William St. Clair v. Andrew Saul ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 27 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WILLIAM R. ST. CLAIR, No. 17-35907
Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 16-cv-05841 TLF
v. MEMORANDUM*
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Theresa Lauren Fricke, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 23, 2019**
Before: GOODWIN, LEAVY, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
William St. Clair appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of St. Clair’s application for
supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We review de novo,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Attmore v. Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2016), and we affirm.
The ALJ did not err by discounting St. Clair’s testimony because the record
contains evidence of malingering. See Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533
F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008) (adverse credibility finding need not be based on
clear and convincing evidence where there is affirmative evidence that the claimant
is malingering).
The ALJ did not err by discounting examining physician Dr. Chestnut’s
opinion on the basis that the limitations Dr. Chestnut opined would not last for at
least twelve months. See 48 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A).
The ALJ did not violate the law of the case doctrine in discounting the
opinions of examining psychologist Dr. van Dam and examining physician Dr.
Parker. See Stacy v. Colvin, 825 F.3d 563, 567 (9th Cir. 2016) (the law of the case
doctrine prevents a court from considering an issue that has already been decided).
The prior remand did not require the acceptance of these opinions, only a better
evaluation of them.
St. Clair has not identified any specific error in the ALJ’s evaluation of the
opinions of mental health counselor Wilson, examining physician Dr. Wheeler, or
consulting physician Dr. Carsten that would impact St. Clair’s Residual Functional
Capacity (“RFC”). See Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929-
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30 (9th Cir. 2003) (party must argue an issue “specifically and distinctly” to invoke
this court’s review).
Because the ALJ found that St. Clair was more limited than Drs. Clifford
and Eather opined, the ALJ was not required to provide reasons for assigning only
“some weight” to their opinions. See Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 613 F.3d
1217, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 2010).
The ALJ proffered germane reasons for discounting lay witness testimony
from vocational counselor Schneider. See Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1164 (ALJ may
rely on inconsistencies between lay testimony and other evidence in the record to
discount the testimony).
Even if the ALJ erred by discounting lay witness testimony from St. Clair’s
parents, Lee and Sandra St. Clair, because of their secondary gain interests, any
error was harmless because St. Clair has not articulated any symptoms or
limitations that the ALJ failed to include in the RFC from their testimony. See
Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115.
Even if the ALJ erred by finding at Step Four that St. Clair was able to
perform past relevant work as a floor waxer, any error was harmless because the
ALJ made an alternative Step Five finding. See id.
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St. Clair’s assertion that the ALJ erred in formulating the hypothetical for
the vocational expert by failing to include all of St. Clair’s limitations fails because
this argument stems from other alleged errors that we have rejected.
AFFIRMED.
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