Sherri Schruder v. Archie Banbury , 656 F. App'x 324 ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    JUL 26 2016
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    SHERRI L. SCHRUDER,                              No. 14-35840
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 1:13-cv-00309-REB
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    ARCHIE BANBURY, Valley County
    Clerk, in his individual and official
    capacities; et al.,
    Defendants - Appellants,
    And
    VALLEY COUNTY, Idaho, a political
    subdivision of the State of Idaho and
    JOHN DOES,
    Defendants.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Idaho
    Ronald E. Bush, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted July 7, 2016
    Seattle, Washington
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    Before: KLEINFELD, McKEOWN, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    The individual defendants in this case appeal the lower court’s denial of
    qualified immunity on two of Sherri Schruder’s claims. We reverse and remand.
    The individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity unless they
    violated Schruder’s “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
    a reasonable person would have known.” Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. of Lynwood
    Unified Sch. Dist., 
    149 F.3d 971
    , 977 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Harlow v.
    Fitzgerald, 
    457 U.S. 800
    , 818 (1982)). We may not “define clearly established law
    at a high level of generality.” Padilla v. Yoo, 
    678 F.3d 748
    , 758 (9th Cir. 2012)
    (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 
    563 U.S. 731
    , 742 (2011)). “[E]xisting precedent
    must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” 
    Id.
    (quoting al-Kidd, 
    563 U.S. at 741
    ).
    The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process requirement protects property
    interests. See Brewster, 
    149 F.3d at
    982–87. A person only has a property interest
    in a benefit if she has a “legitimate claim of entitlement to it,” rather than a
    “unilateral expectation of it.” Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 
    408 U.S. 564
    ,
    2
    577 (1972). What a person has a legitimate claim of entitlement to is defined by
    state law or other “existing rules or understandings.” 
    Id.
    Schruder claims she had a property interest in keeping her job, of which she
    was deprived when she was terminated due to an email she sent about bats. But the
    uncontested evidence shows the County was pursuing a 23% budget reduction,
    hiring freeze, and consolidation of unnecessary positions. The Valley County
    Personnel Policy granted wide discretion to administrators regarding what steps to
    take in the event of a reduction in force. Though Schruder acknowledged that the
    County’s stated reason for terminating her was a reduction in force, she did not
    dispute the County’s decision until well past the Policy’s five-day limit. Even if,
    as Schruder contends, her discharge was motivated by the bat email, “[i]n this
    situation it [is] unclear whether statutory or constitutional rights were implicated in
    [Schruder’s] discharge.” Lucero v. Hart, 
    915 F.2d 1367
    , 1371 (9th Cir. 1990).
    Schruder similarly had no clearly established property interest in
    reinstatement. Whether the Valley County Personnel Policy “is sufficient to create
    a property interest ‘will depend largely upon the extent to which the [Policy]
    contains mandatory language that restricts the discretion of the [decisionmaker].’”
    3
    Allen v. City of Beverly Hills, 
    911 F.2d 367
    , 370 (9th Cir. 1990) (second alteration
    in original) (quoting Jacobson v. Hannifin, 
    627 F.2d 177
    , 180 (9th Cir. 1980)).
    The Policy is not mandatory, but conditional and in part discretionary. One
    provision outlined conditions in which an employee would be reinstated after a
    reduction in force, while another provision gave the County discretion to specify
    what reinstatement preferences would be granted, if any, with a reduction in force.
    Because Schruder had no clearly established “property interest” in her
    continued employment, or in her reinstatement, the lower court should have
    granted qualified immunity to the individual defendants on both claims. See
    Bernstein v. Lopez, 
    321 F.3d 903
    , 905 (9th Cir. 2003).
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    4