Victor Dema v. City of Mesa ( 2013 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            JAN 02 2013
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    VICTOR O. DEMA,                                  No. 11-15481
    Plaintiff - Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:09-cv-00642-NVW
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    CITY OF MESA; et al.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    Neil V. Wake, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted December 19, 2012 **
    Before:        GOODWIN, WALLACE, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
    Victor O. Dema appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
    his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action alleging constitutional violations in connection with
    two investigative stops. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim, Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish,
    
    382 F.3d 969
    , 973 (9th Cir. 2004), and summary judgment, Ramirez v. City of
    Buena Park, 
    560 F.3d 1012
    , 1019 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Dema’s § 1983 claims against the City
    of Mesa because Dema failed to allege the existence of any unconstitutional policy
    or custom. See Hart v. Parks, 
    450 F.3d 1059
    , 1071 (9th Cir. 2006) (municipal
    liability under § 1983 exists only for constitutional violations occurring pursuant to
    an official government policy or custom); Trevino v. Gates, 
    99 F.3d 911
    , 918 (9th
    Cir. 1996) (“Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or
    sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration,
    frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of
    carrying out policy.”).
    The district court properly granted summary judgment on Dema’s racial
    profiling claims against Officer Ortega because reasonable suspicion supported
    detaining Dema, and race was not the sole basis for the investigatory stop. See
    Ramirez, 
    560 F.3d at 1020
     (for brief investigatory stops, “the Fourth Amendment
    is satisfied if the officer’s action is supported by reasonable suspicion”). The court
    also properly granted summary judgment on Dema’s excessive force claim against
    Ortega because Dema failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
    2                                    11-15481
    whether Ortega used unreasonable force against him. See Tekle v. United States,
    
    511 F.3d 839
    , 844-45 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing the factors for determining
    whether the force used was excessive, including the severity of the force applied
    and whether the subject is posing a threat to the safety of the officer).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing without prejudice
    Dema’s § 1983 claims against an unnamed Mesa police officer because Dema
    failed to effect proper service of the summons and complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
    4(e), (m) (describing proper methods for service of process on an individual and
    requiring service within 120 days after the complaint is filed); Oyama v. Sheehan
    (In re Sheehan), 
    253 F.3d 507
    , 511-13 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining good cause
    standard and the district court’s broad discretion to extend the time for service or
    dismiss without prejudice).
    We reject Dema’s contentions concerning the district judge’s alleged bias
    and intimidation. We also reject Dema’s contentions concerning lack of notice,
    denial of a jury trial, conspiracy, malicious prosecution, and denial of his motion
    for reconsideration.
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                    11-15481