Mark Supanich v. Kevin Rundle ( 2012 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 17 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARK SUPANICH, a single man No. 10-36186
individually and as guardian for S.S., a
minor child, D.C. No. 3:10-cv-05008-RBL
Plaintiff - Appellant,
MEMORANDUM *
v.
KEVIN RUNDLE,
Defendant,
and
SANDY PEDIGO, a single woman; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 26, 2012 **
Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Mark Supanich appeals pro se from the district court’s orders dismissing his
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that the defendants conspired to violate his
constitutional rights in state child custody proceedings. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, and review de novo. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th
Cir. 2003); Potrero Hills Landfill, Inc. v. Cnty. of Solano, 657 F.3d 876, 881 (9th
Cir. 2011). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Nw. Envtl.
Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 617 F.3d 1176, 1192 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.
The claims against Nelson and Rundle were properly dismissed, because
Supanich has not identified any deprivation of constitutional rights he suffered due
to Nelson and Rundle’s alleged conspiracy. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept.,
901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) (the dismissal of a complaint may be based upon
the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under
a cognizable legal theory); see also Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th
Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (dissatisfaction with legal proceedings and conclusory
allegations that attorneys, judges, and others conspired against plaintiff in those
proceedings are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983).
Summary judgment as to the claims against Kay and Pegido was proper
because Supanich failed to introduce evidence showing there is a genuine dispute
of material fact as to whether they conspired to violate his constitutional rights.
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See Ward v. EEOC, 719 F.2d 311, 314 (9th Cir. 1983) (to survive summary
judgment on a conspiracy claim, plaintiff must show evidence of a connection or
agreement between the defendants).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by resolving Pegido and Kay’s
motions for summary judgment before the discovery period had closed, because
Supanich has not explained below or on appeal what facts he would have
discovered with additional time, nor how the information sought would preclude
summary judgment. See Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 412 (9th Cir. 1988)
(“The burden is on the nonmoving party . . . to show what material facts would be
discovered that would preclude summary judgment.”).
AFFIRMED.
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