Bullion Monarch Mining, Inc. v. Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc. , 686 F.3d 1041 ( 2012 )


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  •                    FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    BULLION MONARCH MINING, INC.,                No. 11-15479
    Plaintiff-Appellant,              D.C. No.
    v.                             3:09-cv-00612-
    BARRICK GOLDSTRIKE MINES, INC.,                ECR-VPC
    District of Nevada,
    Defendant-Appellee.
               Reno
    ORDER
    CERTIFYING
    A QUESTION TO
    THE NEVADA
       SUPREME COURT
    Filed June 13, 2012
    Before: Sidney R. Thomas, M. Margaret McKeown, and
    William A. Fletcher, Circuit Judges.
    ORDER
    We respectfully certify to the Nevada Supreme Court the
    questions of law set forth in Section III of this order, pursuant
    to Nevada Rule of Appellate Procedure 5. The answer will be
    determinative of an issue pending before this court, and there
    is no clearly controlling precedent in the decisions of the
    Nevada Supreme Court.
    I.   Background
    Plaintiff-Appellant Bullion Monarch Mining, Inc.
    (“Bullion”) alleges that Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc.
    (“Barrick”) owes Bullion mineral royalty payments pursuant
    6761
    6762                   BULLION v. BARRICK
    to an area-of-interest provision contained in a 1979 agree-
    ment. According to Bullion, its predecessor-in-interest and
    several other entities entered into the agreement with a mine
    operator, Barrick’s predecessor-in-interest, to develop mining
    claims in the Carlin Trend in Nevada.
    The agreement contains an area-of-interest provision
    requiring the operator to pay Bullion a royalty on production
    from mining claims the operator might subsequently acquire
    within the area of interest. The agreement restricts Bullion’s
    ability to purchase or develop mineral interests in the area of
    interest. Under the agreement, Bullion is to receive royalty
    payments on production from after-acquired claims in the area
    of interest for ninety-nine years.
    Bullion filed suit in Nevada federal district court seeking
    royalty payments on production from after-acquired claims in
    the area of interest. Barrick contended that the area-of-interest
    provision is void under the Rule Against Perpetuities. Bullion
    contended that the Rule does not apply to royalties on produc-
    tion from after-acquired claims within an area of interest. In
    the alternative, Bullion sought reformation of the agreement
    under Nevada Revised Statute § 111.1039(2).
    The district court granted summary judgment to Barrick
    based on the Rule Against Perpetuities. Bullion timely
    appealed.
    II.   Discussion
    A.   Applicability of the Rule Against Perpetuities
    The Nevada Constitution expressly adopts the Rule Against
    Perpetuities. Nev. Const. art. 15 § 4 (“No perpetuities shall be
    allowed except for eleemosynary [charitable] purposes.”).
    Nevada courts have interpreted this constitutional provision as
    applying the common law Rule Against Perpetuities. See Sar-
    razin v. First Nat’l Bank of Nev., 
    111 P.2d 49
    , 51 (Nev. 1941)
    BULLION v. BARRICK                    6763
    (“‘No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later
    than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation
    of the interest.’ ” (citing John Chipman Gray, The Rule
    Against Perpetuities, § 201 (3d ed. 1915))).
    The Nevada legislature enacted a Statutory Rule Against
    Perpetuities in 1987. 
    Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 111.103-1039
    . The
    statute, however, purports to affect only interests created on
    or after July 1, 1987. 
    Id.
     § 111.1039(1).
    The Nevada Supreme Court has not addressed the question
    whether the Rule Against Perpetuities applies to an area-of-
    interest provision in a mining agreement. Cf. Hennessey v.
    Price, 
    604 P.2d 355
    , 357 (Nev. 1980) (declining to reach the
    perpetuities defense because it was not raised as a defense
    below); Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Mkts., Inc. v. Incline Vill.,
    Inc., 
    517 P.2d 786
    , 788 (Nev. 1973) (same); Nev. ex rel. Bren-
    nan v. Bownman, 
    503 P.2d 454
    , 456-57 (Nev. 1972) (noting
    that Nevada’s constitution exempts charitable gifts from the
    Rule Against Perpetuities); Mohr Park Manor, Inc. v. Mohr,
    
    424 P.2d 101
    , 105-06 (Nev. 1967) (noting, and rejecting,
    potential perpetuities problem with a real estate option con-
    tract); Tsirikos v. Hatton, 
    116 P.2d 189
    , 191 (Nev. 1941)
    (analyzing applicability of the Rule Against Perpetuities in the
    construction of a will); Sarrazin, 111 P.2d at 51 (same),
    Aikins v. Nev. Placer, 
    13 P.2d 1103
    , 1105-06 (Nev. 1932)
    (analyzing a challenge to a mining claim option contract
    under the Rule Against Perpetuities); Nixon v. Brown, 
    214 P. 524
    , 531 (Nev. 1923) (applying charitable exception to the
    Rule Against Perpetuities); Hunter v. Sutton, 
    205 P. 785
    , 789
    (Nev. 1922) (finding it unnecessary to reach the Rule Against
    Perpetuities issue); In re Hartung’s Estate, 
    160 P. 782
    , 784
    (Nev. 1916) (applying charitable exception to the Rule
    Against Perpetuities).
    The parties have particularly directed our attention to two
    out-of-state cases. An Indiana court applied the Rule Against
    Perpetuities to an area-of-interest provision, holding that “roy-
    6764                   BULLION v. BARRICK
    alty interests are real property interests which vest immedi-
    ately in the royalty holder only to the extent that such interests
    are granted in property owned by the grantor at the time of
    conveyance, otherwise such royalty interests will not vest
    until acquisition by the grantor.” Wedel v. Am. Elect. Power
    Serv., 
    681 N.E. 2d 1122
    , 1137-38 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). Wedel
    treats an area-of-interest royalty as a contingent, future inter-
    est because it is uncertain, at the time the agreement is signed,
    whether and when any claims will be acquired within the area
    of interest. Wedel holds that an area-of-interest provision vio-
    lates the Rule if the period between the signing of the agree-
    ment and the acquisition of the claim may exceed the
    applicable perpetuities period.
    A Missouri court reached the opposite conclusion, holding
    that the Rule Against Perpetuities does not apply to an area-
    of-interest provision because such a provision “tends to pro-
    mote, not inhibit, the leasing of the minerals and hence, the
    profitable use of land.” Commerce Bank of Kansas City, N.A.
    v. Peabody Coal Co., 
    861 S.W.2d 569
    , 571 (Mo. Ct. App.
    1993) (citing Charles Meyers, The Effect of the Rule Against
    Perpetuities on Perpetual Non-Participating Royalty and Kin-
    dred Interests, 
    32 Tex. L. Rev. 369
     (1954)). The Sixth Circuit
    adopted the reasoning of Commerce Bank in an unpublished
    memorandum disposition. Willits v. Peabody Coal Co., 
    188 F.3d 510
     (Table), 
    1999 WL 701916
    , at *19-20 (6th Cir.
    1999).
    The Missouri court pointed out the uneasy fit between the
    Rule Against Perpetuities and area-of-interest provisions. The
    classic aims of the Rule Against Perpetuities are two-fold:
    First, the Rule seeks to limit the dead-hand control of grantors
    in the settlement of family estates. Second, and relatedly, it
    seeks to limit the period during which property can be ren-
    dered inalienable. See, e.g., Meyers, 32 Tex. L. Rev. at 416
    (“ ‘Excessively long family settlements were the threat which
    produced the Rule; and the period of perpetuities was tailored
    to fit the needs of family gift transactions.’ ” (quoting W. Bar-
    BULLION v. BARRICK                    6765
    ton Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule’s
    Reign of Terror, 
    65 Harv. L. Rev. 721
    , 725-26 (1952))). Area-
    of-interest provisions are contained in commercial agreements
    rather than in family property settlements. Further, area-of-
    interest provisions do not limit alienability of either the under-
    lying estate or the royalty interest. In this sense, one may even
    question whether area-of-interest provisions create property
    interests, as they create enforceable rights only against the
    contracting parties. According to Dean Meyers, royalty inter-
    ests such as those contained in area-of-interest agreements
    encourage the productive use of mineral land because individ-
    ual owners may not have sufficient capital to fully exploit
    subsurface minerals, gas, or oil, such that the power to
    explore and develop land is often placed in the hands of a sin-
    gle operator. Id. at 420 (“[T]he policy of the Rule against Per-
    petuities is fostered, not infringed, by sustaining the executive
    right, which keeps the power to lease in the hands of a single
    person.”).
    We are not in a position to predict with confidence whether
    the Nevada Supreme Court would agree with the analysis of
    Wedel, with that of Commerce Bank, or with that of some
    other decision.
    B.     Reformation
    In the alternative, Bullion argues that if its royalty interest
    in after-acquired claims in the area of interest violates the
    Rule, Nevada’s Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities gives a
    court the power to reform the agreement. The Nevada
    Supreme Court has not published an opinion addressing this
    question.
    III.        Questions of Law
    We certify two questions to the Nevada Supreme Court:
    6766                   BULLION v. BARRICK
    1. Under Nevada law, does the Rule Against Perpetuities
    apply to an area-of-interest provision in a commercial mining
    agreement?
    2. If the Rule Against Perpetuities does apply, is reforma-
    tion available under Nevada Revised Statute § 111.1039(2)?
    We recognize that the Nevada Supreme Court may, in its
    discretion, reword the certified questions. Palmer v. Pioneer
    Inn Assocs. Ltd., 
    59 P.3d 1237
    , 1238 (Nev. 2002) (per curiam)
    (rephrasing and answering our certified question).
    IV.   Conclusion
    This appeal presents issues of Nevada state law that will be
    determinative of an issue essential to the parties’ dispute. In
    our view, there is no clearly controlling precedent of the
    Nevada Supreme Court. For this reason, we request that the
    Nevada Supreme Court accept and decide the question(s)
    herein certified. We agree to abide by the Nevada Supreme
    Court’s decision as specified by Rule 5 of the Nevada Rules
    of Appellate Procedure, which states that “[t]he written opin-
    ion of the Supreme Court stating the law governing the ques-
    tion certified . . . shall be res judicata as to the parties.” Nev.
    R. App. P. 5(h)
    The Clerk of this court is hereby directed to file in the
    Nevada Supreme Court, under official seal of the Ninth Cir-
    cuit Court of Appeals, copies of all relevant briefs and an
    original and ten copies of this request with certificate of ser-
    vice on the parties. The opening brief remains under seal dur-
    ing the period of certification to the Nevada Supreme Court.
    All further proceedings in this case are stayed pending
    receipt of the answer from the Nevada Supreme Court. This
    appeal is withdrawn from submission and will be resubmitted
    after receipt of the Nevada Supreme Court’s opinion. The
    panel retains jurisdiction over further proceedings in this
    BULLION v. BARRICK                      6767
    court. The parties are directed to notify the Clerk of this court
    within one week after the Nevada Supreme Court accepts or
    rejects the certification, and if it accepts certification, again to
    notify this court within one week after that court renders its
    opinion.
    If the Nevada Supreme Court accepts certification,
    Plaintiff-Appellant Bullion shall be the appellant in that court,
    and Defendant-Appellee Barrick shall be the respondent. As
    required by Nevada Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(c)(5), the
    names and addresses of counsel appear in the appendix.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    Respectfully submitted, Sidney R. Thomas, M. Margaret
    McKeown, William A. Fletcher, Circuit Judges.
    6768                BULLION v. BARRICK
    APPENDIX
    Clayton P. Brust, Robison, Belaustegui, Sharp & Low, 71
    Washington Street, Reno, NV 89503, for the plaintiff-
    appellant. Francis M. Wikstrom, Michael P. Petrogeorge,
    Brandon J. Mark, Parsons, Behle & Latimer, 201 South
    Maine Street, Suite 1800, Salt Lake City, UT 84111; Michael
    R. Kealy, Parsons Behle & Latimer, 50 West Liberty Street,
    Suite 750, Reno NV 89501, for the defendants-appellees.