Shane Sopher v. Michael Washington , 370 F. App'x 846 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             MAR 11 2010
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    SHANE I. SOPHER,                                 No. 08-35925
    Plaintiff - Appellant,             D.C. No. 3:05-cv-06322-HU
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    MICHAEL WASHINGTON; DIANE
    M. REA; DIANNE MIDDLE; STEVEN
    R. POWERS; DARCEY BAKER;
    CANDACE WHEELER,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Oregon
    Garr M. King, Senior District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted November 5, 2009
    Portland, Oregon
    Before:       KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, FISHER and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
    Plaintiff has correctly conceded that a state-court proceeding is “pending”
    within the meaning of Younger v. Harris, 
    401 U.S. 37
    , 41 (1971). Although
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    page 2
    plaintiff filed his federal action first, no “proceedings of substance on the merits”
    had occurred in federal court before the state action began. M&A Gabaee v. Cmty.
    Redevelopment Agency of L.A., 
    419 F.3d 1036
    , 1041 (9th Cir. 2005); see Fresh
    Int’l Corp. v. Agric. Labor Relations Bd., 
    805 F.2d 1353
    , 1358 n.5 (9th Cir. 1986).
    The pending state-court action now provides plaintiff with an adequate
    opportunity to raise his due process claim. State ex rel. Sopher v. Washington
    (Sopher VI), 
    2010 WL 174064
    , at *5–6 (Or. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2010). Adjudicating
    Sopher’s constitutional claims would “have the practical effect of enjoining” that
    proceeding through the application of preclusion rules. AmerisourceBergen Corp.
    v. Roden, 
    495 F.3d 1143
    , 1149 (9th Cir. 2007); see Gilbertson v. Albright, 
    381 F.3d 965
    , 978 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). Plaintiff does not contest that this suit
    implicates important state interests, nor could he. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 
    411 U.S. 475
    , 491–92 (1973). And, even if there were exceptional circumstances
    counseling against abstention before Sopher VI was decided, its jurisdictional
    holding in plaintiff’s favor, 
    2010 WL 174064
    , at *5–6, removes any
    “extraordinarily pressing need for immediate federal equitable relief.” Kugler v.
    Helfant, 
    421 U.S. 117
    , 125 (1975). The state courts now appear ready to “fairly
    and fully adjudicat[e] the federal issue[].” 
    Id. at 124.
    Abstaining on plaintiff’s
    page 3
    due process claim is therefore proper. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v.
    Garden State Bar Ass’n, 
    457 U.S. 423
    , 437 (1982).
    Neither did the district court err in dismissing plaintiff’s equal protection
    and ex post facto claims as time barred. Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not
    allege that defendants concealed any facts that would have prevented him from
    bringing those claims in a timely fashion. In fact, he did timely assert them in an
    earlier state-court action. Even if he hadn’t, both fraudulent concealment and
    equitable estoppel require a plaintiff to allege “some active conduct by the
    defendant above and beyond the wrongdoing upon which the plaintiff’s claim is
    filed” that then “prevent[ed] the plaintiff from suing in time.” Lukovsky v. City &
    County of S.F., 
    535 F.3d 1044
    , 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original)
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    In these claims, plaintiff faults defendants for reviewing his parole
    application under the JAM rules rather than the Matrix System. That defendants
    claimed they could not apply the Matrix System to him isn’t conduct “above and
    beyond” the wrongdoing plaintiff alleges. Whether or not defendants actually
    believed what they said, this was a legal position they announced to justify doing
    what plaintiff claims was unlawful; it was not a fact plaintiff needed to know
    page 4
    before he could bring suit. Plaintiff had all the necessary information to challenge
    defendants’ position from the moment he heard it.
    On appeal, plaintiff continues to assert only that defendants concealed what
    amounts to a legal position, not facts. It was not an abuse of discretion to deny
    leave to amend in these circumstances. See Abagninin v. AMVAC Chem. Corp.,
    
    545 F.3d 733
    , 742 (9th Cir. 2008).
    AFFIRMED.