Carl West v. City of Mesa , 585 F. App'x 429 ( 2014 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 14 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CARL WEST, No. 12-16811
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:12-CV-00657-JWS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CITY OF MESA and JEFFREY JACOBS,
a police Defendant for the City of Mesa/
Husband,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
UNKNOWN JACOBS, named as: Jane
Doe Jacobs/ wife and UNKNOWN
PARTIES, named as: John and Jane Does
I-X, XYZ Corporations I-X, XYZ
Partnerships I-X, and Limited Liability
Companies I-X,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
John W. Sedwick, District Judge, Presiding
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Submitted October 8, 2014**
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: D.W. NELSON, SILVERMAN, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Carl West appeals from dismissal of his complaint against the City of Mesa
and Detective Jeffrey Jacobs. We affirm in part and vacate in part the district
court’s order and remand for entry of an order consistent with this disposition.
1. The district court correctly dismissed West’s state claim for malicious
prosecution because litigation challenging West’s conviction had not yet finally
terminated in his favor. Moran v. Klatzke, 682 P.2d 1156, 1157 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1984). The same rule applies to West’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
City of Mesa and Detective Jacobs insofar as they are based on West’s prosecution.
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). It was therefore error to dismiss
West’s § 1983 claims as time-barred because that claim, like the state malicious
prosecution claim, had not yet accrued.
2. The district court correctly dismissed West’s remaining claims as
time-barred. West’s false arrest and imprisonment claims, both state and federal,
accrued when his detention was validated by legal process. Wallace v. Kato, 549
U.S. 384, 390 (2007); see Hansen v. Stoll, 636 P.2d 1236, 1242 (Ariz. Ct. App.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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1981). West’s remaining tort claims were not subject to a favorable termination
requirement, and accrued at least by the time West was convicted. West’s
complaint alleges that he was injured only by Hrbal’s coerced testimony at his
2003 trial, not by any later misconduct on the part of Detective Jacobs or the City
of Mesa. Gust, Rosenfeld & Henderson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 898 P.2d
964, 966 (Ariz. 1995) (“Under the ‘discovery rule,’ a plaintiff’s cause of action
does not accrue until the plaintiff knows or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence,
should know the facts underlying the cause.”). The limitations periods for West’s
state and federal claims are one-year and two-years, respectively. Ariz. Rev. Stat.
§ 12-541; Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-821; TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th
Cir. 1999). West was convicted on February 6, 2003, making the February 6,
2012 filing of his complaint untimely.1
3. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to
amend. The claims stemming from West’s prosecution against the City of Mesa
and Detective Jacobs could only be saved by amendment if the termination of
West’s conviction was final. At the time of the district court’s order, West’s post-
1
West’s argument on appeal that former FBI Agent Gordwin’s
indictment in 2008 tolls the limitations period also fails. This argument was not
raised before the district court, related allegations do not appear in West’s
complaint, and if the limitations period was tolled until 2008, West’s complaint
would still be untimely.
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conviction relief was not final. During the course of this appeal, however, the
litigation concerning West’s conviction terminated in his favor. Thus, on remand
West must be granted leave to amend the state and federal claims arising from his
prosecution in order to reflect the current legal status of his state conviction.
Additionally, West must be granted leave to amend his Monell claim against the
city because it is not clear on this record that he is unable to allege a policy,
custom, or practice of the City under which Detective Jacobs acted. See Eminence
Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
The remaining claims are time-barred, and thus cannot be saved by amendment.
Id.Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part and REMANDED.
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