Isaiah Williams v. Debra Williams ( 2016 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
AUG 31 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ISAIAH NOEL WILLIAMS, No. 13-17284
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:07-cv-04464-CW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
DEBRA WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Claudia Wilken, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 8, 2015
San Francisco, California
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, SILVERMAN, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Isaiah Williams is an inmate in state prison. He commenced this
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against correctional officer Debra Williams. On appeal, he
argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the
defendant on his due process claim, and that the district court abused its discretion
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
by admitting evidence during trial regarding his alleged membership in a prison
gang and one of his tattoos.
I. Alleged Due Process Violation
Appellant alleges a due process violation based on Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539 (1974). Wolff accorded prisoners certain limited due process rights in
prison disciplinary proceedings “to insure that [a] state-created right is not
arbitrarily abrogated.” Id. at 557. The Court applied the “minimum requirements of
procedural due process” because “the determination of whether [prisoner
misconduct] has occurred becomes critical” when a state deducts good time credits
as punishment. Id. at 558. Under Wolff, an “inmate facing disciplinary proceedings
should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his
defense” so long as it is safe to do so. Id. at 566. Appellant argues that Officer
Williams violated this constitutional right by preventing him from attending his
prison disciplinary hearing on September 3, 2006.
The district court recognized that Appellant Williams had a right to attend
the disciplinary hearing. However, the court concluded that this right was not
clearly established in 2006. Thus, the court granted summary judgment on the due
process claim in favor of the defendant, based on qualified immunity.
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The court erred when it concluded that the right was not clearly established
in 2006. The Supreme Court’s statement in 1974 that prisoners have a right to call
witnesses and present evidence at disciplinary hearings necessarily implies a right
to participate in the hearing process. Here, the district court concluded that the
right was not clearly established in 2006 based on Wheeler v. Sim, 951 F.2d 796(7th Cir. 1992), and Francis v. Coughlin, 891 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1989). Neither of
these authorities undermines Wolff’s holding that prisoners have a right to present
evidence and call witnesses at disciplinary hearings when it is safe to do so. In
Wheeler, “the only due process question at issue [was] whether the Due Process
Clause itself entitles an inmate to present a written statement rather than an oral
statement . . . at a disciplinary hearing.” 951 F.2d at 799 (emphasis in original). In
Francis, the court addressed the issue of whether an inmate “had a right to be
present at the testimony of his witnesses.” 891 F.2d at 48 (emphasis in original).
Here, Appellant alleges that Officer Williams completely denied him the
opportunity to participate in the disciplinary hearing. If proven, this conduct would
be in clear violation of Wolff.
Therefore, we reverse the court’s grant of summary judgment on the due
process claim and remand for further proceedings. We do so even though
Appellant has not yet shown if, or how, he was actually damaged by the alleged
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constitutional deprivation. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978) (“[T]he
denial of procedural due process should be actionable for nominal damages
without proof of actual injury.”).
II. Trial Evidence
Appellant also argues that the district court erred when it admitted into
evidence the name of a white supremacist prison gang to which he allegedly
belongs, and when it admitted into evidence testimony regarding one of his tattoos.
If a district court abuses its discretion by admitting evidence improperly, this
court must determine whether or not the error was harmless. United States v.
Ramirez-Robles, 386 F.3d 1234, 1244 (9th Cir. 2004). An error is harmless if it is
“more probable than not that the erroneous admission of the evidence did not affect
the jury’s verdict.” Id. (quoting United States v. Hill, 953 F.3d 452, 458 (9th Cir.
1991)). This court will not reverse a jury verdict absent a showing of prejudice.
Monotype Corp. PLC v. Int’l Typeface Corp., 43 F.3d 443, 448 (9th Cir. 1994)
(citing Larez v. City of L.A., 946 F.2d 630, 638 (9th Cir. 1991)).
Assuming arguendo that the name of the gang and the testimony regarding
appellant’s tattoo were erroneously admitted, it is more probable than not that the
same jury verdict would have obtained. Absent the challenged evidence, the jury
still would have heard that Appellant was validated as a member of a prison gang,
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and that he picked a fight with a rival gang member. To the extent that the jury was
swayed by reference to the name of the gang and appellant’s tattoo, it would likely
still be swayed in the same manner by the evidence that Appellant belonged to an
apparently violent prison gang. Thus, we affirm the judgment in favor of the
defendant as to Appellant’s deliberate indifference, excessive force, and retaliation
claims.
Each party shall bear its own costs.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED.
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FILED
Williams v. Williams, 13-17284
AUG 31 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
SILVERMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I would affirm the district court in toto for the reasons stated in the original
Memorandum filed in this case on February 2, 2016.