its terms
    inapplicable to petitioner’s case. Further, the circumstance-
    specific approach that Beltran-Tirado took is now in tension
    with intervening and controlling Supreme Court authority.
    The case now stands, at best, as an isolated exception to the
    prevailing rule that a conviction for a fraud offense is
    categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. “Such has
    been the clearly established rule with respect to fraud since at
    least 1951.” Navarro-Lopez, 
    503 F.3d at 1074
     (Reinhardt, J.,
    concurring for a majority).
    The petition for review is DENIED.