Steven Nakash v. Nvidia Corporation , 539 F. App'x 822 ( 2013 )


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  •                                                                              FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                                SEP 04 2013
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    In re: THE NVIDIA GPU LITIGATION.               No. 11-15186
    D.C. No. 5:08-CV-04312-JW
    STEVEN NAKASH; et al.,
    Plaintiffs - Appellees,           MEMORANDUM*
    v.
    NVIDIA CORPORATION,
    Defendant - Appellee,
    v.
    FRANK BARBARA,
    Objector - Appellant.
    In re: THE NVIDIA GPU LITIGATION.               No. 11-15190
    D.C. No. 5:08-CV-04312-JW
    STEVEN NAKASH; et al.,
    Plaintiffs - Appellees,
    v.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    STEVEN F. HELFAND,
    Objector - Appellant,
    v.
    NVIDIA CORPORATION; et al.,
    Defendants - Appellees,
    v.
    APPLE INC.,
    Third-party-defendant -
    Appellee.
    In re: THE NVIDIA GPU LITIGATION.         No. 11-15191
    D.C. No. 5:08-CV-04312-JW
    STEVEN NAKASH; et al.,
    Plaintiffs - Appellees,
    v.
    CHASE A. THOMPSON,
    Objector - Appellant,
    v.
    NVIDIA CORPORATION; et al.,
    Defendants - Appellees,
    2
    v.
    APPLE INC.,
    Third-party-defendant -
    Appellee.
    In re: THE NVIDIA GPU LITIGATION.            No. 11-15192
    D.C. No. 5:08-CV-04312-JW
    STEVEN NAKASH; et al.,
    Plaintiffs - Appellees,
    v.
    NIKKI JOHNSON,
    Objector - Appellant,
    v.
    NVIDIA CORPORATION; et al.,
    Defendants - Appellees,
    v.
    APPLE INC.,
    Third-party-defendant -
    Appellee.
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    3
    for the Northern District of California
    James Ware, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted August 13, 2013
    San Francisco, California
    Before: GRABER, BEA, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
    This is a nationwide class action involving claims by purchasers of
    computers containing allegedly defective graphics processing units designed and
    sold by Defendant NVIDIA Corporation. The district court approved a settlement
    and awarded attorney fees. Nine objectors timely appeal. We affirm.
    1. The district court did not abuse its discretion, Radcliffe v. Experian Info.
    Solutions Inc., 
    715 F.3d 1157
    , 1162 (9th Cir. 2013), in approving the settlement.
    Claimants whose computers exhibit problems can receive replacement computers
    or motherboards or be reimbursed for the costs of repairing their computers.
    Accordingly, the settlement provides "fundamentally fair, adequate and
    reasonable" relief. Torrisi v. Tucson Electric Power Co., 
    8 F.3d 1370
    , 1375 (9th
    Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    (a) Some objectors argue that the district court abused its discretion in
    approving a settlement that provides no remedy to class members who discarded
    their defective computers or who bought replacements. But such members could
    opt out to preserve their claims. Additionally, class members who discarded
    4
    computers could pursue relief through other litigation under Amendment 3 to the
    settlement. The fact that the other litigation was ultimately unsuccessful does not
    show that the district court abused its discretion here. Finally, we note that the
    record shows only 5 objectors who asserted that they had abandoned their
    computers, after individual notice was given to about 5 million consumers; in the
    absence of any evidence that there is a substantial group affected, the settlement
    remains reasonable.
    (b) One objector argues that the settlement was unfair because consumers
    must be able to prove purchase of one of the affected computers. This is a
    reasonable requirement to prevent fraud, and it recognizes the weakness of the
    claim of any purported class member who lacks any documentation of purchase.
    Similarly, the requirement that class members send in a computer for replacement
    or repair is a reasonable method of preventing fraud.
    (c) Some objectors assert that the settlement was a product of collusion
    between Plaintiffs and Defendant. The record fails to bear out this claim. Class
    members received substantial benefits under the settlement. Class certification was
    litigated vigorously, and extensive discovery occurred before a settlement
    agreement was reached. Moreover, mediation services were required to achieve
    the settlement. See, e.g., Jones v. GN Netcom, Inc. (In re Bluetooth Headset Prods.
    5
    Liab. Litig.), 
    654 F.3d 935
    , 948 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that the use of a "neutral
    mediator" is "a factor weighing in favor of a finding of non-collusiveness").
    2. The district court did not abuse its discretion, Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust
    Funds v. Amgen Inc., 
    660 F.3d 1170
    , 1174–75 (9th Cir. 2011), in certifying the
    class.
    (a) One objector asserts that the class definition is too indefinite because it
    will require a "mini-trial" to determine whether claimants fall within the class. But
    the settlement procedure requires only the submission of a simple claim form along
    with documentation of eligibility for relief, to be reviewed by the settlement
    administrator. The class definition is detailed and clear and does not require mini-
    trials.
    (b) One objector argues that differences in states’ consumer class-action
    laws preclude the named plaintiffs from meeting the predominance and adequate
    representation requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b). We
    note, though, that almost all claims arise under California law, even for class
    members who reside in other states. Moreover, Rule 23 does not require that a
    class share identical legal claims where, as here, the common question of fact
    applicable to all class members—whether the computer chip was defective and, if
    so, whether it caused the problems that some buyers experienced—is the core of
    6
    the case. Thus, the named plaintiffs’ claims fairly encompass the class claims,
    Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 
    131 S. Ct. 2541
    , 2550 (2011), and the proposed
    class is "sufficiently cohesive," Wang v. Chinese Daily News, Inc., 
    709 F.3d 829
    ,
    835 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    3. The class notice was adequate. See Torrisi, 
    8 F.3d at 1374
     (holding that
    we review adequacy de novo). A class settlement must provide the best notice
    practicable, including individual notice where reasonable. Fed. R. Civ. P.
    23(c)(2)(B). "Notice is satisfactory if it generally describes the terms of the
    settlement in sufficient detail to alert those with adverse viewpoints to investigate
    and to come forward and be heard." Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Electric, 
    361 F.3d 566
    , 575 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    (a) Some objectors argue that the notice was inadequate because the
    settlement’s website summary failed to clarify whether class members who
    received their computers as gifts qualified for relief. This claim was waived
    because it was not presented to the district court. O’Guinn v. Lovelock Corr. Ctr.,
    
    502 F.3d 1056
    , 1063 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007). Even if the claim was not waived,
    though, the website linked to not just a summary, but also the entire court-
    approved notice. Moreover, as noted, individual notice was sent to about 5 million
    7
    consumers, and full notice was published in USA Today and various other print
    media.
    (b) One objector argues that Amendment 2 changed the definition of the
    class without notice to owners of Dell computers. Amendment 2 did not change
    the class definition or include any persons or computers not encompassed by the
    notice. Thus we see no risk that the amendment caused any un-notified class
    members to release claims.
    (c) Some objectors argue that the notice failed to explain sufficiently which
    HP computers would entitle class members to the replacement remedy. But they
    fail to identify any specific deficiency in the notice.
    4. The district court did not abuse its discretion, In re Bluetooth Headset,
    
    654 F.3d at 940
    , in approving a negotiated award of $13 million in attorney fees.
    Although the award is large, it is proportional to the time spent by counsel under
    the lodestar method that the district court used; counsel provided an accounting of
    more than $10 million worth of time (well over 20,000 hours). The court
    permissibly took into account such factors as the vigor and length of litigation, the
    complexity of issues, the risk that Plaintiffs would have recovered less or nothing
    through further litigation, the significant benefits to class members, and the
    mediator’s opinion that the amount was fair and reasonable.
    8
    5. We have reviewed the remaining arguments carefully, and we find no
    error.
    AFFIRMED.
    9