Raul Barajas-Romero v. Loretta E. Lynch , 846 F.3d 351 ( 2017 )


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  •                FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    RAUL BARAJAS-ROMERO,                     No. 13-70520
    Petitioner,
    Agency No.
    v.                       A017-190-075
    LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney
    General,                                  OPINION
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted April 7, 2014
    Withdrawn from Submission August 19, 2014
    Resubmitted July 30, 2015
    San Francisco, California
    Filed January 18, 2017
    Before: Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Jacqueline H. Nguyen,
    and Paul J. Watford, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Kleinfeld
    2                  BARAJAS-ROMERO V. LYNCH
    SUMMARY*
    Immigration
    The panel granted a petition for review, holding that the
    Board of Immigration Appeals erred in applying the REAL
    ID Act’s “one central reason” nexus standard, rather than the
    “a reason” standard, to an application for withholding of
    removal, and improperly placed the burden on petitioner to
    prove that he could not safely relocate within Mexico for
    purposes of Convention Against Torture protection relief.
    Declining to afford deference to the Board’s precedential
    decision in Matter of C-T-L, 25 I. & N. Dec. 341 (BIA 2010),
    the panel held that by amending the asylum statute to include
    the REAL ID Act’s “one central reason” nexus standard, but
    not similarly amending the withholding of removal statute,
    Congress did not intend for the “one central reason” standard
    to apply to withholding of removal claims. The panel
    explained further that the “a reason” standard applicable to
    withholding of removal claims requires weaker motives than
    the “one central reason” standard.
    The panel held that there is no “rogue official” exception
    for CAT relief, and that an applicant need show a likelihood
    of torture at the instigation of or with the consent or
    acquiescence of either a public official, or some other person
    acting in an official capacity. The panel explained that CAT
    relief may be based on the actions of off-duty police officers,
    even where they were not acting in an official capacity, so
    *
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    BARAJAS-ROMERO V. LYNCH                      3
    long as they carried out the acts or knowingly acquiesced in
    the acts.
    The panel held that although petitioner bore the ultimate
    burden to prove a likelihood of torture, the Board erred by
    placing the burden on petitioner to establish that he could not
    safely relocate within Mexico to avoid future harm.
    The panel remanded for the Board to reconsider the
    withholding claim applying the correct nexus standard, and
    to reconsider the CAT claim under the no-burden-shifting
    relocation standard.
    COUNSEL
    Katherine Cheng (argued), Certified Law Student, UCLA
    School of Law, Los Angeles, California; Michael W.
    Reynolds (argued), and Carlos M. Lazatin, O’Melveny &
    Myers LLP, Los Angeles, California; for Petitioner.
    Tim Ramnitz (argued), Attorney; Shelley R. Goad, Assistant
    Director; Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division,
    United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for
    Respondent.
    4              BARAJAS-ROMERO V. LYNCH
    OPINION
    KLEINFELD, Senior Circuit Judge:
    We address the “principal reason” standard for
    withholding of removal, and also the acquiescence and
    relocation standards for Convention Against Torture relief.
    At issue is why Raul Barajas-Romero was tortured and
    whether he can be returned to Mexico without likely being
    tortured again.
    I. Facts.
    Barajas-Romero came to the United States legally from
    Mexico as a little boy. He grew up in San Pedro, California.
    His mother, brothers, children, and grandchildren are
    American citizens, but he never became naturalized, and he
    remains a citizen of Mexico. Barajas-Romero was deported
    in 1998 because of convictions for felony methamphetamine
    possession and receiving stolen property.
    After he was removed from the United States in 1998,
    Barajas-Romero got a house in Santa Clara, a village in the
    State of Michoacan, where he had relatives. Two years after
    he moved to the village, men attacked him and demanded his
    gold watch and everything in his pockets. He refused to hand
    them over, so the men hit him on the head, kicked him in the
    face, and threw him off a bridge. The assault left him with a
    broken nose, broken teeth, and a wound on his head requiring
    more than a dozen stitches and leaving a two- or three-inch
    scar. The men identified themselves by announcing: “Hey,
    puto, no one messes with the Familia Michoacana.” Barajas-
    Romero’s political opinion did not come up in this first
    BARAJAS-ROMERO V. LYNCH                       5
    attack, just the Familia Michoacana drug cartel’s pride in its
    power.
    Barajas-Romero reported the assault to the police when he
    got out of the hospital. He told them La Familia Michoacana
    were the attackers. The police did nothing. His cousin was
    kidnaped by La Familia the following year. A couple of
    years after that, his next door neighbor, who had built a grand
    house, was murdered when he refused to pay extortion.
    In 2006, Barajas-Romero was doing construction work on
    his house in Santa Clara when the incidents directly giving
    rise to this case occurred. Four off-duty local police officers
    arrived at his home. Barajas-Romero recognized them
    because he got off the bus daily at the police station stop, saw
    them frequently, and had frequently seen them following him.
    When he opened the door, the policemen forced him inside,
    locked the door behind them, and asked him for his money.
    Barajas-Romero said he had none, but they did not believe
    him, especially because they saw all the building materials he
    had purchased for his home.
    The four policemen then locked Barajas-Romero in his
    own bathroom for two days while they deliberated about what
    to do with him. On the third day they took him out, told him
    to call his family for money, and began burning him with
    cigarettes. His leg was permanently scarred, and he later
    showed the twenty or so scars to the Immigration Judge.
    Barajas-Romero called his mother, who was in the United
    States, but she said she had no money she could send. The
    four policemen thought he could get money if they were more
    persuasive, so one of them began hitting him all over his body
    with the blunt side of a machete blade. Barajas-Romero
    6               BARAJAS-ROMERO V. LYNCH
    begged them to stop and said his mother was going to try to
    get money from his brothers.
    However, Barajas-Romero did not merely beg. He also
    made a remark that annoyed the four policemen and could be
    construed as expressing or manifesting an anti-corruption
    political opinion. Barajas-Romero testified that he “got a
    little bold and told them even if I had the money I wouldn’t
    give it to you guys because you guys are getting paid for the
    job, I don’t pay no corrupt cops, nothing.”
    The torture became much worse after Barajas-Romero’s
    “corrupt cops” remark. The four policemen threw him back
    in the bathroom, but this time they did not just leave him
    there. They lifted his pants and put two scorpions on his legs.
    Both scorpions stung. Barajas-Romero became feverish,
    swollen, and had trouble breathing.
    While the policemen tortured him with scorpions, they
    also rubbed a dried corncob back and forth on his forehead to
    make him bleed and cause a permanent scar. They told him
    that if he told anyone what happened, they would put a bullet
    through his permanent scar. When Barajas-Romero begged
    for mercy, the policemen responded by threatening to cut his
    head off with a machete and slashed his leg, causing a deep
    laceration. Then they locked him in the bathroom again.
    Barajas-Romero could not move and passed out from pain,
    fever, and difficulty breathing.
    The next morning the four policemen were gone, and
    Barajas-Romero stumbled out of his house. His neighbors
    tried to help him. A police officer arrived and asked what
    happened, and Barajas-Romero told him that his colleagues
    had done this. The police officer stopped preparing his
    BARAJAS-ROMERO V. LYNCH                    7
    report, stopped talking to Barajas-Romero, and dropped him
    off him at the local clinic without saying a word. The police
    never asked Barajas-Romero to come in to identify the
    officers who had attacked him or for any other information
    regarding their identities. The local clinic where he had been
    dropped off refused to treat him once they learned that his
    torturers were police officers. A second medical facility
    likewise refused to treat him out of fear. Fortunately, a third
    hospital, one about an hour away from Santa Clara, did treat
    his injuries.     He was hospitalized for two weeks.
    Approximately a month after his release, Barajas-Romero
    fled Mexico for the United States because he felt that he
    could not trust the police anywhere in Mexico, and the mark
    on his forehead would be, as his torturers had told him, where
    a bullet would go if he returned.
    Barajas-Romero reentered the United States with a false
    passport and was eventually caught in 2010. Barajas-Romero
    was charged, convicted, and imprisoned for illegal reentry,1
    and then turned over to Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement (“ICE”). ICE commenced proceedings to
    reinstate his prior deportation order. These proceedings are
    the subject of the petition before us. Barajas-Romero was
    found statutorily eligible for withholding of removal and
    Convention Against Torture relief.
    At his hearing before the Immigration Judge in 2012,
    Barajas-Romero provided medical evidence to support his
    claims. As one example, when Barajas-Romero’s lawyer
    showed the Immigration Judge Barajas-Romero’s leg, she
    said “may the record reflect . . . close to 20 cigarette burns or
    more on respondent’s left leg.” Government counsel
    1
    8 U.S.C. § 1326.
    8               BARAJAS-ROMERO V. LYNCH
    conceded that he saw perhaps 15 circular scars of some sort.
    Barajas-Romero’s counsel then pointed to an exhibit, a
    physician’s report saying that the scars were “typical
    purposeful cigarette burns . . . resemb[ling] the cigarette
    burns caused by torture.” Similarly, a physician’s report also
    confirmed a 12 centimeter (4 3/4 inches) scar on his leg
    consistent with a deep laceration, with consequential damage
    to the veins and chronic swelling of the leg. Barajas-Romero
    remains on medication for his physical injuries, and for the
    post-traumatic stress disorder caused by his torture. The
    Immigration Judge found Barajas-Romero to be credible, and
    none of the horrendous facts concerning Barajas-Romero’s
    torture are in question. The issues in this case have to do with
    Barajas-Romero’s right to remain in the United States
    because of his torture, not whether torture occurred.
    The Immigration Judge denied Barajas-Romero’s
    withholding of removal claim on the ground that the
    persecution “was solely an effort to extort money by rogue
    police officers and not because of an expressed or implied [or
    imputed] political opinion” and the threat came “solely from
    the off-duty, rogue officers themselves and not the
    government.” He noted that Mexico has laws against torture
    and corruption, and thousands of police officers have been
    dismissed for violating them. As for the Convention Against
    Torture claim, the Immigration Judge determined that
    Barajas-Romero had the ability to find someplace “acceptable
    to his standards” of safety to live in Mexico.
    The BIA agreed. While the BIA did not disagree that
    Barajas-Romero’s testimony was credible, the BIA held that
    Barajas-Romero’s withholding of removal claim failed
    because he failed to prove that the harm he suffered “was
    fueled by any political motives, even though . . . [Barajas-
    BARAJAS-ROMERO V. LYNCH                          9
    Romero] expressed to his attackers that he was against police
    corruption. Rather, the attacks were designed to extort
    money.” As for the Convention Against Torture claim, the
    BIA held that Barajas-Romero did not show “that any
    particular officer’s actions or acquiescence would not be that
    of a rogue official.” The BIA also held that “the country is
    aggressively targeting corrupt government elements” and that
    Barajas-Romero “could relocate out of the area.”
    Barajas-Romero petitions for review. First, he argues that
    the BIA applied an erroneous standard to his withholding
    claim. Second, he argues that the BIA failed to consider the
    Mexican government’s lack of success in its war on gangs,
    and corruption and the nationwide danger facing him if he
    returned to Mexico.
    II. Analysis
    A. Withholding of removal.
    The Attorney General must, in general, withhold removal
    of an alien if the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened
    “because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership
    in a particular social group, or political opinion.”2 Barajas-
    2
    8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A):
    (A) In general
    Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), the Attorney
    General may not remove an alien to a country if the
    Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or
    freedom would be threatened in that country because of
    the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a
    particular social group, or political opinion.
    10                    BARAJAS-ROMERO V. LYNCH
    Romero argues that his life and freedom would be threatened,
    at least in part, because of his anti-corruption political
    opinion. There is ample evidence in the record that the local
    police and the local drug cartel targeted him without knowing
    anything about his political opinion, merely because they
    thought they could get money from him. There is also ample
    evidence that the police escalated their torture considerably,
    from confinement, beatings, and cigarette burns, to scorpions,
    slashing with a machete, and permanent conspicuous facial
    disfigurement, after he voiced his opposition to police
    corruption. The parties dispute the extent to which political
    opinion must be the basis for the threat for the threat to be
    “because” of the political opinion.
    For purposes of asylum or withholding of removal, it is
    not enough that a person comes from a wretched place, where
    life will most probably be far worse than if he remains in the
    United States. For asylum, a person generally needs to face
    persecution in his home country “on account of race, religion,
    nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
    political opinion.”3 The person seeking asylum has the
    3
    8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42):
    The term “refugee” means (A) any person who is
    outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in
    the case of a person having no nationality, is outside
    any country in which such person last habitually
    resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and
    is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
    protection of, that country because of persecution or a
    well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
    religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
    group, or political opinion, or (B) in such special
    circumstances as the President after appropriate
    consultation (as defined in section 1157(e) of this title)
    BARAJAS-ROMERO V. LYNCH                            11
    burden of proving not only the prospective persecution, but
    also that it would be “on account of” one of the five listed
    reasons.4 A person seeking withholding of removal must
    prove not only that his life or freedom will be threatened in
    his home country, but also that the threat is “because of” one
    of the five listed reasons.5 The list of reasons for which relief
    may be granted is identical for both asylum and withholding
    of removal.
    may specify, any person who is within the country of
    such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person
    having no nationality, within the country in which such
    person is habitually residing, and who is persecuted or
    who has a well-founded fear of persecution on account
    of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
    social group, or political opinion. The term “refugee”
    does not include any person who ordered, incited,
    assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of
    any person on account of race, religion, nationality,
    membership in a particular social group, or political
    opinion. For purposes of determinations under this
    chapter, a person who has been forced to abort a
    pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or
    who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to
    undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a
    coercive population control program, shall be deemed
    to have been persecuted on account of political opinion,
    and a person who has a well founded fear that he or she
    will be forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to
    persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall
    be deemed to have a well founded fear of persecution
    on account of political opinion.
    4
    8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(B)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
    5
    8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b).
    12                     BARAJAS-ROMERO V. LYNCH
    The words “on account of” and “because of” address the
    persecutor’s motive for persecuting the victim.6 For example,
    if the persecutor has no idea what the victim’s political
    opinion is and does not care what it is, then even if the victim
    does reasonably fear persecution, it would not be “on account
    of” the victim’s political opinion. But what if the persecutor
    does have some idea of the victim’s political opinion and
    feels quite hostile to that opinion, but also has other reasons
    for persecuting the victim? People, including persecutors,
    often have mixed motives. When is the persecution,
    motivated only in part by hostility to the victim’s political
    opinion, “because of” or “on account of” that opinion?
    We adopted the Second Circuit’s position in our 1999 en
    banc decision in Borja v I.N.S., holding that persecution “on
    account of” political opinion did not mean persecution solely
    for that reason.7 The victim in that case sought asylum
    because Communist guerrillas in the Philippines had pointed
    a gun at her and threatened to kill her when she said she was
    pro-government, but were also upset that she could not pay
    the increased amount of monthly protection money they
    demanded.8 They persecuted her partly because she was pro-
    government and partly just for the money.9 We held that
    6
    I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. 478
    , 483 (1992); Navas v. I.N.S.,
    
    217 F.3d 646
    , 656–57 (9th Cir. 2000).
    7
    Borja v. I.N.S., 
    175 F.3d 732
    , 735 (9th Cir. 1999).
    8
    
    Id. at 734–35.
         9
    
    Id. at 737.
                         BARAJAS-ROMERO V. LYNCH                            13
    persecution was “on account of” political opinion if it was so
    motivated “at least in part.”10
    Our “at least in part” standard is no longer the law with
    regard to asylum applicants. Congress amended the statute,
    so that for asylum, the victim’s political opinion has to be
    “one central reason.”11 When we decided Borja, the statute
    did not indicate the appropriate burden of proof for
    establishing that persecution was “because of” (or “on
    account of”) a protected ground.12 However, the asylum
    statute now states:
    the applicant must establish that race, religion,
    nationality, membership in a particular social
    group, or political opinion was or will be at
    least one central reason for persecuting the
    applicant.13
    But Congress did not similarly amend the withholding of
    removal statute, and Barajas-Romero seeks withholding of
    removal, not asylum. The withholding statute just says “a”
    reason, not “at least one central reason:”
    10
    
    Id. at 735–36.
        11
    Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, PL
    104–132, April 24, 1996, 110 Stat 1214; Emergency Supplemental
    Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami
    Relief, 2005, PL 109–13, May 11, 2005, 119 Stat 231; 8 U.S.C.
    § 1231(3)(A).
    12
    8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1996) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2009).
    13
    8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis added).
    14                   BARAJAS-ROMERO V. LYNCH
    In determining whether an alien has
    demonstrated that the alien’s life or freedom
    would be threatened for a reason described in
    subparagraph (A) [race, religion, political
    opinion, etc.], the trier of fact shall determine
    whether the alien has sustained the alien’s
    burden of proof, and shall make credibility
    determinations, in the manner described in
    clauses (ii) and (iii) of section 1158(b)(1)(B)
    of this title.14
    Congress’s decision to adopt the “one central reason”
    standard for asylum but not withholding of removal claims
    appears to have been the product of a deliberate choice, rather
    than a mere drafting oversight. When Congress amended the
    withholding of removal statute to clarify the applicable
    burden of proof, it cross-referenced clauses (ii) and (iii) of the
    asylum statute’s burden-of-proof provision, but not clause
    (i).15 Clause (i) is the provision that imposed the “one central
    reason” standard for asylum claims. Congress’s express
    incorporation of two of the three asylum burden-of-proof
    provisions into the withholding of removal statute, but not the
    provision including the “one central reason” language,
    indicates that Congress did not intend for the “one central
    reason” standard to apply to withholding of removal claims.
    See Kucana v. Holder, 
    558 U.S. 233
    , 249 (2010) (“Where
    Congress includes particular language in one section of a
    14
    8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(C) (emphasis added). Clauses (ii) and (iii)
    discussed in the quote refer to the credibility rules for asylum applicants
    located directly after the subsection requiring “one central reason.”
    8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(i)–(iii).
    15
    8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(C).
    BARAJAS-ROMERO V. LYNCH                         15
    statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is
    generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
    purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”).
    The government argues that “one central reason” and “a
    reason” mean the same thing. Barajas-Romero argues that
    the different words used in each statute mean different
    things.16 We agree with Barajas-Romero. The phrase “a
    reason” includes weaker motives than “one central reason.”
    A person may have “a reason” to do something that is not
    his “central” reason or even “one central reason.” Ordinary
    English usage, and the ordinary canon of statutory
    construction reflecting “the same common-sense premise that
    when people say one thing, they do not mean something else”
    indicate that we should attribute some operative meaning to
    the congressional decision to use the phrase “at least one
    central reason” in one statute but not the other.17 Sometimes
    omission of a phrase implies a negative pregnant, and
    sometimes it does not.18 Considering how controversial the
    reason for persecution has been in the immigration law
    community, the express congressional narrowing of one
    statute but not the other to “one central reason” cannot
    reasonably be read so to narrow both.
    16
    
    Kucana, 558 U.S. at 249
    (2010).
    17
    2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47:23 (7th ed.).
    18
    Longview Fibre Co. v. Rasmussen, 
    980 F.2d 1307
    , 1313 (9th Cir.
    1992).
    16                      BARAJAS-ROMERO V. LYNCH
    The BIA in this case followed its own precedent in Matter
    of C-T-L-.19 C-T-L- held that the “one central reason” test for
    asylum applies to withholding, even though the withholding
    statute says merely “a reason.”20 The BIA came to this
    conclusion because: (1) the withholding statute is silent on
    whether the “one central reason” standard applies, (2) the
    general intent of the REAL ID Act was to correct what
    Congress saw as an anomaly created by Borja v. I.N.S.21 and
    Briones v. I.N.S.22 in mixed motive cases, and (3) before the
    REAL ID Act the Immigration and Naturalization Service
    (“INS”) applied the same standard to asylum and
    withholding.23 This analysis starts with a false premise that
    Congress was “silent.” It was not. It explicitly said “at least
    one central reason” for asylum, and “a reason,” an expressly
    different standard, for withholding.
    The government argues that we should accept the BIA’s
    view in C-T-L- because we assumed in Zetino v. Holder24 that
    the “one central reason” standard applies to withholding as
    well as asylum claims. Zetino does not so hold. The alien in
    that case sought asylum and withholding, but submitted no
    evidence that the feared persecution had anything to do with
    19
    Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 341 (2010).
    20
    
    Id. at 344.
         21
    Borja, 
    175 F.3d 732
    .
    22
    Briones v. I.N.S., 
    175 F.3d 727
    (9th Cir. 1999).
    23
    C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 344–48.
    24
    Zetino v. Holder, 
    622 F.3d 1007
    (9th Cir. 2010).
    BARAJAS-ROMERO V. LYNCH                       17
    actual or imputed political opinion.25 His evidence was that
    masked gunmen murdered his family members to steal his
    grandfather’s land and that his home country, El Salvador,
    was infested with violent gangs.26 We drew no distinction
    between the “one central reason” phrase in the asylum statute
    and the “a reason” phrase in the withholding statute, because
    there was no nexus at all between the feared persecution and
    political opinion.27
    We hold that “a reason” is a less demanding standard than
    “one central reason.”          The statutory language is
    unambiguously different, with different meanings, so there is
    no ambiguity justifying deference to the administrative
    agency’s contrary view.28 The different language should not
    be treated as though it means the same thing.29 The
    withholding statute differs from the asylum statute in various
    ways, not just this one, so there is no reason to assume that
    Congress meant for them to be the same in this respect. The
    withholding statute requires applicants to prove that it is more
    likely than not they will be persecuted30, while the asylum
    25
    
    Zetino, 622 F.3d at 1015
    –16.
    26
    
    Id. at 1010.
        27
    
    Id. at 1016.
        28
    Cf. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
    467 U.S. 837
    (1984).
    29
    See 
    Kucana, 558 U.S. at 249
    .
    30
    8 C.F.R. § 208.16.
    18                 BARAJAS-ROMERO V. LYNCH
    statute requires only a “well-founded fear” of persecution31,
    so the lighter standard for the strength of the nexus is offset
    by the more demanding standard of proof in the withholding
    statute. Since in withholding the petitioner must show a
    probability, not just a well-founded fear, of persecution,
    Congress may have diluted the nexus requirement in order to
    afford more protection against mistaken deportations where
    a protected ground played into that likelihood.
    That is not the end of the withholding issue, though. The
    government argues that the police kidnaped and tortured
    Barajas-Romero to extort money, so his voicing of a political
    opinion on the third day of his kidnaping and torture could
    not mean that the torture was because of or on account of his
    previously unknown and irrelevant (to the persecutors) anti-
    corruption opinion.        The evidence, though, is not
    unambiguous. The torture became much worse after Barajas-
    Romero voiced his anti-corruption opinion. Because the BIA
    accepted the government’s view under the wrong standard,
    we remand to the BIA to decide the case under the correct
    standard: “a reason” rather than “one central reason.”
    B. Convention Against Torture.
    Congress provided that “it shall be the policy of the
    United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the
    involuntary return of any person to a country in which there
    31
    Under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a), an applicant “is eligible for asylum if he
    is a ‘refugee,’ i.e., if he is unable or unwilling to return to his home
    country ‘because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
    account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
    group, or political opinion.’ Lim v. I.N.S., 
    224 F.3d 929
    , 934 (9th Cir.
    2000) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)).
    BARAJAS-ROMERO V. LYNCH                            19
    are substantial grounds for believing that the person would be
    in danger of being subjected to torture.”32 It directed that the
    appropriate agencies should adopt regulations to implement
    the provisions of the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).33
    The implementing regulations are at 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16–.18.
    For CAT relief, the alien must prove that it is “more likely
    than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the
    proposed country.”34 The torturers’ motivations need not
    relate to the five protected classifications for asylum or
    withholding of removal, so Barajas-Romero can establish
    entitlement to relief under CAT even if he cannot establish
    motivation related to his political opinion.35 What matters is
    the probability of future torture, which under circuit law
    32
    Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (“FARRA”),
    Pub.L. No. 105–277, Div. G, Title XXII, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681–822
    (1998) (codified as a note to 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (1999)).
    33
    Id.:
    (b) Regulations. - Not later than 120 days after the date
    of enactment of this Act [Oct. 21, 1998], the heads of
    the appropriate agencies shall prescribe regulations to
    implement the obligations of the United States under
    Article 3 of the United Nations Convention Against
    Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or
    Degrading Treatment or Punishment, subject to any
    reservations, understandings, declarations, and provisos
    contained in the United States Senate resolution of
    ratification of the Convention.
    34
    8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2).
    35
    The five protected classifications for asylum are “race, religion,
    nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”
    8 U.S.C. § 1101(42); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(3)(A).
    20                    BARAJAS-ROMERO V. LYNCH
    includes killing,36 carried out or knowingly acquiesced in by
    a public official.37 All evidence relevant to the probability of
    future torture must be considered, including past torture and
    country conditions.38
    Neither the BIA, the Immigration Judge, nor the
    government’s brief, puts at issue whether Barajas-Romero’s
    ordeal amounted to torture. The issue is that to be entitled to
    CAT relief, the torture must be “inflicted by or at the
    instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
    official or other person acting in an official capacity.”39
    36
    Cole v. Holder, 
    659 F.3d 762
    , 771 (9th Cir. 2011).
    37
    
    Id. 38 8
    C.F.R. § 208.16:
    (3) In assessing whether it is more likely than not that
    an applicant would be tortured in the proposed country
    of removal, all evidence relevant to the possibility of
    future torture shall be considered, including, but not
    limited to:
    (i) Evidence of past torture inflicted upon the applicant;
    (ii) Evidence that the applicant could relocate to a part
    of the country of removal where he or she is not likely
    to be tortured;
    (iii) Evidence of gross, flagrant or mass violations of
    human rights within the country of removal, where
    applicable; and
    (iv) Other relevant information regarding conditions in
    the country of removal.
    39
    8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1).
    BARAJAS-ROMERO V. LYNCH                    21
    “Acquiescence of a public official requires that the public
    official, prior to the activity constituting torture, have
    awareness of such activity and thereafter breach his or her
    legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.”40
    The BIA rejected Barajas-Romero’s claim on the grounds
    that the police who tortured him were “rogue officials” and he
    had not proved that he could not avoid the threat by
    relocating. Here is the entire portion of the opinion
    explaining rejection of the claim:
    We find no clear error in the Immigration
    Judge’s finding that there are insufficient facts
    in this case to support the legal determination
    that Mexican officials, acting under “color of
    law,” will more likely than not torture the
    applicant (or acquiesce in his torture) if he
    returns to Mexico. The facts here are simply
    inadequate to show such pervasive corruption
    that any particular officer’s actions or
    acquiescence would not be that of a rogue
    official (I.J. at 6–7). As noted by the
    Im m igrat i on J udge, the Mexican
    government’s laws and enforcement policies
    make it clear that the country is aggressively
    targeting corrupt government elements. The
    Immigration Judge also observed that the
    respondent could relocate out of the area
    where the 2006 attack occurred (I.J. at 7).
    Accordingly, the applicant has not met his
    burden of demonstrating eligibility for
    protection under the CAT.
    40
    8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(7).
    22             BARAJAS-ROMERO V. LYNCH
    The portions of the Immigration Judge’s opinion to which the
    BIA refers say, regarding the “rogue official” issue, that
    although drug cartel violence and police corruption do exist
    in Mexico, the national government aggressively seeks to
    eliminate them:
    Here there is evidence in the country report of
    both drug cartel violence and police
    corruption. As mentioned, police corruption
    has been identified and targeted by Mexican
    authorities. There are laws on the books and
    verifiable efforts to root out corruption in
    government. Still, rogue elements do operate;
    however, the Mexican government’s laws and
    enforcement policies make it clear the country
    is aggressive against such groups. The
    evidence does not establish that it is more
    likely than not if the Respondent was returned
    to Mexico he would suffer torture at the hands
    of the government or persons acting in an
    official capacity or aiding or acquiescing in
    his torture by others. Wakkarv v. Holder,
    
    558 F.3d 1049
    (9th Cir. 2009).
    Regarding relocation, the Immigration Judge says that both
    California and Mexico have dangerous communities, and
    Barajas-Romero could relocate to “any region where he feels
    safe” and that is “populated by individuals, businesses, and
    employers acceptable to his standards”:
    Respondent has painted the entire country of
    Mexico as a potential threat to him from a
    2006 incident. The Court is not persuaded that
    is the case. Respondent has the ability to
    BARAJAS-ROMERO V. LYNCH                       23
    locate in any region where he feels safe or
    where he has access to authorities should he
    be threatened or attacked. Whether in
    California or Mexico, each region has
    communities that are both dangerous and
    secure. The key for Respondent would be to
    locate in an area populated by individuals,
    businesses and employers acceptable to his
    standards.
    The statute and regulations do not establish a “rogue
    official” exception to CAT relief. The regulations say that
    torture, for purposes of relief, has to be “at the instigation of
    or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
    other person acting in an official capacity.”41 The four
    policemen were “public officials,” even though they were
    local police and state or federal authorities might not
    similarly acquiesce.42 Since the officers were apparently off-
    duty when they tortured Barajas-Romero, they were evidently
    not acting “in an official capacity,” but the regulation does
    not require that the public official be carrying out his official
    duties, so long as he is the actor or knowingly acquiesces in
    the acts. The regulation uses the word “or” between the
    phrases “inflicted by . . . a public official” and “acting in an
    official capacity.” The word “or” can only mean that either
    one suffices, so the torture need not be both by a public
    official and also that the official is acting in his official
    capacity. An “and” construction would require that the
    conjunction be “and.” The record leaves no room for doubt
    41
    8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1).
    42
    Madrigal v. Holder, 
    716 F.3d 499
    , 510 (9th Cir. 2013).
    24                       BARAJAS-ROMERO V. LYNCH
    that the four policemen were public officials who themselves
    inflicted the torture.
    CAT relief is forward-looking, requiring the applicant
    prove that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured
    if he were removed to the proposed country, not that he was
    tortured in the past. The alien must prove not only that
    torture will more likely than not occur, but also that there is
    sufficient state action involved in the torture.43 Public
    officials acquiesce in torture if they: “(1) have awareness of
    the activity (or consciously close their eyes to the fact it is
    going on); and (2) breach their legal responsibility to
    intervene to prevent the activity because they are unable or
    unwilling to oppose it.”44 CAT relief is unavailable, despite
    a likelihood of torture, without evidence that the police are
    unwilling or unable to oppose the crime, not just that they are
    unable to solve it, as when the torturers cannot be identified.45
    Police ineffectiveness is not enough to establish an
    entitlement to relief, “absent evidence of corruption or other
    inability or unwillingness to oppose criminal organizations.”46
    State involvement may be established, though, where “police
    officials were corrupt, and worked on behalf of criminals or
    gangsters.”47
    43
    Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 
    755 F.3d 1026
    , 1033 (9th Cir. 2014).
    44
    
    Id. at 1034.
         45
    
    Id. 46 Id.
         47
    
    Id. at 1035.
                         BARAJAS-ROMERO V. LYNCH                 25
    The BIA’s “rogue official” rationale is inconsistent with
    circuit law. The BIA held that the danger Barajas-Romero
    faced from the drug cartel and corrupt police did not establish
    government involvement because Mexican law, and national
    policy to root out the corruption, established the absence of
    official acquiescence. But we held in Madrigal v. Holder that
    “if public officials at the state and local level in Mexico
    would acquiesce in any torture [petitioner] is likely to suffer,
    this satisfies CAT’s requirement that a public official
    acquiesce in the torture, even if the federal government in
    Mexico would not similarly acquiesce.”48 The four police
    who tortured Barajas-Romero and told him he would be
    killed if he returned to Mexico were themselves government
    officials. As we held in Madrigal, the “efficacy of the
    government’s efforts to stop the drug cartels’ violence,” not
    just the willingness of the national government to do so, must
    be examined.49 Here, the BIA focused only on the national
    government’s efforts and not their efficacy, which was
    mistaken under Madrigal.50
    The other part of the BIA’s rationale was that Barajas-
    Romero could relocate “to any region where he feels safe or
    has access to the authorities” in some “area populated by
    individuals, businesses and employers acceptable to his
    standards.” The BIA did not articulate what standard of proof
    it applied when considering relocation, nor why it rejected
    Barajas-Romero’s evidence to the contrary. The policemen
    had marked his forehead with a permanent scar to make him
    48
    
    Madrigal, 716 F.3d at 510
    .
    49
    
    Id. at 509
       50
    
    Id. 26 BARAJAS-ROMERO
    V. LYNCH
    recognizable, and they told him that “that is where the bullet
    would be” if he was seen anywhere in Mexico or if he
    reported the incident, which he did. The State Department
    Human Rights Report on Mexico, while recognizing the
    national government’s efforts to eliminate corruption and
    police entanglement with drug cartels, said that “corruption
    remained a problem at all levels of government,” and some
    “public officials continued to perpetrate . . . some criminal
    acts with impunity.” The State Department cited with
    approval reports that “police, especially at the state and local
    level, were involved in kidnapping, extortion, and in
    providing protection for, or acting directly on behalf of,
    organized crime and drug traffickers.” The State Department
    mentioned a member of Mexico’s national congress, at large
    as a fugitive, who according to prosecutors was in charge of
    providing institutional protection to La Familia, the drug
    cartel who, along with the police, acted against Barajas-
    Romero.
    We recently held in Maldonado v. Lynch that, although a
    petitioner bears the ultimate burden to prove he would be
    tortured if returned to his country, the petitioner does not bear
    the burden under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3) to show that it is
    impossible to avoid torture by internally relocating within a
    country.51 In doing so en banc, we overruled our earlier line
    of authority which had established that the petitioner bore the
    burden of proving that he would be unable to live safely
    elsewhere in the country. We held that “[t]he regulations
    governing CAT deferral, unlike the asylum regulation, do not
    51
    Maldonado v. Lynch, 
    786 F.3d 1155
    , 1163 (9th Cir. 2015) (en
    banc).
    BARAJAS-ROMERO V. LYNCH                            27
    call for any burden shifting.”52 The regulation, rather than
    imposing a burden of proof, says that all evidence bearing on
    the likelihood of future torture should be “considered,”
    including but not limited to past torture, possibility of safe
    relocation, country evidence of flagrant human rights
    violations, and other evidence regarding country conditions.53
    The BIA ruled in this case before Maldonado came down,
    so it doubtless applied what was then the applicable law, that
    Barajas-Romero had the burden of proving that he could not
    safely relocate. The State Department country report says
    that the national government in Mexico is trying to eliminate
    widespread police corruption and police cooperation with
    drug cartels, but it is very much an ongoing effort rather than
    52
    
    Id. 53 8
    C.F.R. § 1208.16:
    (3) In assessing whether it is more likely than not that
    an applicant would be tortured in the proposed country
    of removal, all evidence relevant to the possibility of
    future torture shall be considered, including, but not
    limited to:
    (i) Evidence of past torture inflicted upon the applicant;
    (ii) Evidence that the applicant could relocate to a part
    of the country of removal where he or she is not likely
    to be tortured;
    (iii) Evidence of gross, flagrant or mass violations of
    human rights within the country of removal, where
    applicable; and
    (iv) Other relevant information regarding conditions in
    the country of removal.
    28                   BARAJAS-ROMERO V. LYNCH
    a completed reform.          Past evidence of torture is
    uncontradicted and substantial. There was not much evidence
    presented on relocation beyond Barajas-Romero’s testimony
    that the police who tortured him told him that if he returned
    to Mexico, not just the village of Santa Clara, a bullet would
    go where they had scarred his forehead, and the State
    Department country report, which does not identify a safe
    place for individuals who have become targets of drug cartels
    and the police.
    Because the BIA did not evaluate relocation under the no-
    burden-shifting standard, and applied the incorrect standard
    in assessing Barajas-Romero’s withholding claim, we remand
    pursuant to INS v. Ventura54 so that the BIA may conduct
    such proceedings as may be appropriate to evaluate the
    factors for CAT relief under the standard we set out in
    Maldonado and review Barajas-Romero’s withholding claim
    under the proper legal standard of “a reason.”
    PETITION GRANTED.
    54
    I.N.S. v. Ventura, 
    537 U.S. 12
    , 16 (2002) (per curiam).
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-70520

Citation Numbers: 846 F.3d 351, 2017 WL 192711, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 858

Judges: Kleinfeld, Nguyen, Watford

Filed Date: 1/18/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024

Authorities (11)

Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, ... , 104 S. Ct. 2778 ( 1984 )

Zetino v. Holder , 622 F.3d 1007 ( 2010 )

Cole v. Holder , 659 F.3d 762 ( 2011 )

Mario Ernesto Navas v. Immigration and Naturalization ... , 217 F.3d 646 ( 2000 )

Wakkary v. Holder , 558 F.3d 1049 ( 2009 )

Teresita Moral BORJA, Petitioner, v. IMMIGRATION AND ... , 175 F.3d 732 ( 1999 )

99-cal-daily-op-serv-3115-1999-daily-journal-dar-4071-tomas-tabisula , 175 F.3d 727 ( 1999 )

Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Ventura , 123 S. Ct. 353 ( 2002 )

Kucana v. Holder , 130 S. Ct. 827 ( 2010 )

Melencio Legui Lim v. Immigration and Naturalization Service , 224 F.3d 929 ( 2000 )

longview-fibre-company-james-river-ii-inc-boise-cascade-corporation , 980 F.2d 1307 ( 1992 )

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