Sun Earth, Inc. v. Sun Earth Solar Power Co. , 664 F. App'x 657 ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                    FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    NOV 16 2016
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    SUNEARTH, INC., a California                 No. 13-17622
    corporation; THE SOLARAY
    CORPORATION, a Hawaiian corporation,         D.C. No. 4:11-cv-04991-CW
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,
    MEMORANDUM*
    v.
    SUN EARTH SOLAR POWER CO.,
    LTD., a Chinese limited liability company,
    FKA Ningbo Solar Electric Power Co.,
    Ltd.; NBSOLAR USA INC., a California
    corporation,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    SUNEARTH, INC., a California                 No. 15-16096
    corporation; THE SOLARAY
    CORPORATION, a Hawaiian corporation,         D.C. No. 4:11-cv-04991-CW
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,
    v.
    SUN EARTH SOLAR POWER CO.,
    LTD., a Chinese limited liability company,
    FKA Ningbo Solar Electric Power Co.,
    Ltd.; NBSOLAR USA INC., a California
    corporation,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    Claudia Wilken, Senior District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted December 8, 2015
    San Francisco, California
    Before: KOZINSKI, BYBEE, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting an injunction that
    permitted Sun Earth Solar Power Co., Ltd. and its subsidiary NBSolar USA Inc.
    (collectively, “SESP”) to identify Sun Earth Solar Power Co., Ltd. as the
    manufacturer, importer, or seller on goods “branded as NBSolar rather than Sun
    Earth . . . to the minimum extent necessary as required by law or ordinary business
    customs to operate within the United States under the NBSolar name.” When
    fashioning an injunction to remedy trademark infringement, the district court has
    the discretion to permit non-misleading uses of a trade name. See E. & J. Gallo
    Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 
    967 F.2d 1280
    , 1297–98 (9th Cir. 1992). Nor does the
    exception violate Rule 65(d)’s requirements that the order granting the injunction
    “state its terms specifically” and “describe in reasonable detail . . . the act or acts
    restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d). An injunction allowing limited use of a
    trademark need not “catalog the entire universe of possible uses” but must only, as
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    2
    here, give the trademark holder “adequate notice” of the enjoined party’s
    permissible uses. See GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 
    202 F.3d 1199
    , 1211
    (9th Cir. 2000).
    In light of the en banc per curiam opinion in this matter, we do not decide
    whether the district court erred in determining that this was not an exceptional
    case. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 
    134 S. Ct. 1749
     (2014),
    and Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 
    134 S. Ct. 1744
     (2014),
    altered the analysis of fee applications under the Lanham Act. Therefore, district
    courts analyzing a request for fees under the Lanham Act should examine the
    “totality of the circumstances” to determine if the case was exceptional, Octane
    Fitness, 
    134 S. Ct. at 1756
    , exercising equitable discretion in light of the
    nonexclusive factors identified in Octane Fitness and Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 
    510 U.S. 517
    , 534 n.19 (1994), and using a preponderance of the evidence standard,
    Octane Fitness, 
    134 S. Ct. at 1758
    .
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to order contempt
    sanctions against SESP for infringing content on its independent distributors’
    websites. The injunction only applied to websites maintained by SESP. Sun Earth,
    Inc. has not shown that SESP engaged in the type of knowing, affirmative conduct
    necessary for it to have aided or abetted its distributors’ violations. See Inst. of
    3
    Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y, 
    774 F.3d 935
    , 950–52
    (9th Cir. 2014).
    Appellants also request attorney’s fees as damages for time expended
    responding to SESP’s cross appeal. SESP filed a cross appeal, failed to prosecute
    it, but refused to stipulate to dismissal. We recognize that appellants may be
    entitled to a modest fee award due to this dilatory conduct, see 
    28 U.S.C. § 1912
    ,
    Fed. R. App. P. 38, and refer appellants’ motion to the Appellate Commissioner.
    See 9th Cir. R. 39-1.9.
    Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s permanent injunction and its
    denial of sanctions, and REMAND to the district court for reconsideration of
    whether appellant SunEarth Inc. is entitled to attorney’s fees.2 Parties shall bear
    their own costs on appeal.
    AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED IN PART.
    2
    We also DENY Appellants’ motion to supplement the record as moot.
    4