United States v. Jose Aguilar ( 2019 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
SEP 20 2019
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 18-30059
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
2:16-cr-00036-TOR-9
v.
JOSE MARTIN AGUILAR, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
Thomas O. Rice, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 4, 2019**
Seattle, Washington
Before: D.W. NELSON, RAWLINSON, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
Jose Martin Aguilar (Aguilar) appeals the district court’s judgment imposing
a sentence of 324 months’ custody following his conviction for conspiracy to
distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
“We review a district court’s interpretation of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines (Guidelines) de novo, its factual findings for clear error, and its
application of the Guidelines to the facts of the case for abuse of discretion.”
United States v. McCarns, 900 F.3d 1141, 1143 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).
The government bears the burden of establishing the facts in support of an
enhancement by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Job, 871
F.3d 852, 868 (9th Cir. 2017), as amended.
In reviewing the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, we afford
significant deference to the district court’s consideration of the factors set forth in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the applicable Guidelines range. See United States
v. Martinez-Lopez, 864 F.3d 1034, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc). We will
reverse the sentence only if the court abused its discretion by applying an incorrect
legal rule or “if the sentence was illogical, implausible, or without support in
inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.” Id. (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). We review de novo any claimed Eighth
Amendment violation. See United States v. Pollard, 850 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir.
2017).
Aguilar asserts that the district court improperly double-counted his
possession of a gun to support a two-point enhancement for use of violence, under
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§ 2D1.1(b)(1) of the Guidelines, and separate two-point enhancement for
possession of a dangerous weapon, under § 2D1.1(b)(2). The district court did not
err in its application of the enhancements because a sentencing court “must
generally apply all applicable Guidelines provisions, regardless whether the same
act triggers multiple provisions.” United States v. Joey, 845 F.3d 1291, 1295 (9th
Cir. 2017). The Guidelines expressly contemplate that the enhancements in §§
2D1.1(b)(1) and (b)(2) “may be applied cumulatively.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt.
11(B).
Nor did the district court clearly err when it overruled Aguilar’s objection
that “no testimony” established that he imported methamphetamine into the United
States, or that he knew of the methamphetamine’s Mexican origin. The record
contains unrebutted evidence that the drugs originated from Mexico, and that
Aguilar “manag[ed] the meth that was coming from Mexico and sen[t] the money
back to Mexico,” at one point importing the drugs himself. See United States v.
Biao Huang, 687 F.3d 1197, 1206 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming the application of a
sentencing enhancement for importing methamphetamine where evidence
demonstrated that defendant sold the drugs in partnership with a co-defendant who
knew that the drugs were from China).
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Aguilar failed to meet his burden to show that his sentence was substantively
unreasonable. See United States v. Ressam, 679 F.3d 1069, 1088 (9th Cir. 2012)
(en banc), as amended (noting that relief on the basis of substantive
unreasonableness is rare). The district court imposed the lowest sentence within
his Guidelines range. Before doing so, the court considered Aguilar’s limited
criminal history, and the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3353(a) underlying the
sentence, including the use of violence in furtherance of the conspiracy, Aguilar’s
leadership role in the operation, and any potential sentencing disparity. See Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 55-56 (2007) (referencing remarks addressing
sentencing disparity from the government as satisfying the court’s obligation to
consider this factor). Under these circumstances, the sentence imposed was
substantively reasonable. See United States v. Blinkinsop, 606 F.3d 1110, 1116
(9th Cir. 2010) (“When a district judge has considered the § 3553(a) factors and
the totality of the circumstances supports the sentence, we have held that the
sentence is substantively reasonable . . .”).
Finally, Aguilar’s sentence, which was below the statutory maximum and at
the lowest end of the Guidelines range, does not violate the Eighth Amendment, as
it is not “grossly disproportionate” to the crime. United States v. Barajas-Avalos,
377 F.3d 1040, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004), as amended, (concluding that a low-end
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Guidelines sentence of 360 months’ imprisonment for conspiracy and attempt to
manufacture methamphetamine was not grossly disproportionate to the crime or in
violation of the Eighth Amendment, even though defendant had only one prior
misdemeanor).
AFFIRMED.
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