United States v. Steve McIntosh , 833 F.3d 1163 ( 2016 )


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  •                 FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,               No. 15-10117
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    D.C. No.
    v.                      3:14-cr-00016-
    MMC-3
    STEVE MCINTOSH,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    Maxine M. Chesney, Senior District Judge, Presiding
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,               No. 15-10122
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    D.C. No.
    v.                      1:13-cr-00294-
    LJO-SKO-1
    IANE LOVAN,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    2           UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                No. 15-10127
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    D.C. No.
    v.                       1:13-cr-00294-
    LJO-SKO-3
    SOMPHANE MALATHONG,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                No. 15-10132
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    D.C. No.
    v.                       1:13-cr-00294-
    LJO-SKO-2
    VONG SOUTHY,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                No. 15-10137
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    D.C. No.
    v.                       1:13-cr-00294-
    LJO-SKO-4
    KHAMPHOU KHOUTHONG,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    Lawrence J. O’Neill, District Judge, Presiding
    UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH                   3
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,               No. 15-30098
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    D.C. No.
    v.                    2:12-cr-00016-
    WFN-1
    JERAD JOHN KYNASTON, AKA Jared
    J. Kynaston, AKA Jerad J.
    Kynaston; SAMUEL MICHAEL
    DOYLE, AKA Samuel M. Doyle;
    BRICE CHRISTIAN DAVIS, AKA Brice
    C. Davis; JAYDE DILLON EVANS,
    AKA Jayde D. Evans; TYLER SCOTT
    MCKINLEY, AKA Tyler S.
    McKinley,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Washington
    Wm. Fremming Nielsen, Senior District Judge, Presiding
    4             UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH
    IN RE IANE LOVAN,                      No. 15-71158
    D.C. No.
    IANE LOVAN,                            1:13-cr-00294-
    Petitioner,    LJO-SKO-1
    v.
    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
    CALIFORNIA, FRESNO,
    Respondent,
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Real Party in Interest.
    IN RE SOMPHANE MALATHONG,              No. 15-71174
    D.C. No.
    SOMPHANE MALATHONG,                    1:13-cr-00294-
    Petitioner,    LJO-SKO-3
    v.
    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
    CALIFORNIA, FRESNO,
    Respondent,
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Real Party in Interest.
    UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH                   5
    IN RE VONG SOUTHY,                     No. 15-71179
    D.C. No.
    VONG SOUTHY,                           1:13-cr-00294-
    Petitioner,    LJO-SKO-2
    v.
    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
    CALIFORNIA, FRESNO,
    Respondent,
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Real Party in Interest.
    IN RE KHAMPHOU KHOUTHONG,              No. 15-71225
    D.C. No.
    KHAMPHOU KHOUTHONG,                    1:13-cr-00294-
    Petitioner,    LJO-SKO-4
    v.
    OPINION
    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
    CALIFORNIA, FRESNO,
    Respondent,
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Real Party in Interest.
    6                UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH
    Petitions for Writ of Mandamus
    Argued and Submitted December 7, 2015
    San Francisco, California
    Filed August 16, 2016
    Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Barry G. Silverman,
    and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge O’Scannlain
    SUMMARY*
    Criminal Law
    In ten consolidated interlocutory appeals and petitions for
    writs of mandamus arising from three district courts in two
    states, the panel vacated the district court’s orders denying
    relief to the appellants, who have been indicted for violating
    the Controlled Substances Act, and who sought dismissal
    of their indictments or to enjoin their prosecutions on the
    basis of a congressional appropriations rider, Consolidated
    Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 542, 
    129 Stat. 2242
    , 2332-33 (2015), that prohibits the Department of
    Justice from spending funds to prevent states’ implementation
    of their medical marijuana laws.
    *
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH                     7
    The panel held that it has jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1292
    (a)(1) to consider the interlocutory appeals from these
    direct denials of requests for injunctions, and that the
    appellants have standing to invoke separation-of-powers
    provisions of the Constitution to challenge their criminal
    prosecutions.
    The panel held that § 542 prohibits DOJ from spending
    funds from relevant appropriations acts for the prosecution of
    individuals who engaged in conduct permitted by state
    medical marijuana laws and who fully complied with such
    laws. The panel wrote that individuals who do not strictly
    comply with all state-law conditions regarding the use,
    distribution, possession, and cultivation of medical marijuana
    have engaged in conduct that is unauthorized, and that
    prosecuting such individuals does not violate § 542.
    Remanding to the district courts, the panel instructed that
    if DOJ wishes to continue these prosecutions, the appellants
    are entitled to evidentiary hearings to determine whether their
    conduct was completely authorized by state law. The panel
    wrote that in determining the appropriate remedy for any
    violation of § 542, the district courts should consider the
    temporal nature of the lack of funds along with the
    appellants’ rights to a speedy trial.
    8             UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH
    COUNSEL
    Marc J. Zilversmit (argued), San Francisco, California, for
    Defendant-Appellant Steve McIntosh.
    Robert R. Fischer (argued), Federal Defenders of Eastern
    Washington & Idaho, Spokane, Washington, for Defendant-
    Appellant Jerad John Kynaston.
    Richard D. Wall, Spokane, Washington, for Defendant-
    Appellant Tyler Scott McKinley.
    Douglas Hiatt, Seattle, Washington; Douglas Dwight Phelps,
    Spokane, Washington; for Defendant-Appellant Samuel
    Michael Doyle.
    David Matthew Miller, Spokane, Washington, for Defendant-
    Appellant Brice Christian Davis.
    Nicholas V. Vieth, Spokane, Washington, for Defendant-
    Appellant Jayde Dillion Evans.
    Andras Farkas (argued), Assistant Federal Defender; Heather
    E. Williams, Federal Defender; Federal Defenders of the
    Eastern District of California, Fresno, California; for
    Defendant-Appellant/Petitioner Iane Lovan.
    Daniel L. Harralson, Daniel L. Harralson Law Corp., Fresno,
    California, for Defendant-Appellant/Petitioner Somphane
    Malathong.
    Harry M. Drandell, Law Offices of Harry M. Drandell,
    Fresno, California, for Defendant-Appellant/Petitioner Vong
    Southy.
    UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH                    9
    Peter M. Jones, Wanger Jones Helsley, P.C., Fresno,
    California, for Defendant-Appellant/Petitioner Khamphou
    Khouthong.
    Owen P. Martikan (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;
    Barbara J. Valliere, Chief, Appellate Division; Brian Stretch,
    United States Attorney; United States Attorney’s Office, San
    Francisco, California, and ; Russell E. Smoot and Timothy J.
    Ohms, Assistant United States Attorneys; Michael C.
    Ormsby, United States Attorney; United States Attorney’s
    Office, Spokane, Washington; Camil A. Skipper, Assistant
    United States Attorney; Benjamin B. Wagner, United States
    Attorney; United States Attorney’s Office, Sacramento,
    California; for Plaintiff-Appellee/Real Party in Interest
    United States.
    OPINION
    O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:
    We are asked to decide whether criminal defendants may
    avoid prosecution for various federal marijuana offenses on
    the basis of a congressional appropriations rider that
    prohibits the United States Department of Justice from
    spending funds to prevent states’ implementation of their own
    medical marijuana laws.
    I
    A
    These ten cases are consolidated interlocutory appeals and
    petitions for writs of mandamus arising out of orders entered
    10                UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH
    by three district courts in two states within our circuit.1 All
    Appellants have been indicted for various infractions of the
    Controlled Substances Act (CSA). They have moved to
    dismiss their indictments or to enjoin their prosecutions on
    the grounds that the Department of Justice (DOJ) is
    prohibited from spending funds to prosecute them.
    In McIntosh, five codefendants allegedly ran four
    marijuana stores in the Los Angeles area known as
    Hollywood Compassionate Care (HCC) and Happy Days, and
    nine indoor marijuana grow sites in the San Francisco and
    Los Angeles areas. These codefendants were indicted for
    conspiracy to manufacture, to possess with intent to
    distribute, and to distribute more than 1000 marijuana plants
    in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 846
    , 841(a)(1), 841(b)(l)(A).
    The government sought forfeiture derived from such
    violations under 
    21 U.S.C. § 853
    .
    In Lovan, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency and Fresno
    County Sheriff’s Office executed a federal search warrant on
    60 acres of land located on North Zedicker Road in Sanger,
    California. Officials allegedly located more than 30,000
    marijuana plants on this property. Four codefendants were
    indicted for manufacturing 1000 or more marijuana plants
    and for conspiracy to manufacture 1000 or more marijuana
    plants in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1), 846.
    1
    Appellants filed one appeal in United States v. McIntosh, No. 15-
    10117, arising out of the Northern District of California; one appeal in
    United States v. Kynaston, No. 15-30098, arising out of the Eastern
    District of Washington; and four appeals with four corresponding petitions
    for mandamus—Nos. 15-10122, 15-10127, 15-10132, 15-10137, 15-
    71158, 15-71174, 15-71179, 15-71225, which we shall address as United
    States v. Lovan—arising out of the Eastern District of California.
    UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH                   11
    In Kynaston, five codefendants face charges that arose out
    of the execution of a Washington State search warrant related
    to an investigation into violations of Washington’s Controlled
    Substances Act. Allegedly, a total of 562 “growing
    marijuana plants,” along with another 677 pots, some of
    which appeared to have the root structures of suspected
    harvested marijuana plants, were found. The codefendants
    were indicted for conspiring to manufacture 1000 or more
    marijuana plants, manufacturing 1000 or more marijuana
    plants, possessing with intent to distribute 100 or more
    marijuana plants, possessing a firearm in furtherance of a
    Title 21 offense, maintaining a drug-involved premise, and
    being felons in possession of a firearm in violation of
    
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (g)(1), 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    , 856(a)(1).
    B
    In December 2014, Congress enacted the following rider
    in an omnibus appropriations bill funding the government
    through September 30, 2015:
    None of the funds made available in this Act
    to the Department of Justice may be used,
    with respect to the States of Alabama, Alaska,
    Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
    Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,
    Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine,
    Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
    Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
    Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
    Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, South
    Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont,
    Washington, and Wisconsin, to prevent such
    12             UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH
    States from implementing their own State
    laws that authorize the use, distribution,
    possession, or cultivation of medical
    marijuana.
    Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act,
    2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, § 538, 
    128 Stat. 2130
    , 2217
    (2014).     Various short-term measures extended the
    appropriations and the rider through December 22, 2015. On
    December 18, 2015, Congress enacted a new appropriations
    act, which appropriates funds through the fiscal year ending
    September 30, 2016, and includes essentially the same rider
    in § 542. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L.
    No. 114-113, § 542, 
    129 Stat. 2242
    , 2332–33 (2015) (adding
    Guam and Puerto Rico and changing “prevent such States
    from implementing their own State laws” to “prevent any of
    them from implementing their own laws”).
    Appellants in McIntosh, Lovan, and Kynaston filed
    motions to dismiss or to enjoin on the basis of the rider. The
    motions were denied from the bench in hearings in McIntosh
    and Lovan, while the court in Kynaston filed a short written
    order denying the motion after a hearing. In McIntosh and
    Kynaston, the court concluded that defendants had failed to
    carry their burden to demonstrate their compliance with state
    medical marijuana laws. In Lovan, the court concluded that
    the determination of compliance with state law would depend
    on facts found by the jury in a federal prosecution, and thus
    it would revisit the defendants’ motion after the trial.
    Appellants in all three cases filed interlocutory appeals,
    and Appellants in McIntosh and Lovan ask us to consider
    issuing writs of mandamus if we do not assume jurisdiction
    over the appeals.
    UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH                     13
    II
    Federal courts are courts of limited subject-matter
    jurisdiction, possessing only that power authorized both by
    the Constitution and by Congress. See Gunn v. Minton,
    
    133 S. Ct. 1059
    , 1064 (2013). Before proceeding to the
    merits of this dispute, we must assure ourselves that we have
    jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,
    
    523 U.S. 83
    , 95 (1998).
    A
    The parties dispute whether Congress has authorized us
    to exercise jurisdiction over these interlocutory appeals. “Our
    jurisdiction is typically limited to final decisions of the
    district court.” United States v. Romero-Ochoa, 
    554 F.3d 833
    , 835 (9th Cir. 2009). “In criminal cases, this prohibits
    appellate review until after conviction and imposition of
    sentence.” Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 
    489 U.S. 794
    , 798 (1989). In the cases before us, no Appellants have
    been convicted or sentenced. Therefore, unless some
    exception to the general rule applies, we should not reach the
    merits of this dispute. Appellants invoke three possible
    avenues for reaching the merits: jurisdiction over an order
    refusing an injunction, jurisdiction under the collateral order
    doctrine, and the writ of mandamus. We address the first of
    these three avenues.
    1
    Under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1292
    (a), “the courts of appeals shall
    have jurisdiction of appeals from: (1) Interlocutory orders of
    the district courts of the United States . . . granting,
    continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, . . .
    14             UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH
    except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme
    Court.” (emphasis added). By its terms, § 1292(a)(1)
    requires only an interlocutory order refusing an injunction.
    Nonetheless, relying on Carson v. American Brands, Inc.,
    
    450 U.S. 79
    , 84 (1981), the government argues that
    § 1292(a)(1) requires Appellants to show that the
    interlocutory order (1) has the effect of refusing an
    injunction; (2) has a serious, perhaps irreparable,
    consequence; and (3) can be effectually challenged only by
    immediate appeal.
    The government’s reliance on Carson is misplaced in
    light of our precedent interpreting that case. In Shee Atika v.
    Sealaska Corp., we explained:
    In Carson, the Supreme Court considered
    whether section 1292(a)(1) permitted appeal
    from an order denying the parties’ joint
    motion for approval of a consent decree that
    contained an injunction as one of its
    provisions. Because the order did not, on its
    face, deny an injunction, an appeal from the
    order did not fall precisely within the
    language of section 1292(a)(1). The Court
    nevertheless permitted the appeal. The Court
    stated that, while section 1292(a)(1) must be
    narrowly construed in order to avoid
    piecemeal litigation, it does permit appeals
    from orders that have the “practical effect” of
    denying an injunction, provided that the
    would-be appellant shows that the order
    “might have a serious, perhaps irreparable,
    consequence.”
    UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH                    15
    We find nothing in Carson to suggest that the
    requirement of irreparable injury applies to
    appeals from orders specifically denying
    injunctions. Carson merely expanded the
    scope of appeals that do not fall within the
    meaning of the statute. Sealaska appeals from
    the direct denial of a request for an injunction.
    Carson, therefore, is simply irrelevant.
    
    39 F.3d 247
    , 249 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); accord
    Paige v. California, 
    102 F.3d 1035
    , 1038 (9th Cir. 1996); see
    also Shee Atika, 
    39 F.3d at
    249 n.2 (noting that its conclusion
    was consistent with “the overwhelming majority of courts of
    appeals that have considered the issue” and collecting cases).
    Thus, Carson’s requirements do not apply to appeals from the
    “direct denial of a request for an injunction.” Shee Atika,
    
    39 F.3d at 249
    .
    2
    In the cases before us, the district courts issued direct
    denials of requests for injunctions. Lovan, for instance,
    requested injunctive relief in the conclusion of his opening
    brief: “Therefore, the Court should dismiss all counts against
    Mr. Lovan based upon alleged violations of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    and/or enjoin the Department of Justice from taking any
    further action against the defendants in this case unless and
    until the Department can show such action does not involve
    the expenditure of any funds in violation of the
    Appropriations Act.” At the hearing, Lovan’s counsel made
    exceptionally clear that his motion sought injunctive relief in
    the alternative:
    16             UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH
    THE COURT: But remember, your remedy is
    not because you are upset that the Department
    of Justice is spending taxpayer money. Your
    remedy is a dismissal, which is what you are
    seeking now, is it not?
    MR. FARKAS: And your Honor, as an
    alternative in our motion, we ask for a stay of
    these proceedings, asked this Court to enjoin
    the Department of Justice from spending any
    funds to prosecute Mr. Lovan if this Court
    finds he is in conformity with the California
    Compassionate Use Act. So it is a motion to
    dismiss or, alternatively, a motion to enjoin
    until Congress designates funds for that
    purpose.
    Shortly thereafter, Lovan’s counsel reiterated: “[W]e would
    ask either for a dismissal or to enjoin the government from
    spending any funds that were not appropriated under the
    Appropriations Act.” At the close of the hearing, Lovan’s
    counsel even explicitly argued that the district court’s denial
    of injunctive relief would be appealable immediately: “I
    believe this might be the type of collateral order that is
    appealable to the Ninth Circuit immediately. As I said, we
    are asking for an injunction.” The district court denied
    Lovan’s motion, which clearly requested injunctive relief.
    Similarly, in Kynaston, the opening brief in support of the
    motion began and ended with explicit requests for injunctive
    relief. Subsequent filings by other defendants in that case
    referenced the injunctive relief sought, and one discussed at
    length how courts of equity should exercise their jurisdiction.
    UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH                     17
    The district court denied the motion, which clearly sought
    injunctive relief.
    In McIntosh, the defendant requested injunctive relief in
    his moving papers, and he mentioned his request for
    injunctive relief three times in his reply brief. At the hearing,
    the question of injunctive relief did not arise, and the district
    court said simply that it was denying the motion. Although
    McIntosh could have emphasized the equitable component of
    his request more, we conclude that he raised the issue
    sufficiently for the denial of his motion to constitute a direct
    denial of a request for an injunction.
    Therefore, we have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1292
    (a)(1) to consider the interlocutory appeals from these
    direct denials of requests for injunctions.
    3
    We note the unusual circumstances presented by these
    cases. In almost all federal criminal prosecutions, injunctive
    relief and interlocutory appeals will not be appropriate.
    Federal courts traditionally have refused, except in rare
    instances, to enjoin federal criminal prosecutions. See
    Ackerman v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Union, 
    187 F.2d 860
    , 868
    (9th Cir. 1951); Argonaut Mining Co. v. McPike, 
    78 F.2d 584
    ,
    586 (9th Cir. 1935); Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United States,
    
    442 F.3d 177
    , 185 (3d Cir. 2006); Deaver v. Seymour,
    
    822 F.2d 66
    , 69 (D.C. Cir. 1987). “An order by a federal
    court that relates only to the conduct or progress of litigation
    before that court ordinarily is not considered an injunction
    and therefore is not appealable under § 1292(a)(1).”
    Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 
    485 U.S. 271
    , 279 (1988). Thus, in almost all circumstances, federal
    18                 UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH
    criminal defendants cannot obtain injunctions of their
    ongoing prosecutions, and orders by district courts relating
    solely to requests to stay ongoing federal prosecutions will
    not constitute appealable orders under § 1292(a)(1).
    Here, however, Congress has enacted an appropriations
    rider that specifically restricts DOJ from spending money to
    pursue certain activities. It is “emphatically . . . the exclusive
    province of the Congress not only to formulate legislative
    policies and mandate programs and projects, but also to
    establish their relative priority for the Nation. Once
    Congress, exercising its delegated powers, has decided the
    order of priorities in a given area, it is for . . . the courts to
    enforce them when enforcement is sought.” Tenn. Valley
    Auth. v. Hill, 
    437 U.S. 153
    , 194 (1978); accord United States
    v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Co-op., 
    532 U.S. 483
    , 497
    (2001). A “court sitting in equity cannot ‘ignore the
    judgment of Congress, deliberately expressed in legislation.’”
    Oakland Cannabis, 
    532 U.S. at 497
     (quoting Virginian Ry.
    Co. v. Sys. Fed’n No. 40, 
    300 U.S. 515
    , 551 (1937)). Even if
    Appellants cannot obtain injunctions of their prosecutions
    themselves, they can seek—and have sought—to enjoin DOJ
    from spending funds from the relevant appropriations acts on
    such prosecutions.2 When Congress has enacted a legislative
    2
    We need not decide in the first instance exactly how the district courts
    should resolve claims that DOJ is spending money to prosecute a
    defendant in violation of an appropriations rider. We therefore take no
    view on the precise relief required and leave that issue to the district courts
    in the first instance. We note that district courts in criminal cases have
    ancillary jurisdiction, which “is the power of a court to adjudicate and
    determine matters incidental to the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over
    a cause under review.” United States v. Sumner, 
    226 F.3d 1005
    , 1013–15
    (9th Cir. 2000); see Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.
    UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH                        19
    restriction like § 542 that expressly prohibits DOJ from
    spending funds on certain actions, federal criminal defendants
    may seek to enjoin the expenditure of those funds, and we
    may exercise jurisdiction over a district court’s direct denial
    of a request for such injunctive relief.
    B
    1
    As part of our jurisdictional inquiry, we must consider
    whether Appellants have standing to complain that DOJ is
    spending money that has not been appropriated by Congress.
    “The doctrine of standing asks whether a litigant is entitled to
    have a federal court resolve his grievance.” Kowalski v.
    Tesmer, 
    543 U.S. 125
    , 128 (2004). Although the government
    concedes that Appellants have standing, we have an
    “independent obligation to examine [our] own jurisdiction,
    and standing is perhaps the most important of the
    jurisdictional doctrines.” United States v. Hays, 
    515 U.S. 737
    , 742 (1995) (internal quotation marks and alterations
    omitted).
    Constitutional limits on our jurisdiction are established by
    Article III, which limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to
    “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. It
    “demands that an ‘actual controversy’ persist throughout all
    stages of litigation. That means that standing ‘must be met
    by persons seeking appellate review . . . .’” Hollingsworth v.
    Perry, 
    133 S. Ct. 2652
    , 2661 (2013) (citations omitted). To
    have Article III standing, a litigant “must have suffered or be
    375, 378–80 (1994); Garcia v. Teitler, 
    443 F.3d 202
    , 206–10 (2d Cir.
    2006).
    20              UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH
    imminently threatened with a concrete and particularized
    ‘injury in fact’ that is fairly traceable to the challenged action
    . . . and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
    decision.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components,
    Inc., 
    134 S. Ct. 1377
    , 1386 (2014).
    In Bond v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed a
    situation similar to the cases before us. 
    564 U.S. 211
     (2011).
    There, the Third Circuit had concluded that the criminal
    defendant lacked “standing to challenge a federal statute on
    grounds that the measure interferes with the powers reserved
    to States,” and the Supreme Court reversed. 
    Id. at 216, 226
    .
    The Court explained that “[o]ne who seeks to initiate or
    continue proceedings in federal court must demonstrate,
    among other requirements, both standing to obtain the relief
    requested, and, in addition, an ‘ongoing interest in the
    dispute’ on the part of the opposing party that is sufficient to
    establish ‘concrete adverseness.’” 
    Id. at 217
     (citations
    omitted). “When those conditions are met, Article III does
    not restrict the opposing party’s ability to object to relief
    being sought at its expense.” 
    Id.
     “The requirement of Article
    III standing thus had no bearing upon [the defendant’s]
    capacity to assert defenses in the District Court.” 
    Id.
    Applying those principles to the defendant’s standing to
    appeal, the Court concluded that it was “clear Article III’s
    prerequisites are met. Bond’s challenge to her conviction and
    sentence ‘satisfies the case-or-controversy requirement,
    because the incarceration . . . constitutes a concrete injury,
    caused by the conviction and redressable by invalidation of
    the conviction.’” 
    Id.
     Here, Appellants have not yet been
    deprived of liberty via a conviction, but their indictments
    imminently threaten such a deprivation. Cf. Susan B.
    UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH                     21
    Anthony List v. Driehaus, 
    134 S. Ct. 2334
    , 2342–47 (2014)
    (threatened prosecution may give rise to standing). They
    clearly had Article III standing to pursue their challenges
    below because they were merely objecting to relief sought at
    their expense. And they have standing on appeal because
    their potential convictions constitute concrete, particularized,
    and imminent injuries, which are caused by their prosecutions
    and redressable by injunction or dismissal of such
    prosecutions. See Bond, 
    564 U.S. at 217
    .
    After addressing Article III standing, the Bond Court
    concluded that, “[i]f the constitutional structure of our
    Government that protects individual liberty is compromised,
    individuals who suffer otherwise justiciable injury may
    object.” 
    Id. at 223
    . The Court explained that both federalism
    and separation-of-powers constraints in the Constitution serve
    to protect individual liberty, and a litigant in a proper case
    can invoke such constraints “[w]hen government acts in
    excess of its lawful powers.” 
    Id.
     at 220–24. The Court gave
    numerous examples of cases in which private parties, rather
    than government departments, were able to rely on
    separation-of-powers principles in otherwise jusiticiable cases
    or controversies. See 
    id.
     at 223 (citing Free Enter. Fund v.
    Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 
    561 U.S. 477
     (2010);
    Clinton v. City of New York, 
    524 U.S. 417
    , 433–36 (1998);
    Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 
    514 U.S. 211
     (1995);
    Bowsher v. Synar, 
    478 U.S. 714
     (1986); INS v. Chadha,
    
    462 U.S. 919
     (1983); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
    Pipe Line Co., 
    458 U.S. 50
     (1982); Youngstown Sheet & Tube
    Co. v. Sawyer, 
    343 U.S. 579
     (1952); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
    Corp. v. United States, 
    295 U.S. 495
     (1935)).
    The Court reiterated this principle in NLRB v. Noel
    Canning, 
    134 S. Ct. 2550
     (2014). There, the Court granted
    22             UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH
    relief to a private party challenging an order against it on the
    basis that certain members of the National Labor Relations
    Board had been appointed in excess of presidential authority
    under the Recess Appointments Clause, another separation-
    of-powers constraint. 
    Id. at 2557
    . The Court “recognize[d],
    of course, that the separation of powers can serve to
    safeguard individual liberty and that it is the ‘duty of the
    judicial department’—in a separation-of-powers case as in
    any other—‘to say what the law is.’” 
    Id.
     at 2559–60 (citing
    Clinton, 
    524 U.S. at
    449–50 (Kennedy, J., concurring), and
    quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
    (1803)); see also 
    id.
     at 2592–94 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
    judgment) (discussing at great length how the separation of
    powers protects individual liberty).
    Thus, Appellants have standing to invoke separation-of-
    powers provisions of the Constitution to challenge their
    criminal prosecutions.
    2
    Here, Appellants complain that DOJ is spending funds
    that have not been appropriated by Congress in violation of
    the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution. See U.S.
    Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No Money shall be drawn from the
    Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
    Law . . . .”). This “straightforward and explicit command . . .
    means simply that no money can be paid out of the Treasury
    unless it has been appropriated by an act of Congress.” Office
    of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 
    496 U.S. 414
    , 424 (1990)
    (citation omitted). “Money may be paid out only through an
    appropriation made by law; in other words, the payment of
    money from the Treasury must be authorized by a statute.”
    
    Id.
    UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH                    23
    The Appropriations Clause plays a critical role in the
    Constitution’s separation of powers among the three branches
    of government and the checks and balances between them.
    “Any exercise of a power granted by the Constitution to one
    of the other branches of Government is limited by a valid
    reservation of congressional control over funds in the
    Treasury.” 
    Id. at 425
    . The Clause has a “fundamental and
    comprehensive purpose . . . to assure that public funds will be
    spent according to the letter of the difficult judgments
    reached by Congress as to the common good and not
    according to the individual favor of Government agents.” 
    Id.
    at 427–28. Without it, Justice Story explained, “the executive
    would possess an unbounded power over the public purse of
    the nation; and might apply all its moneyed resources at his
    pleasure.” 
    Id. at 427
     (quoting 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries
    on the Constitution of the United States § 1348 (3d ed.
    1858)).
    Thus, if DOJ were spending money in violation of § 542,
    it would be drawing funds from the Treasury without
    authorization by statute and thus violating the Appropriations
    Clause. That Clause constitutes a separation-of-powers
    limitation that Appellants can invoke to challenge their
    prosecutions.
    III
    The parties dispute whether the government’s spending
    money on their prosecutions violates § 542.
    A
    We focus, as we must, on the statutory text. Section 542
    provides that “[n]one of the funds made available in this Act
    24                 UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH
    to the Department of Justice may be used, with respect to
    [Medical Marijuana States3] to prevent any of them from
    implementing their own laws that authorize the use,
    distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana.”
    Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113,
    § 542, 
    129 Stat. 2242
    , 2332–33 (2015). Unfortunately, the
    rider is not a model of clarity.
    1
    “It is a ‘fundamental canon of statutory construction’ that,
    ‘unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking
    their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.’” Sandifer
    v. U.S. Steel Corp., 
    134 S. Ct. 870
    , 876 (2014) (quoting
    Perrin v. United States, 
    444 U.S. 37
    , 42 (1979)). Thus, in
    order to decide whether the prosecutions of Appellants violate
    § 542, we must determine the plain meaning of “prevent any
    of [the Medical Marijuana States] from implementing their
    own laws that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or
    cultivation of medical marijuana.” The pronoun “them”
    refers back to the Medical Marijuana States, and “their own
    3
    To avoid repeating the names of all 43 jurisdictions listed, we refer to
    Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
    Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
    Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
    Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
    North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
    Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin,
    Wyoming, the District of Columbia, Guam, and Puerto Rico as the
    “Medical Marijuana States” and their laws authorizing “the use,
    distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana” as the “State
    Medical Marijuana Laws.” While recognizing that the list includes three
    non-states, we will refer to the listed jurisdictions as states and their laws
    as state laws without further qualification.
    UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH                     25
    laws” refers to the state laws of the Medical Marijuana States.
    And “implement” means:
    To “carry out, accomplish; esp.: to give
    practical effect to and ensure of actual
    fulfillment by concrete measure.” Implement,
    Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary
    (11th ed. 2003);
    “To put into practical effect; carry out.”
    Implement, American Heritage Dictionary of
    the English Language (5th ed. 2011); and
    “To complete, perform, carry into effect (a
    contract, agreement, etc.); to fulfil (an
    engagement or promise).” Implement, Oxford
    English Dictionary, www.oed.com.
    See Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 
    625 F.3d 550
    , 559 (9th
    Cir. 2010) (We “may follow the common practice of
    consulting dictionaries to determine” ordinary meaning.);
    Sandifer, 
    134 S. Ct. at 876
    . In sum, § 542 prohibits DOJ
    from spending money on actions that prevent the Medical
    Marijuana States’ giving practical effect to their state laws
    that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation
    of medical marijuana.
    2
    DOJ argues that it does not prevent the Medical
    Marijuana States from giving practical effect to their medical
    marijuana laws by prosecuting private individuals, rather than
    taking legal action against the state. We are not persuaded.
    26                UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH
    Importantly, the “[s]tatutory language cannot be
    construed in a vacuum. It is [another] fundamental canon of
    statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read
    in their context and with a view to their place in the overall
    statutory scheme.” Sturgeon v. Frost, 
    136 S. Ct. 1061
    , 1070
    (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, we must
    read § 542 with a view to its place in the overall statutory
    scheme for marijuana regulation, namely the CSA and the
    State Medical Marijuana Laws. The CSA prohibits the use,
    distribution, possession, or cultivation of any marijuana. See
    
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a), 844(a).4 The State Medical Marijuana
    Laws are those state laws that authorize the use, distribution,
    possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana. Thus, the
    CSA prohibits what the State Medical Marijuana Laws
    permit.
    In light of the ordinary meaning of the terms of § 542 and
    the relationship between the relevant federal and state laws,
    we consider whether a superior authority, which prohibits
    certain conduct, can prevent a subordinate authority from
    implementing a rule that officially permits such conduct by
    punishing individuals who are engaged in the conduct
    officially permitted by the lower authority. We conclude that
    it can.
    4
    This requires a slight caveat. Under the CSA, “the manufacture,
    distribution, or possession of marijuana [is] a criminal offense, with the
    sole exception being use of the drug as part of a Food and Drug
    Administration preapproved research study.” Gonzales v. Raich, 
    545 U.S. 1
    , 14 (2005); see 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 812
    (c), 823(f), 841(a)(1), 844(a). Thus,
    except as part of “a strictly controlled research project,” federal law
    “designates marijuana as contraband for any purpose.” Raich, 
    545 U.S. at 24, 27
    .
    UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH                    27
    DOJ, without taking any legal action against the Medical
    Marijuana States, prevents them from implementing their
    laws that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or
    cultivation of medical marijuana by prosecuting individuals
    for use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical
    marijuana that is authorized by such laws. By officially
    permitting certain conduct, state law provides for non-
    prosecution of individuals who engage in such conduct. If
    the federal government prosecutes such individuals, it has
    prevented the state from giving practical effect to its law
    providing for non-prosecution of individuals who engage in
    the permitted conduct.
    We therefore conclude that, at a minimum, § 542
    prohibits DOJ from spending funds from relevant
    appropriations acts for the prosecution of individuals who
    engaged in conduct permitted by the State Medical Marijuana
    Laws and who fully complied with such laws.
    3
    Appellants in McIntosh and Kynaston argue for a more
    expansive interpretation of § 542. They contend that the rider
    prohibits DOJ from bringing federal marijuana charges
    against anyone licensed or authorized under a state medical
    marijuana law for activity occurring within that state,
    including licensees who had failed to comply fully with state
    law.
    For instance, Appellants in Kynaston argue that
    “implementation of laws necessarily involves all aspects of
    putting the law into practical effect, including interpretation
    of the law, means of application and enforcement, and
    procedures and processes for determining the outcome of
    28             UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH
    individual cases.” Under this view, if the federal government
    prosecutes individuals who are not strictly compliant with
    state law, it will prevent the states from implementing the
    entirety of their laws that authorize medical marijuana by
    preventing them from giving practical effect to the penalties
    and enforcement mechanisms for engaging in unauthorized
    conduct.     Thus, argue the Kynaston Appellants, the
    Department of Justice must refrain from prosecuting “unless
    a person’s activities are so clearly outside the scope of a
    state’s medical marijuana laws that reasonable debate is not
    possible.”
    To determine whether such construction is correct, we
    must decide whether the phrase “laws that authorize” includes
    not only the rules authorizing certain conduct but also the
    rules delineating penalties and enforcement mechanisms for
    engaging in unauthorized conduct. In answering that
    question, we consider the ordinary meaning of “laws that
    authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of
    medical marijuana.” “Law” has many different meanings,
    including the following definitions that appear most relevant
    to § 542:
    “The aggregate of legislation, judicial
    precedents, and accepted legal principles; the
    body of authoritative grounds of judicial and
    administrative action; esp., the body of rules,
    standards, and principles that the courts of a
    particular jurisdiction apply in deciding
    controversies brought before them.”
    “The set of rules or principles dealing with a
    specific area of a legal system .”
    UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH                     29
    Law, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); and:
    “1. a. The body of rules, whether proceeding
    from formal enactment or from custom, which
    a particular state or community recognizes as
    binding on its members or subjects. (In this
    sense usually the law.).”
    “One of the individual rules which constitute
    the ‘law’ (sense 1) of a state or polity. . . . The
    plural has often a collective sense . . .
    approaching sense 1.”
    Law, Oxford English Dictionary, www.oed.com. The relative
    pronoun “that” restricts “laws” to those laws authorizing the
    use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical
    marijuana. See Bryan A. Garner, Garner’s Dictionary of
    Legal Usage 887–89 (3d ed. 2011). In sum, the ordinary
    meaning of § 542 prohibits the Department of Justice from
    preventing the implementation of the Medical Marijuana
    States’ laws or sets of rules and only those rules that
    authorize medical marijuana use.
    We also consider the context of § 542. The rider prohibits
    DOJ from preventing forty states, the District of Columbia,
    and two territories from implementing their medical
    marijuana laws. Not only are such laws varied in
    composition but they also are changing as new statutes are
    enacted, new regulations are promulgated, and new
    administrative and judicial decisions interpret such statutes
    and regulations. Thus, § 542 applies to a wide variety of laws
    that are in flux.
    30             UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH
    Given this context and the restriction of the relevant laws
    to those that authorize conduct, we conclude that § 542
    prohibits the federal government only from preventing the
    implementation of those specific rules of state law that
    authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of
    medical marijuana. DOJ does not prevent the implementation
    of rules authorizing conduct when it prosecutes individuals
    who engage in conduct unauthorized under state medical
    marijuana laws. Individuals who do not strictly comply with
    all state-law conditions regarding the use, distribution,
    possession, and cultivation of medical marijuana have
    engaged in conduct that is unauthorized, and prosecuting such
    individuals does not violate § 542. Congress could easily
    have drafted § 542 to prohibit interference with laws that
    address medical marijuana or those that regulate medical
    marijuana, but it did not. Instead, it chose to proscribe
    preventing states from implementing laws that authorize the
    use, distribution, possession, and cultivation of medical
    marijuana.
    B
    The parties cite various pieces of legislative history to
    support their arguments regarding the meaning of § 542.
    We cannot consider such sources. It is a fundamental
    principle of appropriations law that we may only consider the
    text of an appropriations rider, not expressions of intent in
    legislative history. “An agency’s discretion to spend
    appropriated funds is cabined only by the ‘text of the
    appropriation,’ not by Congress’ expectations of how the
    funds will be spent, as might be reflected by legislative
    history.” Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 
    132 S. Ct. 2181
    ,
    2194–95 (2012) (quoting Int’l Union, UAW v. Donovan,
    UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH                     31
    
    746 F.2d 855
    , 860–61 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.)). In
    International Union, then-Judge Scalia explained:
    As the Supreme Court has said (in a case
    involving precisely the issue of Executive
    compliance with appropriation laws, although
    the principle is one of general applicability):
    “legislative intention, without more, is not
    legislation.” The issue here is not how
    Congress expected or intended the Secretary
    to behave, but how it required him to behave,
    through the only means by which it can (as far
    as the courts are concerned, at least) require
    anything—the enactment of legislation. Our
    focus, in other words, must be upon the text of
    the appropriation.
    
    746 F.2d at
    860–61 (quoting Train v. City of New York,
    
    420 U.S. 35
    , 45 (1975)); see also Cherokee Nation of Okla.
    v. Leavitt, 
    543 U.S. 631
    , 646 (2005) (“The relevant case law
    makes clear that restrictive language contained in Committee
    Reports is not legally binding.”); Lincoln v. Vigil, 
    508 U.S. 182
    , 192 (1993) (“‘[I]ndicia in committee reports and other
    legislative history as to how the funds should or are expected
    to be spent do not establish any legal requirements on’ the
    agency.” (citation omitted)).
    We recognize that some members of Congress may have
    desired a more expansive construction of the rider, while
    others may have preferred a more limited interpretation.
    However, we must consider only the text of the rider. If
    Congress intends to prohibit a wider or narrower range of
    DOJ actions, it certainly may express such intention,
    hopefully with greater clarity, in the text of any future rider.
    32                UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH
    IV
    We therefore must remand to the district courts. If DOJ
    wishes to continue these prosecutions, Appellants are entitled
    to evidentiary hearings to determine whether their conduct
    was completely authorized by state law, by which we mean
    that they strictly complied with all relevant conditions
    imposed by state law on the use, distribution, possession, and
    cultivation of medical marijuana. We leave to the district
    courts to determine, in the first instance and in each case, the
    precise remedy that would be appropriate.
    We note the temporal nature of the problem with these
    prosecutions. The government had authority to initiate
    criminal proceedings, and it merely lost funds to continue
    them. DOJ is currently prohibited from spending funds from
    specific appropriations acts for prosecutions of those who
    complied with state law. But Congress could appropriate
    funds for such prosecutions tomorrow. Conversely, this
    temporary lack of funds could become a more permanent lack
    of funds if Congress continues to include the same rider in
    future appropriations bills. In determining the appropriate
    remedy for any violation of § 542, the district courts should
    consider the temporal nature of the lack of funds along with
    Appellants’ rights to a speedy trial under the Sixth
    Amendment and the Speedy Trial Act, 
    18 U.S.C. § 3161.5
    5
    The prior observation should also serve as a warning. To be clear,
    § 542 does not provide immunity from prosecution for federal marijuana
    offenses. The CSA prohibits the manufacture, distribution, and possession
    of marijuana. Anyone in any state who possesses, distributes, or
    manufactures marijuana for medical or recreational purposes (or attempts
    or conspires to do so) is committing a federal crime. The federal
    government can prosecute such offenses for up to five years after they
    occur. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3282
    . Congress currently restricts the government
    UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH                             33
    V
    For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the orders of the
    district courts and remand with instructions to conduct an
    evidentiary hearing to determine whether Appellants have
    complied with state law.6
    VACATED AND                          REMANDED                 WITH
    INSTRUCTIONS.
    from spending certain funds to prosecute certain individuals. But
    Congress could restore funding tomorrow, a year from now, or four years
    from now, and the government could then prosecute individuals who
    committed offenses while the government lacked funding. Moreover, a
    new president will be elected soon, and a new administration could shift
    enforcement priorities to place greater emphasis on prosecuting marijuana
    offenses.
    Nor does any state law “legalize” possession, distribution, or
    manufacture of marijuana. Under the Supremacy Clause of the
    Constitution, state laws cannot permit what federal law prohibits. U.S.
    Const. art VI, cl. 2. Thus, while the CSA remains in effect, states cannot
    actually authorize the manufacture, distribution, or possession of
    marijuana. Such activity remains prohibited by federal law.
    6
    We have jurisdiction under the All Writs Act to “issue all writs
    necessary or appropriate in aid of [our] jurisdiction[] and agreeable to the
    usages and principles of law.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 1651
    . The writ of mandamus
    “is a drastic and extraordinary remedy reserved for really extraordinary
    causes.” United States v. Guerrero, 
    693 F.3d 990
    , 999 (9th Cir. 2012)
    (quoting Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 
    542 U.S. 367
    , 380 (2004)). We
    DENY the petitions for the writ of mandamus because the petitioners have
    other means to obtain their desired relief and because the district courts’
    orders were not clearly erroneous as a matter of law. See 
    id.
     (citing
    Bauman v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 
    557 F.2d 650
    , 654–55 (9th Cir. 2010)). In
    addition, we GRANT the motion for leave to file an oversize reply brief,
    ECF No. 47-2; DENY the motion to strike, ECF No. 52; and DENY the
    motion for judicial notice, ECF No. 53.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-10117, 15-10122, 15-10127, 15-10132, 15-10137, 15-30098, 15-71158, 15-71174, 15-71179, 15-71225

Citation Numbers: 833 F.3d 1163, 2016 WL 4363168

Judges: O'Scannlain, Silverman, Bea

Filed Date: 8/16/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024

Authorities (38)

United States v. Thomas Alan Sumner , 226 F.3d 1005 ( 2000 )

Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. , 102 S. Ct. 2858 ( 1982 )

Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. , 134 S. Ct. 1377 ( 2014 )

Sturgeon v. Frost , 136 S. Ct. 1061 ( 2016 )

Bond v. United States , 131 S. Ct. 2355 ( 2011 )

Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha , 103 S. Ct. 2764 ( 1983 )

Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. , 115 S. Ct. 1447 ( 1995 )

United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative , 121 S. Ct. 1711 ( 2001 )

Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter , 132 S. Ct. 2181 ( 2012 )

Gunn v. Minton , 133 S. Ct. 1059 ( 2013 )

Hollingsworth v. Perry , 133 S. Ct. 2652 ( 2013 )

Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp. , 134 S. Ct. 870 ( 2014 )

shee-atika-plaintiff-counterclaim-v-sealaska-corp , 39 F.3d 247 ( 1994 )

United States v. Hays , 115 S. Ct. 2431 ( 1995 )

Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Canning , 134 S. Ct. 2550 ( 2014 )

Gonzales v. Raich , 125 S. Ct. 2195 ( 2005 )

Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. Stolt-Nielsen Transportation Group Ltd. ... , 442 F.3d 177 ( 2006 )

ackerman-atty-gen-v-international-longshoremens-warehousemens-union , 187 F.2d 860 ( 1951 )

Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond , 110 S. Ct. 2465 ( 1990 )

Bowsher v. Synar , 106 S. Ct. 3181 ( 1986 )

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