Charles Turner v. Aoao Wailea Pt. Village ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 27 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHARLES P. TURNER, No. 16-15808
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:14-cv-00306-BMK
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ASSOCIATION OF APARTMENT
OWNERS OF WAILEA POINT VILLAGE;
ROBERT READER, individually and as
Resident Manager of AOAO Wailea Point
Village; DARRYL JOHNSON, individually
and as Security Supervisor of AOAO of
Wailea Point Village; DOES, 1-10,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
Barry M. Kurren, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 14, 2018
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: TASHIMA, W. FLETCHER, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Charles Turner appeals a judgment in favor of the Association of Apartment
Owners of Wailea Point Village (“Wailea Point”), and two Wailea Point employees,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Robert Reader and Darryl Johnson. The district court granted a defense motion for
summary judgment on Turner’s claims asserting (1) disability discrimination in
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et
seq., and Hawaii law, Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-2; (2) religious discrimination in
violation of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and Hawaii
law, Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-2; (3) violation of the Hawaii Whistleblowers’ Protection
Act, Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-62; and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Reviewing de novo, Szajer v. City of L.A., 632 F.3d 607, 610 (9th Cir. 2011), we
vacate the summary judgment on Turner’s disability discrimination claims, but
otherwise affirm.
1. Turner asserts disparate treatment and failure to accommodate disability
claims under the ADA and Hawaii law. Because Hawaii looks “to interpretations of
analogous federal laws” when interpreting its antidiscrimination laws, Schefke v.
Reliable Collection Agency, Ltd., 32 P.3d 52, 69 (Haw. 2001) (quoting Shoppe v.
Gucci Am., Inc., 14 P.3d 1049, 1058 (Haw. 2000)), we analyze both the federal and
state law claims under the settled ADA precedents.
A. ADA discrimination claims are “subject to the burden-shifting framework
outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973).”
Curley v. City of N. Las Vegas, 772 F.3d 629, 632 (9th Cir. 2014). Under that
framework, on summary judgment, the plaintiff must first adduce sufficient evidence
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of a prima facie case. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the plaintiff meets
that burden, the defendant must present evidence of a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason” for the challenged conduct. Id. If the defendant does so, then the burden of
production returns to the plaintiff, who must offer evidence that the proffered
nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual. Id. at 804.
In rejecting Turner’s disparate treatment claim, the district court focused on
the third McDonnell Douglas prong, finding no evidence of pretext. But Turner’s
burden on this front was not great. “To avoid summary judgment at this step,
however, the plaintiff must only demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute of
material fact regarding pretext. The amount of evidence required to do so is
minimal.” Nicholson v. Hyannis Air Serv., Inc., 580 F.3d 1116, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009).
Thus, “any indication of discriminatory motive . . . may suffice to raise a question
that can only be resolved by a fact-finder,” and “[w]hen [the] evidence, direct or
circumstantial, consists of more than the McDonnell Douglas presumption, a factual
question will almost always exist with respect to any claim of a nondiscriminatory
reason.” McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1124 (9th Cir. 2004)
(omission and second alteration in original) (citations omitted).
Turner’s declaration—which stated, for example, that Wailea Point singled
him out for sleeping during the night shift while other employees did so without
repercussions—raises a dispute of material fact as to disparate treatment. Turner’s
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declaration also states that he was disciplined for failing to report certain activity by
residents, but other employees were not disciplined for like failures. Although
Turner’s declaration does not specifically allege that the non-disciplined employees
in each instance were not disabled, given the small workforce at the apartment
complex and the employer’s knowledge of the employees, the declaration contains
at least minimal evidence establishing a dispute of material fact on the issue of
disparate treatment. See Nicholson, 580 F.3d at 1127.
B. Absent undue hardship, an employer must offer reasonable
accommodations to disabled employees. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Once an
employee requests an accommodation, “the employer must engage in an interactive
process . . . to determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation.” Zivkovic v. S.
Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002). “‘Liability for failure to
provide reasonable accommodations ensues only where the employer bears
responsibility for the breakdown’ in the interactive process.” Id. (quoting Beck v.
Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1137 (7th Cir. 1996)).
Wailea Point plainly attempted to accommodate Turner’s left foot injury. But,
Turner testified that after he told his supervisor the initial accommodations were
ineffective, the employer failed to explore additional modifications. Because an
employer can violate “its duty regarding the mandatory interactive process” by
failing to explore other possible accommodations once it becomes aware that current
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accommodations are ineffective, see Humphrey v. Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, 239 F.3d
1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2001), there is a material issue of disputed fact on Turner’s
failure to accommodate claim.1
2. To state a religious discrimination claim, Turner must show that “he had a
bona fide religious belief, the practice of which conflict with an employment duty.”
Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993).2 The record contains no
evidence that Turner’s religious beliefs conflict with his employment duty.
Although Turner prefers to attend church at 7:00 a.m. on Sundays, he admitted that
other services are available after his shift ends.
3. To prevail under the Hawaii Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, Haw. Rev.
Stat. § 378-62, Turner must show that protected conduct had a “causal connection”
to and was a “substantial or motivating factor” in the employer’s retaliation, Crosby
v. State Dep’t of Budget & Fin., 876 P.2d 1300, 1310 (Haw. 1994) (citation omitted).
Even assuming that Wailea Point knew Turner had filed complaints with state
authorities, the record does not contain evidence that such knowledge was a
1
With respect to Turner’s accommodation claim relating to his right foot
injury, however, the district court properly granted the employer summary judgment
because Turner was responsible for the breakdown in the interactive process. See
Allen v. Pac. Bell, 348 F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
2
Hawaii looks to federal law as “a useful analytical tool” in evaluating religious
discrimination claims. Furukawa v. Honolulu Zoological Soc’y, 936 P.2d 643, 649
(Haw. 1997). The parties do not claim that federal law and state law differ in any
respect material to this appeal.
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substantial or motivating factor in the decision to terminate him. The firing occurred
over a year after Turner filed the complaints, a period too lengthy to establish the
requisite causal connection. See id.; Mussack v. State, No. 28774, 2011 WL
6144904, at *4 (Haw. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2011).
4. Turner’s intentional infliction of emotion distress claims required evidence
of “outrageous” behavior, Hac v. Univ. of Haw., 73 P.3d 46, 60–61 (Haw. 2003)
(adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (Am. Law. Inst. 1965)), which Hawaii
case law defines as actions “without just cause or excuse and beyond all bounds of
decency,” Enoka v. AIG Haw. Ins. Co., 128 P.3d 850, 872 (Haw. 2006) (citation
omitted). The record contains no evidence of conduct by the defendants meeting
this exacting standard. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d (requiring
actions “regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community”).
5. Finally, Wailea Point argues that some of Turner’s disability discrimination
claims are time-barred. That claim appears to have merit, but because the district
court did not address it, we decline to do so in the first instance, without prejudice
to Wailea Point asserting it before the district court on remand.
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; and REMANDED IN
PART. Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
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