United Cook Inlet Drift Ass'n v. National Marine Fisheries Service , 837 F.3d 1055 ( 2016 )


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  •                 FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT                No. 14-35928
    ASSOCIATION; COOK INLET
    FISHERMEN’S FUND,                         D.C. No.
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,    3:13-cv-00104-TMB
    v.
    OPINION
    NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES
    SERVICE; PENNY PRITZKER, in
    her official capacity as Acting
    United States Secretary of
    Commerce; KATHRYN
    SULLIVAN, Acting Under
    Secretary of Commerce and
    Administrator for the National
    Oceanic and Atmospheric
    Administration; JAMES W.
    BALSIGER, in his official
    capacity as NMFS Alaska
    Region Administrator,
    Defendants-Appellees,
    STATE OF ALASKA,
    Intervenor-Defendant-
    Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Alaska
    Timothy M. Burgess, Chief Judge, Presiding
    2        UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT ASS’N V. NMFS
    Argued and Submitted August 2, 2016
    Anchorage, Alaska
    Filed September 21, 2016
    Before: Raymond C. Fisher, Richard A. Paez,
    and Andrew D. Hurwitz, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Hurwitz
    SUMMARY *
    Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
    Management Act
    The panel reversed the district court’s summary
    judgment in favor of the government in an action under the
    Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
    Act brought by two groups of commercial fishermen urging
    the rejection of Amendment 12, which removed the historic
    net-fishing area of Cook Inlet from the Salmon Fishery
    Management Plan (“FMP”); and remanded with instructions
    that judgment be entered in favor of plaintiffs.
    The panel held that the National Marine Fisheries
    Service cannot exempt a fishery under its authority that
    required conservation and management from an FMP
    because the agency is content with State management. The
    panel held that the Magnuson-Stevens Act unambiguously
    *
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT ASS’N V. NMFS             3
    requires a Regional Fishery Management Council to create
    an FMP for each fishery under its authority that requires
    conservation and management. The panel further held that
    the Magnuson-Stevens Act allowed delegation to a state
    under the FMP, but did not excuse the obligation to adopt an
    FMP when a Regional Fishery Management Council opted
    for state management.         The panel concluded that
    Amendment 12 was therefore contrary to law to the extent
    that it removed Cook Inlet from the FMP.
    COUNSEL
    Jason T. Morgan (argued) and Beth S. Ginsberg, Stoel Rives
    LLP, Seattle, Washington, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
    Ellen J. Durkee (argued) and Coby Howell, Attorneys,
    Appellate Section; John C. Cruden, Assistant Attorney
    General; Environment and Natural Resources Division,
    United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.;
    Caroline Park, NOAA Office of the General Counsel, Silver
    Spring, Maryland; Lauren Smoker, NOAA Office of the
    General Counsel, Department of Commerce, Juneau,
    Alaska; for Defendants-Appellees.
    Seth M. Beausang (argued), Assistant Attorney General,
    Anchorage, Alaska, for Intervenor-Defendant-Appellee.
    4       UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT ASS’N V. NMFS
    OPINION
    HURWITZ, Circuit Judge:
    The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
    Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–91 (“Magnuson-
    Stevens Act,” or “the Act”), creates a “national program for
    the conservation and management of the fishery resources of
    the United States.” 
    Id. § 1801(a)(6).
    The Act establishes
    eight Regional Fishery Management Councils, each of
    which “shall” prepare a fishery management plan (“FMP”)
    “for each fishery under its authority that requires
    conservation and management.” 
    Id. § 1852(a),
    (h)(1). The
    Secretary of Commerce, acting through the National Marine
    Fisheries Service (“NMFS”), then reviews each FMP or
    amendment of a plan “to determine whether it is consistent
    with the [Act’s] national standards, the other provisions of
    this chapter, and any other applicable law,” 16 U.S.C.
    § 1854(a)(1). See Or. Trollers Ass’n v. Gutierrez, 
    452 F.3d 1104
    , 1108 (9th Cir. 2006).
    The issue for decision is whether NMFS can exempt a
    fishery under its authority that requires conservation and
    management from an FMP because the agency is content
    with State management. The district court held that it could.
    We disagree, and reverse.
    BACKGROUND
    I. Factual and Legislative Background
    Cook Inlet is one of the nation’s most productive salmon
    fisheries. Its salmon are anadromous, beginning their lives
    in Alaskan freshwater, migrating to the ocean, and returning
    to freshwater to spawn.
    UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT ASS’N V. NMFS                 5
    In 1953, the United States entered into the International
    Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific
    Ocean. In response, Congress enacted the North Pacific
    Fisheries Act of 1954 (the “1954 Act”), authorizing the
    Secretary of the Interior to promulgate regulations governing
    fisheries contiguous to Alaskan waters. See Pub. L. No. 83-
    579, §§ 10 & 12, 68 Stat. 698, 699–700 (previously codified
    at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1021–35). The Secretary then issued a
    regulation prohibiting salmon net fishing in the western
    waters of Alaska, but excepting Cook Inlet and two other
    areas where net fishing had historically been permitted under
    Alaska law; in those areas, federal regulation was to mirror
    existing Alaskan regulation. 50 C.F.R. § 210.10 (repealed).
    Before 1976, the United States asserted authority only
    over waters up to twelve nautical miles from the coastline,
    and there was substantial concern that foreign fishers were
    depleting American fisheries. See Mark H. Zilberberg, A
    Legislative History of the Fishery Conservation
    & Management Act of 1976 (“Legislative History”) 237–41,
    352, 448–49, 455–56, 472–73, 476–81, 519 (1976). In 1976,
    Congress enacted the Fishery Conservation and
    Management Act (the “1976 Act”), Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90
    Stat 331 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1891),
    later renamed the Magnuson-Stevens Act. The 1976 Act
    extended federal jurisdiction to 200 miles from the coastline,
    
    id. § 101
    (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1811), and
    regulated foreign fishing in that area, 
    id. §§ 201,
    204
    (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1824). States
    retained jurisdiction over the first three miles from the coast,
    
    id. § 306(a)
    (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1856), and
    the federal government had jurisdiction over the next 197
    miles, originally called the fishery conservation zone
    (“FCZ”) and later named the exclusive economic zone
    (“EEZ”), 
    id. § 101
    (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
    6       UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT ASS’N V. NMFS
    § 1811). See also 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1); Exclusive
    Economic Zone of the United States of America, 48 Fed.
    Reg. 10,605 (Mar. 10, 1983).
    The federal government manages its waters through
    eight regional Councils. 16 U.S.C. § 1852. During the
    debate on the 1976 Act, Senator Gravel of Alaska criticized
    the concept of federal management on one side of the three-
    mile line and state management on the other, because fish
    freely travel across the three-mile boundary. Legislative
    History 412–13, 460–67. Senator Gravel suggested that a
    state should manage its federal waters under a plan approved
    by the federal government. 
    Id. at 467,
    471. Senator Stevens
    of Alaska, one of the bill’s managers, offered an even
    broader proposal, which provided for exclusive state
    management of “[t]hose fisheries capable of being managed
    as a unit, which reside principally within the waters of a
    single State.” 
    Id. at 422.
    But, Congress instead approved a
    more modest substitute offered by the bill’s other manager,
    Senator Magnuson, directing Councils, if possible, to
    incorporate state management measures in FMPs. Id.; 1976
    Act § 305(c) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1855).
    In 1979, NMFS promulgated an FMP for salmon
    fisheries near Alaska. See Fishery Management Plan for the
    High Seas Salmon, 44 Fed. Reg. 33,250 (June 8, 1979) (the
    “Salmon FMP”). The Salmon FMP divided Alaskan federal
    waters into East and West Areas; Cook Inlet is in the West
    Area. 
    Id. at 33,267.
    With respect to the West Area, the FMP
    tracked the regulations promulgated under the 1954 Act
    prohibiting commercial salmon fishing except in the three
    historic net-fishing areas, including Cook Inlet, which the
    State would continue to manage. 
    Id. (“These fisheries
    are
    technically in the FCZ, but are conducted and managed by
    the State of Alaska as inside fisheries.”). The decision to
    UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT ASS’N V. NMFS               7
    leave these fisheries in the hands of the State was not based
    on a finding that they were in good health; to the contrary,
    the Salmon FMP found that “[a]ll salmon species are at
    historic low levels in the Cook Inlet management area, with
    chinook stocks seriously depleted.” 
    Id. at 33,309.
    In 1983, Congress amended the Act to specify that a
    Council need only prepare an FMP with respect to a fishery
    “that requires conservation and management.” Pub. L. No.
    97-453, § 5(4), 96 Stat. 2481, 2486 (codified as amended at
    16 U.S.C. § 1852(h)(1)). The conference report explained
    this amendment was intended “to clarify that the function of
    the Councils is not to prepare a fishery management plan
    (FMP) for each and every fishery within their geographical
    areas of authority. Rather, such plans are to be developed
    for those fisheries which require conservation and
    management.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-982, 97th Cong., 2d
    Sess., at *18.
    Alaska had proposed to amend the Act “to direct the
    Secretary of Commerce to delegate authority of a domestic
    fishery in the FCZ to the adjacent state . . . if . . . 1) the
    fishery does not cross interstate boundaries; and 2) the State
    is capable and willing to provide conservation and
    management consistent with the National Standards.”
    Omnibus Authorization Bill for the National Oceanic and
    Atmospheric Administration: Hearings Before the S. Comm.
    on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., Serial No. 97-118, 97 Cong.
    310 (1982) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Ronald O.
    Skoog, Commissioner, Alaska Department of Fish and
    Game). But, this proposal was not enacted. See Pub. L. No.
    97-453, § 5(4), 96 Stat. 2481, 2486 (1982).
    The Salmon FMP was revised in 1990. The revised FMP
    stated that, under the regulation implementing the 1954 Act,
    50 C.F.R. § 210, salmon net fishing in the West Area was
    8       UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT ASS’N V. NMFS
    prohibited, with the exception of the three historic net-
    fishing areas, which “technically extend into the EEZ, but
    . . . are conducted and managed by the State of Alaska as
    nearshore fisheries.”
    In 1992, a new international convention prohibited all
    fishing for anadromous fish beyond the EEZ. Convention
    for the Conservation of Anadromous Stocks in the North
    Pacific Ocean, art. I, III. Congress promptly implemented
    that convention and repealed the 1954 Act. North Pacific
    Anadromous Stocks Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-567,
    §§ 801–14, 106 Stat. 4309 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 5001–
    5012). The Secretary of Commerce then concluded that
    regulations promulgated under the 1954 Act, including
    50 C.F.R. § 210, no longer had statutory support, and
    repealed them. Removal of Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg.
    39,271, 39,272 (Aug. 2, 1995). But, the Salmon FMP was
    not revised, and Alaska continued to manage the three
    historic net fisheries.
    In 1995, a fishing vessel, “Mister Big,” engaged in a
    massive unregulated harvest of scallops in the federal waters
    of Prince William Sound. See Trawler Diane Marie, Inc. v.
    Brown, 
    918 F. Supp. 921
    (E.D.N.C. 1995). That scallop
    fishery was not covered by an FMP, but the Magnuson-
    Stevens Act provided that a State could regulate fishing
    vessels in federal waters that were registered in that state. 
    Id. at 924,
    926; see Pub. L. No. 98-623, § 404(4), 98 Stat. 3394,
    3408 (1984) (“[A] State may not directly or indirectly
    regulate any fishing vessel outside its boundaries, unless the
    vessel is registered under the law of that State.”). The Mister
    Big set sail from Seattle, renounced its Alaska registration,
    and began fishing for scallops in the Sound. Trawler Diane
    
    Marie, 918 F. Supp. at 924
    . By January 26, 1995, the quota
    that Alaska set for the area, 50,000 pounds of scallops, had
    UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT ASS’N V. NMFS                  9
    been harvested, so Alaska closed the scallop season and
    Alaska-registered boats returned home. 
    Id. But, the
    Mister
    Big continued to dredge, eventually harvesting 52,000
    pounds of scallops before the Secretary of Commerce
    approved an emergency closure of the fishery. 
    Id. at 925,
    927. The North Pacific Council had drafted an FMP which
    addressed the possibility that an unregulated vessel might
    fish for scallops in the federal waters off Alaska, but had not
    adopted it “because of the belief that all vessels fishing in the
    EEZ would be registered in Alaska and thus bound by the
    state’s regulations.” 
    Id. at 926.
    The following year, Congress revised the provision
    regarding state authority to regulate fishing vessels in federal
    waters. See Sustainable Fisheries Act, Pub. L. No. 104-297,
    § 112, 110 Stat. 3559, 3595–97 (1996). After that
    amendment, the Magnuson-Stevens Act now provides, in
    relevant part:
    A State may regulate a fishing vessel outside
    the boundaries of the State in the following
    circumstances:
    (A) The fishing vessel is registered under the
    law of that State, and (i) there is no fishery
    management plan or other applicable Federal
    fishing regulations for the fishery in which
    the vessel is operating; or (ii) the State’s laws
    and regulations are consistent with the
    fishery management plan and applicable
    Federal fishing regulations for the fishery in
    which the vessel is operating.
    (B) The fishery management plan for the
    fishery in which the fishing vessel is
    operating delegates management of the
    10      UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT ASS’N V. NMFS
    fishery to a State and the State’s laws and
    regulations are consistent with such fishery
    management plan.
    16 U.S.C. § 1856(a)(3). The version of the bill reported out
    of the House Committee on Resources would have
    authorized Alaska to enforce its regulations in federal waters
    even absent an FMP. H.R. Rep. No. 104-171, at *11–12
    (1995). But, that version was not enacted. Pub. L. No. 104-
    297, § 112.
    II. Amendment 12
    The North Pacific Council has jurisdiction over the
    federal waters of Cook Inlet. Six of its 11 voting members
    are from Alaska and the remainder are from Washington and
    Oregon. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a)(1)(G), (b)(1), (b)(2)(C).
    In 2010, the North Pacific Council began a
    comprehensive review of the Salmon FMP. As a result,
    NMFS “realized” that Cook Inlet was “not exempt from the
    FMP as previously assumed.” Council staff prepared a
    discussion paper, which summarized the situation as
    follows:
    The FMP is vague on the function of the FMP
    in these areas. Though the FMP broadly
    includes these three areas and the salmon and
    fisheries that occur there within the fishery
    management unit and states that management
    of these areas is left to the State under other
    Federal law, the FMP does not explicitly
    defer management of these salmon fisheries
    to the State. The FMP does not contain any
    management goals or objectives for these
    three areas or any provisions with which to
    UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT ASS’N V. NMFS            11
    manage salmon fishing. The FMP only
    refrains from extending the general fishing
    prohibition to those areas, where, as the FMP
    notes, fishing was authorized by other
    Federal law, [which has since been repealed].
    Therefore, the FMP’s reference to “other
    Federal laws” may no longer be fully
    effective.
    The North Pacific Council circulated a draft
    Environmental Assessment, held five public meetings, and
    took testimony. In 2011, the North Pacific Council
    unanimously voted to remove the three historic net fishing
    areas from the Salmon FMP. In April 2012, NMFS solicited
    comments on this change, “Amendment 12,” and proposed
    implementing regulations. 77 Fed. Reg. 19,605 (Apr. 2,
    2012); 77 Fed. Reg. 21,716 (Apr. 11, 2012).
    Two groups of commercial fishermen, the United Cook
    Inlet Drift Association and the Cook Inlet Fishermen’s Fund
    (collectively, “United Cook”), submitted comments urging
    the rejection of Amendment 12. The comments cited a 51%
    decline since 1981 in the commercial catch of sockeye
    salmon. United Cook attributed this decline to two
    management failures by Alaska. First, United Cook argued
    that the State had failed to address the introduction of
    carnivorous northern pike into nearby lakes and streams.
    Second, United Cook argued that Alaska was not properly
    managing the escapement of salmon in Cook Inlet. The
    Magnuson-Stevens Act requires limits on the number of fish
    caught. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(15). In contrast, Alaska
    manages commercial salmon fishing through escapement
    goals, i.e., the number of salmon allowed to “escape” past a
    fishery to spawn. According to United Cook, “the State
    misses the high end of its escapement goal targets as much
    12      UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT ASS’N V. NMFS
    as 35% of the time,” leading to a massive unharvested supply
    of fish, and “has no escapement goals at all for many runs in
    Cook Inlet.”
    In June 2012, NMFS issued a final Environmental
    Assessment, finding that “the State is the appropriate
    authority for managing Alaska salmon fisheries given the
    State’s existing infrastructure and expertise,” and that “the
    State’s escapement based management system is a more
    effective management system for preventing overfishing
    than a system [like the federal one] that places rigid numeric
    limits on the number of fish that may be caught.” NMFS
    also issued a finding that Amendment 12 would have no
    significant impact on the environment because it would not
    change the management of the fisheries. NMFS approved
    Amendment 12, and, in December 2012, promulgated
    implementing regulations. See Fisheries of the Exclusive
    Economic Zone Off Alaska; Pacific Salmon, 77 Fed. Reg.
    75,570 (Dec. 21, 2012); 50 C.F.R. § 679.2 (definition of
    West Area).
    III.   Procedural Background
    United Cook filed this action in 2013, challenging
    Amendment 12 and its implementing regulations as contrary
    to the Magnuson-Stevens Act’s requirement that a Council
    prepare an FMP “for each fishery under its authority that
    requires conservation and management,” 16 U.S.C.
    § 1852(h)(1). United Cook also alleged that Amendment 12
    was arbitrary and capricious and contrary to the National
    Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). The
    district court granted Alaska’s motion to intervene as a
    defendant, and entered summary judgment for the
    government. United Cook timely appealed.
    UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT ASS’N V. NMFS                13
    DISCUSSION
    The Magnuson-Stevens Act requires that “[e]ach
    Council shall, in accordance with the provisions of this
    chapter—(1) for each fishery under its authority that requires
    conservation and management, prepare and submit to the
    Secretary (A) a fishery management plan . . . .” 16 U.S.C.
    § 1852(h)(1). Thus, the usual initial question is whether the
    fishery at issue even needs conservation and management.
    See Anglers Conservation Network v. Pritzker, 
    139 F. Supp. 3d
    102, 114–15 (D.D.C. 2015).             We review that
    administrative decision under the traditional arbitrary and
    capricious standard. 
    Id. But we
    need not tarry over that
    issue here; the government concedes that the Cook Inlet
    fishery requires conservation and management.
    But, the government argues that the Act only requires an
    FMP for fisheries that need federal conservation and
    management, and that Cook Inlet is in good hands with
    Alaska. The district court found the Act ambiguous, gave
    Chevron deference to the government’s interpretation, and
    found not arbitrary and capricious the agency’s decision that
    federal involvement was not necessary.
    We determine whether to afford Chevron deference to an
    agency interpretation of a statute under a two-step analysis.
    First, we consider “whether Congress has directly spoken to
    the precise question at issue.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat.
    Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
    467 U.S. 837
    , 842 (1984). “If the
    intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter.” 
    Id. Only “if
    the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
    specific issue,” do we go to step two, which considers
    “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
    construction of the statute.” 
    Id. at 843.
    14      UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT ASS’N V. NMFS
    “We start, as always, with the language of the statute.”
    Williams v. Taylor, 
    529 U.S. 420
    , 431 (2000). Section
    1852(h)(1) of the Act provides that a Council “shall” prepare
    an FMP for a fishery (1) “under its authority” that
    (2) requires “conservation and management.”              The
    government concedes that Cook Inlet is a fishery under its
    authority that requires conservation and management. But it
    argues that an FMP is only mandated by the Act when
    “federal” conservation and management is required. Thus,
    the government asks us to insert the word “federal” into
    § 1852(h)(1) before the phrase “conservation and
    management.”
    “[W]e ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a
    statute that do not appear on its face,” Bates v. United States,
    
    522 U.S. 23
    , 29 (1997), and the government never
    persuasively explains why we should deviate from that rule
    here. See Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Blank,
    
    693 F.3d 1084
    , 1095 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejecting a reading of
    the Magnuson-Stevens Act which “requires inserting the
    word ‘only’ or ‘solely’ into subsection [1853a](c)(5)”); see
    also Stanton Rd. Assocs. v. Lohrey Enters., 
    984 F.2d 1015
    ,
    1020 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that courts “lack . . . power” to
    “read into the statute words not explicitly inserted by
    Congress”). In arguing that we should insert the word
    “federal” into § 1852(h)(1), the government relies heavily on
    what it calls the “deferral” provision of the Act,
    § 1856(a)(3)(A)(i), which allows a state to regulate state-
    licensed vessels in federal waters when no FMP exists. The
    government argues that this provision assumes that NMFS
    can cede regulatory authority to a state over federal waters
    that require conservation and management simply by
    declining to issue an FMP. But, § 1856(a)(3)(A)(i) does not
    create an exception to the general obligation to issue an FMP
    when a fishery requires conservation and management;
    UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT ASS’N V. NMFS                15
    rather, the provision only restates the longstanding principle
    that a State can regulate vessels registered under its laws in
    federal waters absent federal law to the contrary. This
    principle dates at least to 1976. See 1976 Act § 306(a) (“No
    State may directly or indirectly regulate any fishing which is
    engaged in by any fishing vessel outside its boundaries,
    unless such vessel is registered under the laws of such
    State.”).
    The 1996 amendment to the Magnuson-Stevens Act did
    not expand that traditional state authority, but rather limited
    state jurisdiction over state-registered vessels to when (i)
    there is no FMP, or (ii) state law is consistent with the FMP.
    See Sustainable Fisheries Act, § 112 (codified at 16 U.S.C.
    § 1856(a)(3)(A)). This “deferral provision” would be a
    strange form of delegation of federal regulatory authority, as
    it does not allow states to regulate vessels registered in other
    states. In contrast, the next paragraph of the 1996
    amendments, the so-called “delegation” provision, expressly
    authorizes NMFS to “delegate[ ] management of the fishery
    to a State” through an FMP, at which point the state can
    regulate any fishing vessel in the federal waters at issue,
    regardless of registration. 
    Id. (codified at
    16 U.S.C.
    § 1856(a)(3)(B)).
    The Act is clear: to delegate authority over a federal
    fishery to a state, NMFS must do so expressly in an FMP.
    16 U.S.C. § 1856(a)(3)(B). If NMFS concludes that state
    regulations embody sound principles of conservation and
    management and are consistent with federal law, it can
    incorporate them into the FMP. 
    Id. § 1853(b)(5).
    Indeed,
    Amendment 12 expressly delegates management of the East
    Area – certain federal waters off Alaska not including Cook
    Inlet – to Alaska. Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone
    Off Alaska; Pacific Salmon, 77 Fed. Reg. at 75,570–71;
    16       UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT ASS’N V. NMFS
    50 C.F.R. §§ 679.1(i)(2) (“State of Alaska laws and
    regulations that are consistent with the Salmon FMP and
    with the regulations in this part apply to vessels of the United
    States that are commercial and sport fishing for salmon in
    the East Area of the Salmon Management Area.”), 679.3(f).
    Amendment 12 could have expressly delegated management
    of Cook Inlet to Alaska as well, but it did not. The
    government argues removing Cook Inlet from the FMP
    amounts to delegation. But, the federal government cannot
    delegate management of the fishery to a State without a plan,
    because a Council is required to develop FMPs for fisheries
    within its jurisdiction requiring management and then to
    manage those fisheries “through” those plans. 16 U.S.C.
    §§ 1801(b)(4)–(5), 1852(h)(1). The “deferral” provision
    covers those waters where for some reason a plan is not in
    effect; it is not an invitation to a Council to shirk the statutory
    command that it “shall” issue an FMP for each fishery within
    its jurisdiction requiring conservation and management.
    Although we find the statutory language clear, we also
    note that the legislative history of the Act belies the
    government’s argument. 1 The Act makes plain that federal
    fisheries are to be governed by federal rules in the national
    interest, not managed by a state based on parochial concerns.
    Compare 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801(a)(6) (“A national program for
    the conservation and management of the fishery resources of
    the United States is necessary to prevent overfishing . . . and
    to realize the full potential of the Nation’s fishery
    1
    “[W]e ‘cautiously adhere’ to the practice of consulting legislative
    history” at step one of a Chevron analysis, Irvine Med. Ctr. v. Thompson,
    
    275 F.3d 823
    , 829 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Am. Rivers v. Fed. Energy
    Reg. Comm’n, 
    201 F.3d 1186
    , 1196 n.16 (9th Cir. 2000)), recognizing
    that “courts have no authority to enforce a principle gleaned solely from
    legislative history that has no statutory reference point,” Shannon v.
    United States, 
    512 U.S. 573
    , 584 (1994) (alterations omitted).
    UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT ASS’N V. NMFS               17
    resources.”) and 1802(33)(A) (“The term ‘optimum’, with
    respect to the yield from a fishery, means the amount of fish
    which—(A) will provide the greatest overall benefit to the
    Nation.”) and 1811(a) (“[T]he United States claims, and will
    exercise in the manner provided for in this chapter, sovereign
    rights and exclusive fishery management authority over all
    fish, and all Continental Shelf fishery resources, within the
    exclusive economic zone.”) with Alaska Br. 13 (“The Alaska
    Constitution requires the State to manage natural resources
    for the maximum benefit and use for all Alaskans.” (citing
    Alaska Const. art. VIII, §§ 1–2)). Congress therefore
    repeatedly rejected proposals to provide for state
    management of federal fisheries without an FMP. Compare
    Legislative History 422, 467, 471, with 1976 Act § 305(c);
    compare 
    Hearings, supra, at 310
    , with Pub. L. No. 97-453,
    § 5(4) (1982); compare H. Rep. No. 104-171 at *11–12, with
    Pub. L. No. 104-297, § 112 (1996). We decline the
    government’s invitation to vest in Alaska the very authority
    that Congress abjured.
    Alaska argues that NMFS has discretion not to adopt an
    FMP for federal waters requiring management and
    conservation, because “shall” sometimes means “may.” See
    Sierra Club v. Whitman, 
    268 F.3d 898
    , 904 (9th Cir. 2001).
    But, that is not the general rule; we recognized in Sierra Club
    that “‘shall’ in a statute generally denotes a mandatory duty.”
    Id.; see also United States v. Monsanto, 
    491 U.S. 600
    , 607
    (1989) (stating that by using “shall,” “Congress could not
    have chosen stronger words to express its intent that
    forfeiture be mandatory”); Brower v. Evans, 
    257 F.3d 1058
    ,
    1067 n.10 (9th Cir. 2001) (“‘Shall’ means shall.” (quoting
    Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 
    254 F.3d 833
    , 837–
    38 (9th Cir. 2001))). Our holding in Sierra Club that the
    Environmental Protection Agency did not have a mandatory
    duty to bring enforcement actions under the Clean Water Act
    18       UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT ASS’N V. NMFS
    was driven by “the traditional presumption that an agency’s
    refusal to investigate or enforce is within the agency’s
    discretion,” and based on an “[a]nalysis of the structure and
    the legislative history of the Clean Water 
    Act.” 268 F.3d at 902
    , 904. No similar factors here support reading “shall” as
    “may.” 2
    The government argues that § 1852(h)(1) does not
    expressly require an FMP to cover an entire fishery, noting
    that “the provision says nothing about the geographic scope
    of plans at all.” But, the statute requires an FMP for a
    fishery, a defined term. See 16 U.S.C. § 1802(13). No one
    disputes that the exempted area of Cook Inlet is a salmon
    fishery. But, under the government’s interpretation, it could
    fulfill its statutory obligation by issuing an FMP applying to
    only a single ounce of water in that fishery. We disagree.
    When Congress directed each Council to create an FMP “for
    each fishery under its authority that requires conservation
    and management,” 
    id. § 1852(h)(1),
    it did not suggest that a
    Council could wriggle out of this requirement by creating
    2
    Alaska also argues that, if we fail to add the word “federal” before
    “conservation and management” in § 1852(h)(1), NMFS will be forced
    to issue an FMP for every fishery, because all fisheries require some
    conservation and management. However, the legislative history of the
    Act directly refutes this argument. A previous version of the statute
    required an FMP for every fishery under a Council’s authority. In 1983,
    Congress amended the statute to specify that an FMP is necessary only
    where a fishery “requires conservation and management.” Pub. L. No.
    97-453 § 5(4), 96 Stat. 2481, 2486 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
    § 1852(h)(1)). If every fishery required some type of conservation and
    management, this amendment would amount to a nullity. But, “[w]hen
    Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its amendment
    to have real and substantial effect.” Stone v. I.N.S., 
    514 U.S. 386
    , 397–
    98 (1995)). The amendment thus indicates Congress understood that
    some fisheries might not require conservation or management.
    UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT ASS’N V. NMFS                       19
    FMPs only for selected parts of those fisheries, excluding
    other areas that required conservation and management. See
    
    id. § 1853(a)
    (setting out the required contents of FMPs). 3
    Finally, the government argues that its interpretation is
    supported by National Standards 3 and 7 in the Magnuson-
    Stevens Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(3), (7), and the
    implementing guidelines for those standards, 50 C.F.R.
    §§ 600.305–355. But, the National Standards only govern
    the contents of an FMP, not the decision whether to issue
    one. See 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a) (requiring that FMPs “be
    consistent with the following national standards for fishery
    conservation and management”).           The government’s
    advisory guidelines fare no better, as they do not have the
    force of law. 
    Id. § 1851(b).
    CONCLUSION
    The Magnuson-Stevens Act unambiguously requires a
    Council to create an FMP for each fishery under its authority
    that requires conservation and management. The Act allows
    delegation to a state under an FMP, but does not excuse the
    3
    The government also appears to argue that it fully discharged its
    statutory obligation when the Salmon FMP was adopted in 1990, because
    the FMP included Cook Inlet (albeit by placing it under Alaska’s
    authority), and that it was thereafter free under the Act to remove any
    parts of the West Area from the FMP. But, removing a fishery from an
    FMP is no different than excluding that fishery from the start. An
    amendment to an FMP, like the FMP itself, must conform to the statutory
    scheme. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1852(h)(1) (“Each Council shall . . . prepare
    and submit to the Secretary . . . (B) amendments to each such plan that
    are necessary.”); 1854(a)(1) (requiring the Secretary to review an FMP
    amendment “to determine whether it is consistent with the national
    standards, the other provisions of this chapter, and any other applicable
    law”).
    20       UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT ASS’N V. NMFS
    obligation to adopt an FMP when a Council opts for state
    management. Amendment 12 is therefore contrary to law to
    the extent it removes Cook Inlet from the FMP. 4 We reverse
    the judgment of the district court and remand with
    instructions that judgment be entered in favor of United
    Cook.
    REVERSED and REMANDED.
    4
    Because Congress has spoken clearly, we need not reach Chevron
    step two. And, because we conclude that Amendment 12 is contrary to
    law with respect to its removal of Cook Inlet from the FMP, we need not
    address United Cook’s other challenges to the Amendment.