United States v. Jerry Donovan ( 2010 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 15 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 09-30003
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 4:08-cr-00002-RRB-1
v.
MEMORANDUM *
JERRY LEE DONOVAN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska
Ralph R. Beistline, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 13, 2010 **
Seattle, Washington
Before: KLEINFELD and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges, and SETTLE,*** District
Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Benjamin H. Settle, United States District Judge for
the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
The parties are familiar with the facts and arguments in the case so we do
not repeat them here. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
affirm.
Donovan bases his evidentiary argument primarily on Alaska forfeiture law
and principles of state sovereignty. However, “evidence seized in compliance with
federal law is admissible without regard to state law.” United States v. Chavez-
Vernaza, 844 F.2d 1368, 1374 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). Cooperation and
evidence sharing between state and federal agencies does not violate principles of
state sovereignty.
Regarding the motion to suppress Donovan’s inculpatory statements, the
district court’s factual finding after conducting an evidentiary hearing that
Donovan’s testimony was not credible and its ruling that he was not subject to a
two-step interrogation were not illogical, implausible, or without support in the
record. See United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir. 2009) (en
banc) (citation omitted).
Finally, we hold that Donovan’s waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966).
Following proper Miranda warnings, Donovan acknowledged he understood the
warnings and then answered Sergeant Datta’s questions, while remaining relaxed
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and appearing coherent and rational. This is sufficient to constitute an implied
waiver as long as that waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See United
States v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1127, amended on other grounds,
416 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). The district court held that
“Donovan’s age, experience and background corroborate the court’s assessment
that he had the capacity to under[stand] the warnings given him and to exercise
those rights decidedly.” In light of the record, the district court’s finding that
Donovan understood his rights is not illogical, implausible, or unsupported. See
Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1262. The record likewise demonstrates, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that Donovan’s waiver and subsequent statements were voluntary
and were not the product of government coercion. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S.
157, 169–70 (1986) (citations omitted).
AFFIRMED.
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