Robin Kimbell v. Stephen Benner ( 2019 )


Menu:
  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUL 24 2019
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ROBIN DUBOC KIMBELL,                            No. 18-56260
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:17-cv-04767-FMO-SS
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    STEPHEN BENNER, Doctor; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Fernando M. Olguin, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted July 15, 2019**
    Before:      SCHROEDER, SILVERMAN, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
    Robin Duboc Kimbell appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
    dismissing her civil rights action seeking to recoup funds that were seized by the
    federal government in connection with her ex-husband’s criminal proceedings. We
    have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo the district court’s
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    sua sponte dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Omar v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc.,
    
    813 F.2d 986
    , 991 (9th Cir. 1987). We affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Kimbell’s claims against the judicial
    and prosecutorial defendants because these defendants are entitled to judicial
    immunity or quasi-judicial immunity. See Duvall v. Cty. of Kitsap, 
    260 F.3d 1124
    ,
    1133-34 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing judicial immunity, factors relevant to whether
    an act is judicial in nature, and extension of judicial immunity to officials other
    than judges “who perform functions closely associated with the judicial process”
    (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
    The district court properly dismissed the remainder of Kimbell’s action
    because Kimbell failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See
    Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678, 681 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint
    must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
    that is plausible on its face” and conclusory allegations are not entitled to be
    assumed true) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Raditch v.
    United States, 
    929 F.2d 478
    , 480 (9th Cir. 1991) (procedural due process requires
    “notice and an opportunity to respond in some manner”).
    Kimbell’s motion for leave to file a supplemental memorandum of law
    (Docket Entry No. 11) is denied.
    AFFIRMED.
    2                                       18-56260