Rony Perez-Guzman v. Loretta E. Lynch , 835 F.3d 1066 ( 2016 )


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  •                 FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    RONY ESTUARDO PEREZ-GUZMAN,              No. 13-70579
    AKA Ronnie Perez-Guzman,
    Petitioner,          Agency No.
    A200-282-241
    v.
    LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney                OPINION
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Argued and Submitted May 4, 2016
    Pasadena, California
    Filed August 31, 2016
    Before: Raymond C. Fisher, Milan D. Smith, Jr.,
    and Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Fisher
    2                   PEREZ-GUZMAN V. LYNCH
    SUMMARY*
    Immigration
    The panel granted in part and denied in part a petition for
    review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals.
    The panel held that the Attorney General’s regulation,
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.31, precluding an individual subject to a
    reinstated removal order from applying for asylum, is a
    reasonable interpretation of the statutory scheme and is
    therefore entitled to deference at step two of the framework
    established under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
    Defense Council, Inc., 
    467 U.S. 837
    (1984). The panel also
    remanded the petitioner’s withholding of removal and
    Convention Against Torture claims in light of intervening
    authorities, including Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 
    707 F.3d 1081
    (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc), and Madrigal v. Holder, 
    716 F.3d 499
    (9th Cir. 2013).
    The panel concluded that Congress has not directly
    spoken to the interplay between 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1)
    (permitting “[a]ny alien” to apply for asylum “irrespective of
    such alien’s status”) and 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (barring aliens
    subject to reinstated removal orders from “any relief under”
    chapter 12 of title 8 of the U.S. Code, which includes the
    asylum statute).
    At Chevron step two, however, the agency’s
    reconciliation of these two provisions through 8 C.F.R.
    § 1208.31(e) was reasonable, and hence entitled to deference.
    *
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    PEREZ-GUZMAN V. LYNCH                   3
    The panel also held that the petitioner’s procedural
    challenges to § 1208.31(e), under the Administrative
    Procedure Act, were untimely because they were not brought
    within six years after adoption of the regulation.
    COUNSEL
    Eric M. Fraser (argued), Osborn Maledon, P.A., Phoenix,
    Arizona, for Petitioner.
    Tim Ramnitz (argued); Anthony C. Payne, Senior Litigation
    Counsel; Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant Attorney
    General; Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division,
    United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for
    Respondent.
    Keren Zwick (argued), National Immigrant Justice Center,
    Chicago, Illinois; Stephen W. Manning, Immigrant Law
    Group P.C., Portland, Oregon; Robin L. Goldfaden, Lawyers’
    Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area,
    San Francisco, California; for Amicus Curiae American
    Immigration Lawyers Association, Lawyers’ Committee for
    Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area, and National
    Immigrant Justice Center.
    4                PEREZ-GUZMAN V. LYNCH
    OPINION
    FISHER, Circuit Judge:
    Rony Estuardo Perez-Guzman (Perez), a native and
    citizen of Guatemala, entered the United States without
    inspection for the first time in 2011. The Department of
    Homeland Security (DHS) apprehended and removed him
    after expedited removal proceedings. Perez reentered the
    United States in 2012 and was again apprehended by DHS,
    which reinstated the earlier removal order. After an asylum
    officer found Perez had established a reasonable fear of being
    tortured if removed to Guatemala, he was referred to an
    Immigration Judge (IJ) for consideration of his applications
    for withholding of removal and protection under the
    Convention Against Torture (CAT). Because Perez was
    subject to a reinstated removal order, the IJ declined to
    consider his application for asylum. The IJ denied on the
    merits his requests for withholding of removal and protection
    under CAT, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
    affirmed.
    The parties agree that we must remand to the BIA on
    Perez’s claims for withholding of removal and protection
    under CAT in light of intervening circuit precedent. The
    issue we consider here is whether an individual subject to a
    reinstated removal order is eligible to apply for asylum under
    the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended by
    the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
    Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). We hold Congress has not clearly
    expressed whether 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), enacted by IIRIRA,
    prevents an individual subject to a reinstated removal order
    from applying for asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158. We
    conclude, however, that the Attorney General’s regulation
    PEREZ-GUZMAN V. LYNCH                       5
    preventing Perez from applying for asylum under these
    circumstances is a reasonable interpretation of the statutory
    scheme, and is entitled to deference under Chevron, U.S.A.,
    Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
    467 U.S. 837
    (1984). Accordingly, we remand to the BIA only for
    reconsideration of Perez’s withholding and CAT claims.
    I. Background
    A. Factual Background
    Perez alleges that three incidents in his home county of
    Guatemala make him eligible for asylum, withholding of
    removal and CAT protection. First, Perez was struck by a
    stray bullet fired by members of a gang extorting a local
    businessman and gave a statement to police about the gang
    members involved in the shooting. After they were released
    from jail, the gang members visited Perez’s house while he
    was away.
    Second, Perez discovered his name appeared on a “death
    squad kill list” compiled by a group of police officers and
    soldiers who engaged in extrajudical law enforcement by
    executing suspected gang members, guerillas and other
    criminals. Other individuals on the list were later killed,
    including Perez’s cousin. Shortly after his cousin’s murder,
    Perez fled his hometown.
    Finally, Perez was abducted by individuals purporting to
    be Guatemalan police officers. The kidnappers blindfolded
    Perez, tied him to a chair and beat him before realizing they
    had abducted the wrong man. The kidnappers discussed
    killing Perez, but released him with the threat that they would
    kill him if he reported the attack.
    6                PEREZ-GUZMAN V. LYNCH
    Perez left Guatemala and entered the United States for the
    first time in June 2011, but was stopped by the Border Patrol.
    He later testified before the IJ that the Border Patrol agents
    never asked him whether he feared returning to Guatemala,
    but only “came out with a paper” for him to sign certifying
    that he had entered the country illegally. Records of a brief
    interview conducted during the expedited removal process,
    however, note Perez answered in the negative when asked
    whether he feared returning to Guatemala. He was removed
    to Guatemala in July 2011.
    Perez reentered the United States and was apprehended a
    second time in January 2012. DHS reinstated his earlier
    removal order. Because Perez expressed a fear of returning
    to Guatemala, he was referred to an asylum officer, who
    found his fear of persecution or torture was reasonable and
    referred him to an IJ for further proceedings.
    Before the IJ, Perez sought asylum, withholding of
    removal and protection under CAT. The IJ, however,
    concluded Perez was ineligible for asylum because he had
    previously been removed and DHS had reinstated his earlier
    removal order. The IJ also denied Perez’s applications for
    withholding of removal and CAT protection, concluding he
    had not established a likelihood that he would either be
    persecuted on a protected ground or tortured with government
    consent or acquiescence if returned to Guatemala. The BIA
    affirmed the denial of withholding of removal and CAT
    protection on the merits. It explained it would not reach the
    merits of Perez’s asylum claim and that “[b]ecause the
    Department of Homeland Security . . . reinstated a prior order
    of removal in this case, the Immigration Judge’s
    PEREZ-GUZMAN V. LYNCH                                7
    consideration was limited to the applicant’s request for
    withholding of removal and CAT protection. See 8 C.F.R.
    § 1208.31(e).”
    B. Legal Background
    Perez’s claim turns on the interplay between two
    provisions of the INA – 8 U.S.C. § 1158, the asylum statute,
    and 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), the reinstatement bar.1
    The Refugee Act of 1980 directed the Attorney General
    to establish procedures for granting asylum and enacted the
    initial version of § 1158, which afforded any alien the right to
    apply for asylum irrespective of immigration status. See
    Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 208, 94 Stat. 102
    (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1158). Although
    Congress later amended the statute to prevent individuals
    convicted of aggravated felonies from receiving asylum, see
    Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 515, 104
    Stat. 4978, the law governing asylum applications remained
    largely unchanged until the enactment of IIRIRA, Pub. L. No.
    104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
    In its post-IIRIRA form, § 1158(a)(1) retains its original
    scope, stating that “[a]ny alien who is physically present in
    the United States . . . irrespective of such alien’s status, may
    apply for asylum in accordance with this section.”
    § 1158(a)(1) (emphasis added). A few statutory exceptions
    qualify this broad eligibility, barring asylum applications
    from individuals who can be resettled in another country, see
    § 1158(a)(2)(A), failed to timely apply, see § 1158(a)(2)(B),
    1
    Unless otherwise noted, all citations are to title 8 of the United States
    Code.
    8                PEREZ-GUZMAN V. LYNCH
    or previously were denied asylum, see § 1158(a)(2)(C).
    Section 1158(a)(2)(D) creates an exception to the exceptions
    in subsections (a)(2)(B) and (C), stating in relevant part that
    an individual may make a second application for asylum
    notwithstanding a previous denial if he shows changed
    circumstances affecting his eligibility for asylum. See
    § 1158(a)(2)(D).
    IIRIRA also revised the effect of reinstatement, the
    summary removal process whereby the government reinstates
    and executes an individual’s previous removal order rather
    than initiating a new removal proceeding against him. Before
    IIRIRA, only a subset of individuals who illegally reentered
    the country were subject to reinstatement of their earlier
    removal orders; the rest were placed in ordinary removal
    proceedings, even on subsequent reentries. See Fernandez-
    Vargas v. Gonzales, 
    548 U.S. 30
    , 33–35 (2006). In addition,
    individuals in the “limited class of illegal reentrants” subject
    to reinstatement could still “seek some varieties of
    discretionary relief” from their reinstated removal order. 
    Id. at 34.
    With IIRIRA, however, Congress replaced the old
    reinstatement provisions with “one that toed a harder line,”
    and “[u]nlike its predecessor, . . . applie[d] to all illegal
    reentrants, explicitly insulate[d] the [reinstated] removal
    orders from review, and generally foreclose[d] discretionary
    relief from the terms of the reinstated order.” 
    Id. at 34–35
    (noting the availability of withholding of removal). This
    reinstatement bar, codified at § 1231(a)(5), states
    [i]f the Attorney General finds that an alien
    has reentered the United States illegally after
    having been removed or having departed
    voluntarily, under an order of removal, the
    prior order of removal is reinstated from its
    PEREZ-GUZMAN V. LYNCH                              9
    original date and is not subject to being
    reopened or reviewed, the alien is not eligible
    and may not apply for any relief under this
    chapter, and the alien shall be removed under
    the prior order at any time after the reentry.
    § 1231(a)(5) (emphasis added). “[T]his chapter” refers to
    chapter 12 of title 8 of the U.S. Code, which contains both the
    asylum statute and reinstatement bar.
    Consistent with this section, the Attorney General
    promulgated 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(e),2 which states in relevant
    part that “[i]f an asylum officer determines that an alien
    [subject to a reinstated removal order] has a reasonable fear
    of persecution or torture, the officer shall so inform the alien
    and issue a . . . [r]eferral to [an] Immigration Judge, for full
    consideration of the request for withholding of removal only.”
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(e) (emphasis added).3 The notice
    published in the Federal Register stated in its summary that
    “[f]or persons subject to reinstatement, . . . the rule
    establishes a screening mechanism” similar to the one used in
    expedited removal proceedings. See Regulations Concerning
    the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 8478, 8478
    2
    The regulation was originally promulgated as 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(e), but
    the administrative regulations governing immigration proceedings were
    recodified in 2003 to reflect the transfer of the Immigration and
    Nationality Service’s functions to DHS. See Aliens and Nationality;
    Homeland Security; Reorganization of Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg. 9824
    (Feb. 28, 2003). For convenience, we refer to the regulation as 8 C.F.R.
    § 1208.31(e) throughout this opinion.
    3
    A separate regulation permits an individual subject to a reinstated
    removal order to seek CAT protection as well. See 8 C.F.R.
    § 1208.16(c)(4).
    10               PEREZ-GUZMAN V. LYNCH
    (Feb. 19, 1999). The notice went on to explain that the new
    process was intended “to rapidly identify and assess” claims
    for withholding of removal and CAT protection made by
    individuals subject to reinstated removal orders and other
    forms of expedited removal to “allow for the fair and
    expeditious resolution of such claims without unduly
    disrupting the streamlined removal processes applicable to
    these aliens.” 
    Id. at 8479;
    see also 
    id. at 8485
    (discussing
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.31 specifically). The notice further stated the
    agency’s conclusion that such individuals, including “aliens
    subject to reinstatement of a previous removal order under
    [§ 1231(a)(5)],” were “ineligible for asylum” but “may be
    entitled to withholding of removal” or CAT protection. 
    Id. at 8485.
    The notice identified a number of statutes giving the
    agency authority to promulgate regulations to govern asylum
    and withholding procedures, including § 1158. See 
    id. at 8487
    (listing the authorities for 8 C.F.R. Part 208 generally).
    II. Discussion
    As noted, the parties agree remand is appropriate on
    Perez’s withholding of removal and CAT claims in light of
    intervening circuit precedent. The only disputed question is
    whether Perez is entitled to a remand on his asylum claim as
    well. We conclude he is not.
    A. Exhaustion
    At the outset, we reject the government’s contention that
    Perez failed to exhaust his argument for asylum eligibility
    before the BIA. Although we generally lack jurisdiction to
    review a final agency order unless administrative remedies
    have been exhausted, see Alvarado v. Holder, 
    759 F.3d 1121
    ,
    1127 (9th Cir. 2014), exhaustion is not required where it
    PEREZ-GUZMAN V. LYNCH                       11
    would be futile to raise a particular issue before the agency.
    Here, the BIA rejected Perez’s asylum claim under 8 C.F.R.
    § 1208.31(e), which bars individuals in reinstatement
    proceedings from applying for asylum. Because the BIA had
    no authority to disregard this regulation, exhaustion would
    have been futile. See Coyt v. Holder, 
    593 F.3d 902
    , 905 (9th
    Cir. 2010) (“Because the BIA has no authority to declare a
    regulation invalid, ‘the exhaustion doctrine does not bar
    review of a question concerning the validity of an INS
    regulation because of a conflict with a statute.’” (quoting
    Espinoza-Gutierrez v. Smith, 
    94 F.3d 1270
    , 1273 (9th Cir.
    1996))); 
    Espinoza-Gutierrez, 94 F.3d at 1273
    (observing that
    an argument contesting the validity of an agency’s own
    regulations will “necessarily . . . fall[] on deaf ears” because
    the BIA “simply has no authority to invalidate a regulation
    that it is bound to follow”).
    B. Asylum
    Perez argues the asylum statute’s language permitting
    “[a]ny alien” to apply for asylum “irrespective of such alien’s
    status” unambiguously permits him to apply for asylum
    notwithstanding his reinstated removal order. § 1158(a)(1).
    The government, in response, argues the reinstatement bar’s
    statement that an individual subject to a reinstated removal
    order “is not eligible and may not apply for any relief under
    this chapter” unambiguously makes Perez ineligible to apply
    for asylum, a form of relief arising under the same chapter.
    § 1231(a)(5). The question is whether § 1158’s permission
    to apply for asylum or § 1231(a)(5)’s denial of any relief
    falling within the same chapter governs the class of
    individuals who, like Perez, are subject to reinstated removal
    orders.
    12               PEREZ-GUZMAN V. LYNCH
    To answer this question of statutory interpretation, we
    follow the framework laid out in Chevron. “Under the first
    step, we determine ‘whether Congress has directly spoken to
    the precise question at issue.’” Humane Soc’y of U.S. v.
    Locke, 
    626 F.3d 1040
    , 1054 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting
    
    Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842
    –43). If the intent of Congress is
    clear, our inquiry ends and we give effect to Congress’
    unambiguously expressed intent. See 
    id. If, on
    the other
    hand, Congress has not spoken to a particular issue or the
    statute is ambiguous, we may consider the responsible
    agency’s interpretation of the statutory scheme. “[I]f the
    implementing agency’s construction is reasonable, Chevron
    requires a federal court to accept the agency’s construction of
    the statute, even if the agency’s reading differs from what the
    court believes is the best statutory interpretation.” Nat’l
    Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs.,
    
    545 U.S. 967
    , 980 (2005).
    In addressing this question, we are not writing on a clean
    slate. Three other circuits have already considered the
    interplay between § 1158 and § 1231. Each has concluded
    that individuals subject to reinstated removal orders may not
    apply for asylum relief. See Jimenez-Morales v. U.S. Att’y
    Gen., 
    821 F.3d 1307
    , 1310 (11th Cir. 2016); Ramirez-Mejia
    v. Lynch, 
    794 F.3d 485
    , 491 (5th Cir. 2015) (relying on
    § 1231(a)(5)’s plain language, as well as relevant regulations
    and case law); Herrera-Molina v. Holder, 
    597 F.3d 128
    ,
    138–39 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing § 1231(a)(5)’s text as well
    as relevant circuit precedent and regulations). Although we
    find these opinions persuasive in some respects, those circuits
    did not discuss § 1158(a)(1), but mentioned it only in passing,
    see 
    Ramirez-Mejia, 794 F.3d at 490
    , or not at all, see
    
    Jimenez-Morales, 821 F.3d at 1310
    ; 
    Herrera-Molina, 597 F.3d at 38
    –39. Thus, although we reach the same
    PEREZ-GUZMAN V. LYNCH                       13
    conclusion as these other courts, we do so on somewhat
    different reasoning.
    1. Chevron Step One
    At step one of Chevron, we conclude Congress has not
    directly spoken to the interplay of § 1158(a)(1) and
    § 1231(a)(5). On the contrary, § 1158(a)(1) and § 1231(a)(5)
    are in apparent conflict. Section 1158 broadly grants “any
    alien” the opportunity to seek asylum, “regardless of such
    alien’s status,” subject only to a few exceptions not applicable
    here. Section 1231, by contrast, expressly bars aliens subject
    to reinstated removal orders from any relief under chapter 12,
    the chapter that includes asylum. In attempting to resolve this
    apparent conflict, we begin with the language of the statute,
    reading it in context and giving undefined terms their
    ordinary meanings. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dep’t of
    Revenue, 
    562 U.S. 277
    , 283–84 (2011); Synagogue v. United
    States, 
    482 F.3d 1058
    , 1061–62 (9th Cir. 2007). “Our goal is
    to understand the statute ‘as a symmetrical and coherent
    regulatory scheme’ and to ‘fit, if possible, all parts into a
    harmonious whole.’” Gila River Indian Cmty. v. United
    States, 
    729 F.3d 1139
    , 1145 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting FDA v.
    Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
    529 U.S. 120
    , 133
    (2000)).
    Each party argues the plain language of § 1158 and
    § 1231(a)(5) can be harmonized by interpreting one section
    as establishing an absolute rule to which the other section
    must yield. Perez contends § 1231(a)(5) does not really bar
    “any relief” under chapter 12, whereas the government says
    § 1158(a)(1) does not really permit “any alien” to apply for
    asylum. “Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive
    meaning.” United States v. Gonzalez, 
    520 U.S. 1
    , 5 (1997).
    14                PEREZ-GUZMAN V. LYNCH
    But within a particular statute, “[a]mbiguity is a creature . . .
    of statutory context.” Brown v. Gardner, 
    513 U.S. 115
    , 118
    (1994); see also Dada v. Mukasey, 
    554 U.S. 1
    , 16 (2008) (“In
    reading a statute we must not ‘look merely to a particular
    clause,’ but consider ‘in connection with it the whole
    statute.’” (quoting Kokozha v. Belford, 
    417 U.S. 642
    , 650
    (1974)).
    We agree with the parties that although both subsections
    use absolute language, each is qualified in certain respects
    when read in context. The text of § 1158(a)(1) states that
    “[a]ny” alien may apply for asylum “in accordance with this
    section,” regardless of immigration status. § 1158(a)(1). The
    rest of § 1158, however, undercuts the breadth of that
    guarantee by including a series of exceptions preventing
    certain aliens from applying under specific circumstances.
    See § 1158(a)(2)(A)–(C). Section 1231(a)(5)’s text is
    perhaps stronger in stating that the reinstatement of a prior
    removal order precludes “any relief under this chapter.”
    § 1231(a)(5).       But our well-settled interpretation of
    § 1231(a)(5) recognizes that, notwithstanding the prohibition
    on “any relief,” withholding of removal and CAT protection
    are available to individuals in reinstatement proceedings. See
    Ixcot v. Holder, 
    646 F.3d 1202
    , 1207 (9th Cir. 2011)
    (“Notwithstanding the seemingly absolute bar . . . aliens
    subject to [§ 1231(a)(5)] ‘may seek withholding of removal’
    . . . .” (quoting 
    Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 35
    n.4));
    Ortiz-Alfaro v. Holder, 
    694 F.3d 955
    , 956 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012)
    (assuming CAT “constrains the Attorney General from
    removing aliens . . . notwithstanding” the language of
    § 1231(a)(5)). The Attorney General’s regulations agree. See
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(e) (allowing withholding of removal);
    PEREZ-GUZMAN V. LYNCH                               15
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(4) (allowing CAT protection); 8 C.F.R.
    § 214.14(c)(1)(ii) (allowing U Visas).4
    The relevant question, however, is not simply whether the
    two provisions are absolute, but how Congress intended to
    harmonize them. If one subsection’s text were clearly
    intended to take precedence over the other, our inquiry would
    be at an end. That both provisions are qualified in certain
    respects moves us no closer to a clear answer. Neither
    subsection gives an indication of how Congress intended to
    resolve a conflict between the two. We therefore turn to the
    other “traditional tools of statutory construction” in search of
    an answer. See 
    Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843
    n.9.
    Both Perez and the government invoke the canon of
    generalia specialibus non derogant – the “principle that the
    specific governs the general” – to advance their preferred
    interpretation of the statutory scheme. See Nitro-Lift Techs.,
    LLC v. Howard, 
    133 S. Ct. 500
    , 504 (2012). The canon
    provides that a “narrow, precise, and specific” statutory
    provision is not overridden by another provision “covering a
    more generalized spectrum” of issues. Radzanower v. Touche
    Ross & Co., 
    426 U.S. 148
    , 153–54 (1976). When two statutes
    come into conflict, courts assume Congress intended specific
    4
    The government suggested for the first time at oral argument that the
    two sections do not actually conflict if “relief” is understood as a term of
    art under the INA. It posits that, in barring any “relief,” § 1231(a)(5) does
    not prevent individuals from seeking nondiscretionary forms of
    “protection” like withholding of removal and protection under CAT.
    Although one other circuit found this purported distinction persuasive, see
    
    Ramirez-Mejia, 794 F.3d at 489
    , we treat this argument as waived because
    any textual distinction between the two terms was raised for the first time
    at oral argument, see Harger v. Dep’t of Labor, 
    569 F.3d 898
    , 904 n.9 (9th
    Cir. 2009).
    16                PEREZ-GUZMAN V. LYNCH
    provisions to prevail over more general ones, see Fourco
    Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 
    353 U.S. 222
    , 228–29
    (1957), the assumption being that the more specific of two
    conflicting provisions “comes closer to addressing the very
    problem posed by the case at hand and is thus more deserving
    of credence,” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading
    Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 183 (2012).
    As Scalia and Garner acknowledge, however, it is
    “[s]ometimes . . . difficult to determine whether a provision
    is a general or a specific one.” 
    Id. at 187.
    Here, the difficulty
    is that each subsection is specific in certain respects and
    general in others. Section 1158(a)(1) is more specific in that
    it speaks narrowly to the rules governing asylum applications.
    Conversely, § 1231(a)(5) is more specific in that it speaks
    directly to the particular subset of individuals, like Perez, who
    are subject to reinstated removal orders. Although the
    government’s position may have a slight edge, both parties’
    arguments on this point are sensible. We conclude the
    general-specific canon does not help to clearly discern
    Congress’s intent as to which section should take precedence
    here.
    Nor does the legislative history of § 1158 and
    § 1231(a)(5) resolve this ambiguity. IIRIRA’s amendments
    to the INA show Congress intended to add more detail to the
    existing asylum scheme while simultaneously expanding the
    scope and consequences of the reinstatement of an earlier
    removal order. Because neither party has identified any
    legislative materials speaking directly to the availability of
    asylum in reinstatement proceedings, however, we conclude
    the legislative history “is silent on the precise issue before
    us.” 
    Chevron, 467 U.S. at 862
    .
    PEREZ-GUZMAN V. LYNCH                         17
    Perez and amici argue IIRIRA broadened the scope of
    § 1158 when it amended the statute slightly to allow “[a]ny
    alien,” rather than “an alien,” to apply for asylum. But the
    rest of § 1158(a)(1)’s text reenacted the existing language
    permitting the alien, “regardless of such alien’s status, to
    apply for asylum.” Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1980)
    (permitting “an alien physically present in the United States,
    . . . , irrespective of such alien’s status, to apply for asylum”),
    with 
    id. § 1158(a)(1)
    (1996) (providing that “[a]ny alien who
    is physically present in the United States . . . , irrespective of
    such alien’s status, may apply for asylum”). We are reluctant
    to assume Congress’ intent is clear from this change alone,
    and must read this amendment in concert with the
    simultaneous enactment of § 1231(a)(5), which was a
    completely new addition in IIRIRA. In adopting both
    changes simultaneously, Congress effectively adopted “a
    clear limitation in one section” – § 1231(a)(5) – “without
    amending another section” dealing with the same subject
    matter. See 
    Ramirez-Mejia, 794 F.3d at 490
    . This might
    suggest Congress assumed § 1231(a)(5)’s use of the phrase
    “any relief under this chapter” would most naturally be read
    as precluding asylum applications. See McNary v. Haitian
    Refugee Ctr., Inc., 
    498 U.S. 479
    , 496 (1991) (“It is
    presumable that Congress legislates with knowledge of our
    basic rules of statutory construction. . . .”).
    In sum, when read in context and compared with each
    other, § 1158(a)(1) and § 1231(a)(5) reveal no clear
    congressional intent on how to resolve a claim, like Perez’s,
    which places the two sections in conflict. Both provisions
    appear to establish broad and conflicting rules. On closer
    examination, however, it is apparent that both provisions are
    qualified in certain respects – § 1158 by various textual
    exceptions, and § 1231(a)(5) by the government’s practice
    18                  PEREZ-GUZMAN V. LYNCH
    and our precedent. Furthermore, we cannot say the general-
    specific canon clearly resolves the ambiguity in the statutory
    scheme.5 We therefore conclude Congress has not spoken
    directly to whether individuals subject to reinstated removal
    orders may apply for asylum. We accordingly proceed to
    Chevron’s second step, where we ask whether the agency’s
    interpretation of an ambiguous statute is a permissible
    construction of the statutory scheme. See 
    Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843
    .
    2. Chevron Step Two
    Before we address the substance of the agency’s
    interpretation, we must briefly discuss Perez and amici’s
    argument that 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(e) should not be accorded
    Chevron deference because the agency failed to adequately
    explain its reasoning when it promulgated the regulation in
    1999. We do not reach the merits of this argument because
    it is untimely.
    5
    Perez also cites the “longstanding principle of construing any lingering
    ambiguities in [removal] statutes in favor of the alien.” INS v. Cardoza-
    Fonseca, 
    480 U.S. 421
    , 449 (1987). Like the rule of lenity, this rule is a
    tiebreaker in the case of insoluble – or “lingering” – ambiguity. Id.; see
    Lagandaon v. Ashcroft, 
    383 F.3d 983
    , 993 (9th Cir. 2004). As we have
    held in the criminal context, however, “[t]he rule of lenity . . . does not
    prevent an agency from resolving statutory ambiguity through a valid
    regulation.” Pacheco-Camacho v. Hood, 
    272 F.3d 1266
    , 1271–72 (9th
    Cir. 2001) (citing Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great
    Or., 
    515 U.S. 687
    , 704 n.18 (1995)); see also Mujahid v. Daniels,
    
    413 F.3d 991
    , 998–99 (9th Cir. 2005) (prioritizing the rule of lenity over
    Chevron deference “is tenuous at best and requires us to fill in more
    blanks than we are willing to do”).
    PEREZ-GUZMAN V. LYNCH                               19
    a. Timeliness
    Procedural challenges to agency rules under the
    Administrative Procedure Act are subject to the general six-
    year limitations period in the U.S. Code. See Wind River
    Mining Corp. v. United States, 
    946 F.2d 710
    , 713–14 (9th
    Cir. 1991) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a)). Under Wind River,
    challenges to a “mere procedural violation in the adoption of
    a regulation or other agency action” must be brought within
    six years of the agency rulemaking, whereas challenges to
    “the substance of an agency’s decision as exceeding
    constitutional or statutory authority” may be brought any time
    “within six years of the agency’s application of the disputed
    decision to the challenger.” 
    Id. at 715–16.
    Whether Perez’s
    challenges are timely therefore depends on whether they are
    procedural or substantive.6
    Perez’s central claim is that the Attorney General’s
    refusal to consider his asylum application is based on an
    unreasonable interpretation of § 1158 and § 1231(a)(5). The
    parties agree this is a substantive challenge. Because it was
    brought within six years of the BIA’s refusal to consider
    Perez’s asylum application, it is timely. See Cal. Sea Urchin
    Comm’n v. Bean, ___ F.3d ___, 
    2016 WL 3739700
    , at *4 (9th
    6
    Perez argues we should not rule on timeliness because the government
    did not raise it until supplemental briefing. We have given both parties
    “ample opportunity to address the issue” through supplemental briefing,
    and will exercise our discretion to decide it. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v.
    Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 
    508 U.S. 439
    , 447–48 (1993). Although
    the government suggested in supplemental briefing that Perez’s challenge
    is substantive, there is no “impropriety in refusing to accept what in effect
    [is the parties’] stipulation on a question of law.” 
    Id. at 448.
    In addition,
    the government noted that “[i]f this were . . . a procedural challenge . . .
    it would be time-barred.”
    20               PEREZ-GUZMAN V. LYNCH
    Cir. July 12, 2016) (holding timely a challenge to “the present
    application of an earlier rule that allegedly contradicted the
    agency’s statutory authority”).
    Perez and amici also argue that 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31 merits
    no deference at Chevron step two because the agency
    allegedly failed to explain its interpretation of § 1158 and
    § 1231 when it originally promulgated the regulation. This
    portion of their challenge, in other words, alleges “a
    procedural violation in the adoption of a regulation.” Wind
    
    River, 946 F.2d at 714
    . We conclude that although Perez’s
    arguments about the substance of 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31’s
    interpretation are timely, his arguments about the alleged
    procedural errors in its promulgation are not. We therefore
    decline to consider them. See also Sai Kwan Wong v. Doar,
    
    571 F.3d 247
    , 262–63 (2d Cir. 2009) (collecting cases).
    The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Encino
    Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 
    136 S. Ct. 2117
    (2016), supports
    this approach. There, the Court held an agency regulation
    that represented a change in longstanding agency position
    was not entitled to Chevron deference because the agency had
    failed to adequately explain its change in position. The Court
    explained that a “basic procedural requirement[] of
    administrative rulemaking is that an agency must give
    adequate reasons for its decisions.” 
    Id. at 2125
    (emphasis
    added); see also 
    id. (“Chevron deference
    is not warranted
    where the regulation is ‘procedurally defective’ – that is,
    where the agency errs by failing to follow the correct
    procedures in issuing the regulation.”). “Of course,” it noted,
    “a party might be foreclosed in some instances from
    challenging the procedures used to promulgate a given rule.”
    
    Id. (citing JEM
    Broad. Co. v. FCC, 
    22 F.3d 320
    , 324–26
    (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
    PEREZ-GUZMAN V. LYNCH                      21
    JEM Broadcasting arose in a similar procedural posture
    to this case. The FCC had earlier promulgated a rule
    preventing review of certain license applications that included
    inaccurate or incomplete information. See JEM 
    Broad., 22 F.3d at 322
    –23. The FCC subsequently declined to review
    JEM’s defective application by citing that rule, and JEM
    sought to “attack . . . the procedural genesis of the [rule] in
    the context of an enforcement action,” by arguing the rule had
    been improperly promulgated without notice and comment
    years earlier. 
    Id. at 324.
    The D.C. Circuit held JEM’s
    challenge was untimely:
    JEM does not claim . . . that the “hard look”
    rules are unconstitutional, that they exceed the
    scope of the FCC’s substantive authority, or
    . . . that the rules are premised on an
    erroneous interpretation of a statutory
    term. . . .
    [C]hallenges to the procedural lineage of
    agency regulations, whether raised by direct
    appeal . . . or as a defense to an agency
    enforcement proceeding, will not be
    entertained outside the . . . period provided by
    statute.
    
    Id. at 325
    (quoting Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC,
    
    939 F.2d 1035
    , 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). Although it
    recognized that “some parties – such as those not yet in
    existence when a rule is promulgated” – would “never . . .
    have the opportunity to challenge the procedural lineage of
    rules that are applied to their detriment,” the court concluded
    “the law countenances this result because of the value of
    repose.” 
    Id. at 326.
    We have reached the same conclusion.
    22                   PEREZ-GUZMAN V. LYNCH
    See Wind 
    River, 946 F.2d at 715
    (“The government’s interest
    in finality outweighs a late-comer’s desire to protest the
    agency’s action as a matter of policy or procedure.”); see also
    Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 
    177 F.3d 1126
    , 1129 (9th
    Cir. 1999) (noting a limitations period on procedural
    challenges is necessary “so that regulations are not
    indefinitely subject to challenge in court”).7
    In the absence of binding contrary authority, we apply the
    approach required by Wind River and approved by the
    Supreme Court in Encino Motorcars to conclude Perez’s
    procedural challenge to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(e) falls outside
    the limitations period. We therefore move on to determine
    whether 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(e) is a permissible construction
    of the statute under Chevron step two.
    b. The Chevron Step Two Inquiry
    At step two of Chevron, we must “accept the agency’s
    construction of the statute” so long as that reading is
    reasonable, “even if the agency’s reading differs from what
    the court believes is the best statutory interpretation.” Brand
    7
    Perez also argues his challenge is timely because the agency “fail[ed]
    to put aggrieved parties on reasonable notice of the rule’s content.” JEM
    
    Broad., 22 F.3d at 326
    . We disagree. We noted in Wind River that
    “‘[p]ublication in the Federal Register is legally sufficient notice to all
    interested or affected persons regardless of actual knowledge or hardship
    resulting from 
    ignorance.’” 946 F.2d at 714
    (alteration in original)
    (quoting Shiny Rock Mining Corp. v. United States, 
    906 F.2d 1362
    , 1364
    (9th Cir. 1990)). Here, the notice published in the Federal Register was
    sufficient to inform an interested party the regulation created a streamlined
    system for assessing claims from individuals in reinstatement proceedings
    and that the agency viewed such individuals as ineligible for asylum. See
    64 Fed. Reg. at 8485, discussed above at pp. 9–10.
    PEREZ-GUZMAN V. LYNCH                              23
    X Internet 
    Servs., 545 U.S. at 980
    . Deference “is especially
    appropriate in the immigration context where officials
    ‘exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate
    questions of foreign relations.’” INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre,
    
    526 U.S. 415
    , 425 (1999) (quoting INS v. Abudu, 
    485 U.S. 94
    ,
    110 (1988)). With these principles in mind, we consider
    whether 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(e), which prevents individuals
    subject to reinstated removal orders from applying for asylum
    but permits them to seek withholding of removal, is a
    reasonable interpretation of § 1158 and § 1231. We conclude
    it is.8
    8
    Perez and amici argue 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(e) does not merit Chevron
    deference because the agency failed to exercise its interpretive authority
    at all and treated § 1231(a)(5) as unambiguous. They therefore suggest we
    should remand to the agency under the rule expressed in Negusie v.
    Holder, 
    555 U.S. 511
    (2009), and Gila River Indian Community v. United
    States, 
    729 F.3d 1139
    (9th Cir. 2013). We reject this suggestion. The
    government’s argument on appeal that the statute is unambiguous does not
    tell us how the agency viewed the statute when it initially promulgated the
    regulation. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 
    488 U.S. 204
    , 213
    (1988) (noting appellate counsel’s “convenient litigating position” is not
    entitled to deference). Rather, agency action rises or falls on the agency’s
    own contemporaneous reasoning, and where we have remanded under
    Negusie the administrative record has more clearly shown that “the agency
    misapprehended the clarity of the statute” and “mistakenly derermine[d]
    that its interpretation [was] mandated by plain meaning, or some other
    binding rule,” Gila 
    River, 729 F.3d at 1149
    (emphasis added). The
    administrative history does not discuss the specific language of the asylum
    statute, but neither does it suggest the agency saw § 1231(a)(5) as
    compelling the regulation’s particular approach to asylum, withholding of
    removal or CAT protection. On the contrary, the agency’s explanation
    shows it applied its expertise by crafting an expedited screening process
    and balancing the fair resolution of claims for relief from removal against
    Congress’ desire to provide for streamlined removal of certain classes of
    individuals, including those subject to reinstated removal orders. See
    64 Fed. Reg. at 8485, discussed above at pp. 9–10.
    24               PEREZ-GUZMAN V. LYNCH
    First, the regulation is consistent with a reasonable
    judgment that § 1231(a)(5) is a more specific provision than
    § 1158, even if not conclusively so, and is therefore “more
    deserving of credence” when the two provisions conflict.
    Scalia & 
    Gardner, supra, at 183
    . As discussed, both parties
    advance reasonable arguments for why the canon favors their
    interpretations of the statutory scheme. At step two, however,
    “we are not deciding between two plausible statutory
    constructions; we are evaluating an agency’s interpretation of
    a statute under Chevron.” Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales,
    
    486 F.3d 484
    , 492 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). It was not
    unreasonable for the agency to conclude § 1231(a)(5)’s
    prohibition on “any relief under this chapter” forecloses
    individuals from applying for asylum relief. Indeed, the other
    circuits to consider this issue have concluded it does. See
    
    Jimenez-Morales, 821 F.3d at 1310
    ; 
    Ramirez-Mejia, 794 F.3d at 490
    ; 
    Herrera-Molina, 597 F.3d at 138
    –39.
    Second, the agency’s approach is consistent with
    Congress’ intent in IIRIRA that the reinstatement of a
    previous removal order would cut off certain avenues for
    relief from removal. Reinstatement was designed to be “a
    different and far more summary procedure” than regular
    removal. 
    Moralez-Izquierdo, 486 F.3d at 491
    . To that end,
    Congress intended § 1231(a)(5) to subject more individuals
    to reinstatement proceedings and to “limit[] the possible relief
    from a removal order available to them.” 
    Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 33
    ; see also 
    Ramirez-Mejia, 794 F.3d at 490
    .
    Forbidding asylum applications from individuals in
    reinstatement proceedings, although harsh, is in keeping with
    this approach. See Barnhart v. Walton, 
    535 U.S. 212
    , 219
    (2002) (upholding an agency construction that made
    “considerable sense in terms of the statute’s basic
    objectives”). Furthermore, the agency’s interpretation is a
    PEREZ-GUZMAN V. LYNCH                       25
    reasonable construction of the legislative history we
    discussed above, which is at least consistent with the view
    that, in enacting § 1158(a)(1) and § 1231(a)(5) together,
    Congress assumed the phrase “any relief under this chapter”
    would include the asylum provision in the statute. See
    
    Chevron, 467 U.S. at 862
    (noting that when legislative history
    “as a whole is silent” on the “precise issue” before the court,
    it may nonetheless be “consistent” with a particular
    interpretation of the statute). Had Congress intended to
    include a carve-out for asylum relief, it could have done so
    explicitly when it wrote § 1231(a)(5) or revised § 1158.
    There are nonetheless some weaknesses in the agency’s
    approach, but they are not fatal to its interpretation. We have
    already noted that, notwithstanding § 1231(a)(5)’s bar on
    “any relief” under chapter 12, the Attorney General has
    interpreted that section to permit individuals to seek
    withholding of removal, CAT protection and U Visas – all
    forms of relief that, like asylum, arise under chapter 12. See
    8 C.F.R. §§ 214.14(c)(1)(ii), 1208.16(c)(4), 1208.31(e). The
    government suggests this policy draws a reasonable line
    between discretionary and nondiscretionary relief, and the
    Supreme Court acknowledged “the practical import of th[at]
    distinction,” albeit in a slightly different context. Cf. INS v.
    Cardoza-Fonseca, 
    480 U.S. 421
    , 444 (1987) (holding it was
    “not . . . at all anomalous” that asylum applicants and
    applicants for withholding were governed by different
    standards of proof and stating there was “no basis for the . . .
    assertion that the discretionary/mandatory distinction has no
    practical significance”).
    This explanation, however, fails to account for why,
    under the Attorney General’s regulations, individuals in
    reinstatement are permitted to apply for U Visas – a form of
    26                  PEREZ-GUZMAN V. LYNCH
    discretionary relief – but not for asylum. It may be relevant
    that U Visas were created in 2000, four years after IIRIRA
    implemented the revised asylum statute and the reinstatement
    bar. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Prevention Act
    of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 1513, 114 Stat. 1464. In
    concluding that the Attorney General’s approach in 8 C.F.R.
    § 1208.31(e) is reasonable under Chevron, however, we note
    the Supreme Court apparently found nothing inconsistent
    between the “absolute terms” by which § 1231(a)(5) bars
    relief and the government’s decision to make certain forms of
    relief from removal available in reinstatement proceedings.
    See 
    Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 35
    n.4 (“Notwithstanding
    the absolute terms in which the bar on relief is stated, even an
    alien subject to [§ 1231(a)(5)] may seek withholding of
    removal under [§ 1231(b)(3)] . . . , or under 8 C.F.R.
    §§ 241.8(e) and 208.31. . . .” (emphasis added)); see also
    
    Jimenez-Morales, 821 F.3d at 1310
    (citing Fernandez-
    
    Vargas, 548 U.S. at 35
    n.4); 
    Herrera-Molina, 597 F.3d at 139
    n.8 (same).9 Although the availability of asylum is an
    important component of our immigration law, it is not
    unreasonable to conclude Congress intended to bar this form
    of relief to persons in reinstated removal proceedings while
    preserving relief for individuals able to meet the higher
    standards for withholding of removal and CAT relief. See
    Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 
    813 F.3d 240
    , 241 (5th Cir. 2016)
    (denying rehearing en banc) (“Even if withholding of removal
    and CAT protection are slightly less potent remedies than
    9
    In Fernandez-Vargas, the Supreme Court parenthetically described
    8 C.F.R. §§ 241.8(e) and 208.31 as “raising the possibility of 
    asylum.” 548 U.S. at 35
    n.4. This appears to have been an oversight; although both
    regulations refer to “asylum officers,” they clearly permit only
    withholding from removal. Indeed, the main text of the Court’s footnote
    correctly refers only to “seek[ing] withholding of removal” under those
    regulations.
    PEREZ-GUZMAN V. LYNCH                      27
    asylum, the difference may well be consistent with
    Congress’s intent to penalize illegal reentry. We need not
    justify the difference, but we note possible reasons for it.”).
    In addition, although the Attorney General’s
    interpretation makes sense as applied to an individual who
    has already had an opportunity to seek asylum upon his initial
    entry to the United States, it does not account for individuals
    in reinstatement proceedings who may have compelling
    claims based on new circumstances arising subsequent to
    their previous removal proceedings. The Attorney General’s
    interpretation of § 1231(a)(5) may have dire humanitarian
    consequences for individuals in reinstatement who seek relief
    from removal, either because they were previously denied
    asylum and are now subject to changed circumstances or
    because they were improperly denied an opportunity to seek
    asylum during their earlier removal from the United States.
    However, the government has discretion to forgo
    reinstatement and instead place an individual in ordinary
    removal proceedings. See Villa-Anguiano v. Holder,
    
    727 F.3d 873
    , 878 (9th Cir. 2013). Once in ordinary
    proceedings, the individual can raise an asylum application
    without implicating § 1231(a)(5)’s bar. The government has
    followed this procedure before, see, e.g., Maldonado Lopez
    v. Holder, No. 12-72800 (9th Cir. dismissed Feb. 4, 2014),
    and we assume it will continue to exercise that discretion in
    appropriate cases, such as those presenting strong
    humanitarian concerns. To the extent this consideration
    “really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather
    than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open
    by Congress,” it cannot invalidate the agency’s interpretation
    at Chevron’s second step. See 
    Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866
    .
    28               PEREZ-GUZMAN V. LYNCH
    In sum, despite our reservations, we are not persuaded
    that 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(e)’s interpretation of § 1231(a)(5)
    and § 1158(a)(1) is an unreasonable construction of the
    statute. See 
    Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843
    –44. It is consistent
    with the broad language of § 1231(a)(5), with Congress’
    intent to make reinstatement an expedited process for
    removing individuals who reenter the United States and with
    the overall legislative history of both provisions.
    Perez’s remaining arguments to the contrary are not
    persuasive. First, Perez and amici argue the Attorney
    General’s interpretation of § 1231(a)(5) is contrary to the
    structure of § 1158 itself. They focus in particular on
    § 1158(a)(2)(D), which provides that an applicant’s second
    asylum application “may be considered” if he shows changed
    circumstances materially affecting his eligibility for asylum.
    Perez and amici argue that if § 1231(a)(5) categorically
    forbids an individual in reinstatement from applying for
    asylum, § 1158(a)(2)(D) is superfluous. This argument
    incorrectly assumes that any individual to whom
    § 1158(a)(2)(D) applies will necessarily be subject to a
    reinstated removal order. Not so. The reinstatement of a
    prior removal order is neither “automatic” nor “obligatory,”
    and the Attorney General has discretion not to reinstate an
    individual’s earlier removal order and instead place him in
    ordinary removal proceedings. See 
    Villa-Anguiano, 727 F.3d at 878
    (quoting Alcala v. Holder, 
    563 F.3d 1009
    , 1013 (9th
    Cir. 2009)). If the Attorney General elects to place an
    individual who previously applied for and was denied asylum
    into ordinary removal proceedings upon his reentry to the
    United States, § 1158(a)(2)(D) is not superfluous. On the
    contrary, it affirmatively authorizes a second asylum claim in
    PEREZ-GUZMAN V. LYNCH                            29
    light of his changed circumstances – something that would
    ordinarily be precluded by § 1158(a)(2)(C).10
    Second, Perez and amici argue the asylum statute is a
    “closed universe” unaffected by other portions of the INA.
    In other words, they suggest § 1158’s enumerated exceptions
    for eligibility to apply for asylum are exhaustive. Amici note
    the asylum scheme makes no reference to § 1231(a)(5), and
    suggest § 1158 was intended to govern asylum applications
    independent of the rest of the INA. The Attorney General,
    however, is not unreasonable for adopting a contrary view.
    None of the various provisions for relief under the INA
    explicitly refers to § 1231(a)(5), but § 1231(a)(5) specifies
    “any relief under this chapter.” No explicit cross-reference to
    every affected section is necessary for us to conclude that
    “any relief under this chapter” can reasonably be read to
    preclude applications for asylum, a form of relief arising
    under chapter 12.
    For the foregoing reasons, we hold that 8 C.F.R.
    § 1208.31(e) is a reasonable interpretation of the interplay
    between § 1158 and § 1231, and we must therefore defer to
    it under Chevron. In keeping with that regulation, Perez is
    not eligible to apply for asylum under § 1158 as long as he is
    subject to a reinstated removal order.
    10
    Perez is a first-time asylum claimant, and alleges no circumstances
    that materially changed between his removal from the United States and
    his subsequent reentry. We therefore have no opportunity here to
    determine how § 1158(a)(2)(D) might affect § 1231(a)(5) in a case where
    those two provisions are actually in conflict.
    30                PEREZ-GUZMAN V. LYNCH
    C. Withholding of Removal and CAT Relief
    After the BIA concluded Perez had not shown past
    persecution on account of his membership in a particular
    social group, we held witnesses who testify against gang
    members may constitute a “particular social group.” See
    Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 
    707 F.3d 1081
    , 1092 (9th Cir.
    2013) (en banc). In addition, after the BIA rejected Perez’s
    CAT claim because there was no evidence the Guatemalan
    government sanctioned his abuse by police, we held that local
    officials’ acquiescence in torture is sufficient to entitle an
    applicant to CAT relief, even if the national government did
    not acquiesce in the treatment. See Madrigal v. Holder,
    
    716 F.3d 499
    , 509 (9th Cir. 2013). In light of these
    intervening authorities, the parties agree we should remand
    on Perez’s claims for withholding of removal and CAT relief.
    III. Conclusion
    We remand for the agency to reconsider Perez’s
    applications for withholding of removal and CAT protection
    in light of Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 
    707 F.3d 1081
    (9th Cir.
    2013) (en banc), and Madrigal v. Holder, 
    716 F.3d 499
    (9th
    Cir. 2013). We affirm the BIA’s conclusion that it could not
    consider Perez’s application for asylum relief in light of his
    reinstated removal order.
    PETITION GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN
    PART; REMANDED TO THE BIA.
    Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-70579

Citation Numbers: 835 F.3d 1066, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16109

Judges: Fisher, Smith, Nguyen

Filed Date: 8/31/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024

Authorities (35)

Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca , 107 S. Ct. 1207 ( 1987 )

Raul Morales-Izquierdo v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney ... , 486 F.3d 484 ( 2007 )

Gabriel Espinoza-Gutierrez v. Richard C. Smith, District ... , 94 F.3d 1270 ( 1996 )

Dada v. Mukasey , 128 S. Ct. 2307 ( 2008 )

CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Alabama Department of Revenue , 131 S. Ct. 1101 ( 2011 )

Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Abudu , 108 S. Ct. 904 ( 1988 )

McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. , 111 S. Ct. 888 ( 1991 )

United States National Bank v. Independent Insurance Agents ... , 113 S. Ct. 2173 ( 1993 )

United States v. Gonzales , 117 S. Ct. 1032 ( 1997 )

Nitro-Lift Technologies, L. L. C. v. Howard , 133 S. Ct. 500 ( 2012 )

Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Aguirre-Aguirre , 119 S. Ct. 1439 ( 1999 )

National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X ... , 125 S. Ct. 2688 ( 2005 )

Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, ... , 104 S. Ct. 2778 ( 1984 )

Ixcot v. Holder , 646 F.3d 1202 ( 2011 )

Food & Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco ... , 120 S. Ct. 1291 ( 2000 )

Wind River Mining Corporation v. United States of America ... , 946 F.2d 710 ( 1991 )

Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp. , 77 S. Ct. 787 ( 1957 )

Melquiades T. Lagandaon v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General , 383 F.3d 983 ( 2004 )

shiny-rock-mining-corporation-v-united-states-of-america-us-department , 906 F.2d 1362 ( 1990 )

Sabil M. Mujahid v. Charles A. Daniels, Warden , 413 F.3d 991 ( 2005 )

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