Grigoryan v. Holder ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              OCT 31 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ANNA GRIGORYAN,                                  No. 08-70753
    Petitioner,                       Agency No. A099-460-090
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Argued and Submitted October 10, 2012
    Pasadena, California
    Before:        PREGERSON and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and BENNETT,
    District Judge.**
    Petitioner Anna Grigoryan, a native and citizen of Armenia, seeks review of
    the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision denying her application for
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Mark W. Bennett, United States District Judge for the
    Northern District of Iowa, sitting by designation.
    asylum, withholding of removal, and the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
    This court has jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and reviews for substantial
    evidence, INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. 478
    , 481 (1992).
    The record compels a finding that Grigoryan has a well-founded fear of
    persecution based on a protected ground. Grigoryan’s credible testimony
    demonstrates that she has a subjective fear of persecution. She also has an
    objectively reasonable fear of persecution. See Cordon-Garcia v. INS, 
    204 F.3d 985
    , 990 (9th Cir. 2000). Grigoryan experienced substantial harm in Armenia after
    she began working with Shitak, an Armenian human rights organization; she was
    threatened, insulted, vandalized, and ultimately attacked in an underground
    subway. Past “threats and violence” are indicative of Grigoryan’s “individualized
    risk of experiencing similar mistreatment” were she to return to Armenia. Hoxha
    v. Ashcroft, 
    319 F.3d 1179
    , 1184 (9th Cir. 2003). Grigoryan has continued to be
    threatened since her arrival in the United States, including by military officials in
    Armenia.
    The agency’s determination that Grigoryan was not harmed on account of a
    protected ground is not supported by substantial evidence. Grigoryan “need only
    ‘provide some evidence of [motive], direct or circumstantial,’” Karapetyan v.
    Mukasey, 
    543 F.3d 1118
    , 1127 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502
    
    2 U.S. 478
    , 483 (1992)). Grigoryan publicly voiced opposition to Armenian
    corruption and protested the lack of human rights in the country. See Mamouzian
    v. Ashcroft, 
    390 F.3d 1129
    , 1134 (9th Cir. 2004) (petition granted where Armenian
    applicant was threatened and beaten as a result of “articles she wrote in which she
    voiced opposition to corruption in the ruling party”). Further, there is significant
    circumstantial evidence, such as comments made to Grigoryan by military
    officials, that the threats to, and attack on, Grigoryan were related to her political
    work. There is no reasonable explanation for the threats and attack other than
    Grigoryan’s activities with Shitak.
    Substantial evidence does not support the BIA’s determination that
    Grigoryan has not shown the Armenian government is unable or unwilling to
    protect her because she did not seek protection from the government. This court
    will “presume that the persecution was perpetrated by government agents where
    there is no evidence to the contrary and where there is no evidence of hostility
    between the applicant and non-governmental actors.” 
    Karapetyan, 543 F.3d at 1128
    . Here, the evidence compels the conclusion that Grigoryan was persecuted
    by those acting on behalf of the government. When the government is responsible
    for persecution, an applicant is not required to seek help from the police. Baballah
    v. Ashcroft, 
    367 F.3d 1067
    , 1078 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[W]hen the government is
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    responsible for persecution, the third prong of our asylum inquiry is satisfied
    without further analysis”).
    Withholding of removal requires an alien to “demonstrate that it is more
    likely than not that he would be subject to persecution on one of the specified
    grounds,” Al-Harbi v. INS, 
    242 F.3d 882
    , 888 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation
    marks omitted). The record compels the conclusion that it is more likely than not
    that Grigoryan will experience persecution by the government if she returns to
    Armenia, and that such persecution is on account of her political activities. Thus,
    substantial evidence does not support the agency’s denial of withholding of
    removal.
    Grigoryan did not “establish that it is more likely than not that . . . she would
    be tortured if removed” to Armenia. Kamalthas v. INS, 
    251 F.3d 1279
    , 1284 (9th
    Cir. 2001) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)). “‘Torture is an extreme form of cruel
    and inhuman treatment and does not include lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or
    degrading treatment or punishment that do not amount to torture.’” Al-Saher v.
    INS, 
    268 F.3d 1143
    , 1147 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(2)).
    Substantial evidence supports the IJ and BIA’s conclusions that Grigoryan is not
    likely to experience torture were she to return to Armenia. 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1).
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    We grant Grigoryan’s petition on her asylum and withholding of removal
    claims. We remand this case to the agency for the Attorney General to exercise his
    discretion under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) as to whether to grant asylum, and direct the
    agency to enter an order for withholding of removal. See 
    Baballah, 367 F.3d at 1079
    . We affirm the BIA's denial of Grigoryan’s application for CAT protection.
    Petition GRANTED in part, DENIED in part, and REMANDED.
    Costs to the petitioner.
    5