Santos Alverez Vasquez v. Merrick Garland ( 2022 )


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  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAY 11 2022
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    SANTOS LUIS ALVEREZ VASQUEZ,                     No.   15-73336
    Santos Luis Alvarez Vasquez,
    Agency No. A088-447-874
    Petitioner,
    v.                                              MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted May 9, 2022**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: W. FLETCHER and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and SILVER,*** District
    Judge.
    Santos Luis Alverez Vasquez petitions for review of a Board of Immigration
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Roslyn O. Silver, United States District Judge for the
    District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
    Appeals (“BIA”) decision denying withholding of removal and relief under the
    Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We review the BIA’s denial of withholding
    of removal and CAT relief for substantial evidence. Guo v. Sessions, 
    897 F.3d 1208
    ,
    1212 (9th Cir. 2018). We have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
     and deny the
    petitions.
    1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of withholding of removal.
    In reviewing Alverez Vasquez’s petition, the BIA affirmed the Immigration Judge’s
    (“IJ”) adverse credibility finding against Alverez Vasquez and denied withholding
    of removal.1 An adverse credibility finding is an adequate ground to deny a claim
    for withholding of removal. Aguilar Fermin v. Barr, 
    958 F.3d 887
    , 892–93 (9th Cir.
    2020); Farah v. Ashcroft, 
    348 F.3d 1153
    , 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).
    An adverse credibility determination must be “based on the totality of the
    circumstances and all relevant factors, not a single factor.” Alam v. Garland, 
    11 F.4th 1133
    , 1135 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (simplified). The BIA determined that
    the IJ considered the relevant statutory factors in reaching its decision. The BIA
    specifically highlighted the IJ’s consideration of (1) discrepancies within Alverez
    Vasquez’s testimony and (2) discrepancies between Alverez Vasquez’s testimony
    and other evidence in the record. See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii) (listing the
    1
    The BIA also found that Alverez Vasquez waived any challenge to the IJ’s
    adverse credibility finding. Because substantial evidence supports the BIA’s
    adverse credibility decision, we do not address the waiver issue.
    2
    “internal consistency” of statements and “consistency of such statements with other
    evidence of record” as factors to consider). For example, Alverez Vasquez provided
    contradictory testimony with respect to the identity of the other bus driver on the
    date of the gang attack. As a result, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial
    of withholding of removal.
    2. Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s denial of CAT relief. The
    BIA found that Alverez Vasquez failed to establish that it was “more likely than not”
    that he would be tortured “with the consent or acquiescence” of the Honduran
    government.    See 
    8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16
    (c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1).       Because Alverez
    Vasquez’s testimony was discredited, the BIA did not consider his arguments
    surrounding his 2004 gang attack. Instead, the BIA looked to his remaining country
    conditions evidence and concluded that such evidence was insufficient to establish
    eligibility for CAT relief. While the country conditions reports show that torture
    occurs in Honduras, “they do not compel the conclusion that [the petitioner] would
    be tortured if returned.” Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 
    457 F.3d 915
    , 923 (9th Cir. 2006).
    Nor do the reports show that the Honduran government would consent or acquiesce
    to any torture of Alverez Vasquez. For example, while the 2013 State Department
    report acknowledges “serious impediments to the protection of human rights” the
    report makes clear that the Honduran government has taken “steps to prosecute and
    punish officials who committed abuses.” Thus, the country conditions evidence fails
    3
    to compel a finding that it is “more likely than not” that Alverez Vasquez would be
    tortured “with the consent or acquiescence” of the Honduran government.
    DENIED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-73336

Filed Date: 5/11/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 5/11/2022