United States v. Alex Medrano ( 2019 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    AUG 27 2019
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No.   18-50168
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                D.C. No. 2:14-cr-00556-R-1
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    ALEX ROMERO MEDRANO, AKA
    Dreamer,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted August 16, 2019**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: CALLAHAN and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and CHEN,*** District
    Judge.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Edward M. Chen, United States District Judge for the
    Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
    Alex Medrano pleaded guilty to distribution of methamphetamine, and was
    originally sentenced to probation.1 The government appealed that sentence as
    incompatible with the five-year statutory mandatory minimum sentence established
    for his crime of conviction. We agreed with the government, and remanded for
    resentencing “in accordance with the mandatory minimum[.]” United States v.
    Medrano, 714 F. App’x 765, 766 (9th Cir. 2018). On remand, the district court
    imposed a five-year term of imprisonment. Medrano now appeals his revised
    custodial sentence. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and we
    affirm.
    Medrano cites United States v. Arrellano-Rios, 
    799 F.2d 520
    , 523 (9th Cir.
    1986), for the proposition that an increased sentence imposed after a defendant has
    fully served a lawful sentence violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. Medrano
    overlooks that his original sentence was not lawfully imposed, as we clearly
    articulated in our memorandum disposition remanding this case for resentencing.
    See Medrano, 714 F. App’x at 766. Our case law distinguishes an unlawful first
    sentence from a lawful one, and the Double Jeopardy Clause is not implicated
    when a lawful sentence is imposed after an unlawful sentence is vacated. See
    1
    Because the parties are familiar with the facts and arguments, we
    recite them only as necessary to resolve Medrano’s appeal.
    2
    United States v. Kane, 
    876 F.2d 734
    , 737 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Generally, a defendant
    can acquire no expectation of finality in an illegal sentence, which remains subject
    to modification.”); United States v. Edmonson, 
    792 F.2d 1492
    , 1496 (9th Cir.
    1986) (“There is no double jeopardy prohibition against correcting an illegal
    sentence even if such correction increases the punishment.”). Likewise, we discern
    no constitutional problem with the failure to credit non-custodial time against a
    custodial sentence. Cf. Kennick v. Superior Ct., 
    736 F.2d 1277
    , 1281, 1283 (9th
    Cir. 1984).
    Medrano’s due process challenge also fails. Substantial, prejudicial
    appellate delay can trigger due process concerns, United States v. Antoine, 
    906 F.2d 1379
    , 1382 (9th Cir. 1990), but in this case the delay between Medrano’s first
    sentence of probation and the completion of the government’s appeal was caused
    in large part by Medrano’s repeated probation violations. In light of the fact that
    the Bureau of Prisons has credited the six months Medrano served in custody for
    his fourth probation violation against his five-year prison sentence, Medrano has
    not shown that his right to due process was violated.2
    AFFIRMED.
    2
    The government’s unopposed motion to supplement the record (Dkt.
    No. 29) is granted.
    3