Narinderjit Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. ( 2014 )


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  •                             NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                            FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                             APR 23 2014
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    NARINDERJIT SINGH,                               No. 10-71208               U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    Petitioner,                        Agency No. A073-419-674
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    NARINDERJIT SINGH,                               No. 10-73415
    Petitioner,                        Agency No. A073-419-674
    v.
    ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    Page 2 of 3
    Submitted April 9, 2014**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: KLEINFELD, NGUYEN, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
    1. Our jurisdiction to review the denial of an INA § 212(i) waiver is limited
    by 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    . See Corona-Mendez v. Holder, 
    593 F.3d 1143
    , 1146 (9th Cir.
    2010). We have jurisdiction to review only questions of law and constitutional
    claims. 
    Id.
     Singh’s “factual errors” and adverse credibility arguments don’t fall
    under either category, as they boil down to claims that the Immigration Judge (IJ)
    abused its discretion. See Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales, 
    424 F.3d 926
    , 930 (9th Cir.
    2005). We therefore lack jurisdiction to review these arguments.
    We have jurisdiction to review Singh’s due process claim, but we reject it on
    the merits. Singh’s children were not his qualifying relatives for the § 212(i)
    waiver, so their feelings were not relevant to the hardship inquiry. See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1182
    (i). As the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) noted, Singh’s wife was a
    qualifying relative, and he could have testified about the hardship she would suffer
    based on their children’s reaction to his removal. Singh did not provide such
    testimony. That Singh failed to do so doesn’t show that “the proceeding was so
    fundamentally unfair that [he] was prevented from reasonably presenting his case.”
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Page 3 of 3
    Colmenar v. INS, 
    210 F.3d 967
    , 971 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks
    omitted).
    2. We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of Singh’s motion to
    reopen. See Fernandez v. Gonzalez, 
    439 F.3d 592
    , 599–600 (9th Cir. 2006).
    However, the BIA didn’t abuse its discretion in denying that motion. It properly
    considered Singh’s newly submitted evidence and concluded that the evidence
    didn’t materially alter Singh’s hardship showing. The BIA had previously
    considered whether his wife’s anxiety and depression satisfied the extreme
    hardship standard, and the BIA didn’t abuse its discretion in concluding the
    additional evidence wasn’t material. Cf. Garcia v. Holder, 
    621 F.3d 906
    , 912–13
    (9th Cir. 2010). The BIA was not required to explicitly reject each and every
    document Singh presented. See Najmabadi v. Holder, 
    597 F.3d 983
    , 990 (9th Cir.
    2010). It needed only to provide a decision sufficiently detailing its reasoning so
    as to allow for adequate review, and it did so here. 
    Id.
    PETITION DISMISSED IN PART; DENIED IN PART.