Armani v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. ( 2016 )


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  •                       FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    AVERY ARMANI,                                        No. 14-56866
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    D.C. No.
    v.                            2:13-cv-07058-
    RSWL-RZ
    NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL LIFE
    INSURANCE COMPANY, a
    corporation,                                           OPINION
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Ronald S.W. Lew, Senior District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted October 3, 2016
    Pasadena, California
    Filed November 4, 2016
    Before: Dorothy W. Nelson and Richard A. Paez, Circuit
    Judges, and Elaine E. Bucklo,* Senior District Judge.
    Opinion by Judge D.W. Nelson
    *
    The Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo, Senior United States District Judge
    for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
    2            ARMANI V. NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL
    SUMMARY**
    Employee Retirement Income Security Act
    The panel vacated in part the district court’s judgment in
    favor of the defendant in part in plaintiff’s action under the
    Employee Retirement Income Security Act, challenging a
    denial of benefits under a long term disability insurance
    policy.
    The administrative record showed that the plaintiff could
    not sit for more than four hours a day. The district court,
    reviewing de novo, nonetheless upheld the insurer’s
    determination that the plaintiff could perform sedentary work.
    The panel held that the district court erred by rejecting the
    plaintiff’s proposed definition of “sedentary” work on the
    basis that it was drawn from the Social Security context.
    Agreeing with other circuits, the panel held that an employee
    who cannot sit for more than four hours in an eight-hour
    workday cannot perform “sedentary” work that requires
    “sitting most of the time.”
    The panel vacated the part of the district court’s judgment
    denying the plaintiff his long term disability benefits and
    remanded for further proceedings.
    **
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    ARMANI V. NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL                  3
    COUNSEL
    Charles Fleishman (argued) and Paul A. Fleishman, The
    Fleishman Law Firm, Woodland Hills, California, for
    Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Linda M. Lawson (argued) and Charles K. Chineduh,
    Meserve Mumper & Hughes LLP, Los Angeles, California,
    for Defendant-Appellee.
    OPINION
    D.W. NELSON, Senior Circuit Judge:
    Avery Armani (Armani) appeals the district court’s
    judgment denying him benefits under his long term disability
    policy sponsored by his employer and issued by Appellee
    Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company (Northwestern
    Mutual). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
    and we VACATE the part of the judgment denying Armani
    benefits and REMAND the case for further proceedings
    consistent with this opinion.
    BACKGROUND
    Armani worked as a full-time controller for the
    Renaissance Insurance Agency (Renaissance) from
    November 3, 2008 to May 18, 2011. On January 6, 2011,
    during the normal course of his employment, Armani injured
    his back while lifting a heavy backup power supply. A
    family practitioner treated Armani on January 26, 2011, and
    diagnosed a lumbar region sprain, muscle spasms, and
    sciatica. A chiropractor, Dr. Brian Padveen, later treated
    4          ARMANI V. NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL
    Armani, restricted him to modified work effective April 13,
    2011, and instructed Armani not to sit continuously without
    the ability to change position. On April 19, 2011, an MRI
    revealed minor disc desiccation as well as disc bulge and
    annular tear. Armani stopped working on May 18, 2011 as a
    result of his increasing back pain. Dr. Padveen determined
    the next day that Armani was unable to work and that he
    should be re-evaluated on June 22, 2011. Armani saw a
    different chiropractor on June 22, 2011, who also determined
    that Armani was unable to work and that he should be re-
    evaluated again at a later date.
    As a Renaissance employee, Armani was insured under a
    group long-term disability policy (the LTD Plan) issued by
    Northwestern Mutual. Under the terms of the LTD Plan, the
    definition of disability changes after benefits are paid for 24
    months. For the first 24 months, a claimant is “only required
    to be Disabled from [his] own occupation,” which means the
    claimant is either “[u]nable to perform with reasonable
    continuity the material duties of [his] own occupation” or
    “[u]nable to earn more than 80% of [his] Indexed
    Predisability Earnings while working in [his] own
    occupation.” To receive benefits after 24 months of disability
    payments, the claimant must then “be Disabled from all
    occupations.” This requires the claimant to demonstrate that
    he is “[u]nable to perform with reasonable continuity the
    material duties of any gainful occupation for which [he is]
    reasonably fitted by education, training, and experience” or
    “[u]nable to earn more than 80% of [his] Indexed
    Predisability Earnings while working in [his] own or any
    other occupation.”
    Armani completed a Group Disability Claim Employee
    Statement for Northwestern Mutual on July 15, 2011,
    ARMANI V. NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL                    5
    reporting that his back injury prevented him “from sitting,
    standing, walking, driving, and concentrating for prolonged
    period of time without experiencing a lot of pain &/or
    difficulty.” Northwestern Mutual also received a description
    of Armani’s “working conditions” as “sedentary the majority
    of the time in a quiet office environment.” Armani indicated
    that his job required him to sit for approximately seven hours
    a day and stand or walk for one hour a day. On July 25,
    2011, Northwestern Mutual received an Attending Physician
    Statement indicating that Armani was limited to sitting for
    four hours, standing for two hours, and walking for two hours
    during an eight-hour workday. Northwestern Mutual’s
    vocational case manager later confirmed that Armani’s
    occupation was classified as sedentary, and Armani’s
    disability claim was approved under the “own occupation”
    test effective July 18, 2011.
    Between September 2011 and January 2012, Armani
    continued to visit chiropractors, pain specialists, and
    physicians, all of whom confirmed that Armani’s disability
    precluded him from working. On January 16, 2012, another
    chiropractor indicated that Armani was limited to sitting for
    four hours a day and to standing and walking for two hours a
    day, but believed that Armani’s condition would improve and
    that he could return to work on July 6, 2012. Based solely on
    these medical records, Northwestern Mutual’s reviewing
    physician, Dr. John Hart, determined that Armani was
    capable of working in a sedentary position.
    On February 11, 2013, Armani returned to Dr. Padveen,
    who determined that Armani was still limited to sitting for
    four hours a day and to standing and walking for two hours a
    day. In a follow-up visit on April 15, 2013, Dr. Padveen
    again stated that Armani could sit for between two and four
    6          ARMANI V. NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL
    hours a day and must alternate between sitting and standing
    to relieve pain every 30 minutes.
    Dr. Hart was asked again by Northwestern Mutual to
    review Armani’s medical records and on April 18, 2013,
    wrote that Armani was “capable of doing a sedentary-level
    occupation without limitations or restrictions.” Using Dr.
    Hart’s report, Northwestern Mutual’s vocational case
    manager assessed Armani’s ability to perform “any
    occupation” given his functional capacity, work history,
    skills, and training. On June 12, 2013, the case manager
    identified three positions in addition to Armani’s own
    position that he could perform at a “sedentary” level. She
    based her assessment on the Dictionary of Occupational
    Titles (DOT), published by the United States Department of
    Labor, which states that “[s]edentary work involves sitting
    most of the time, but may involve walking or standing for
    brief periods of time.” (emphasis added).
    By letter dated July 9, 2013, Northwestern Mutual
    informed Armani that his LTD claim was being closed
    because his records did not support a disability under the
    “own occupation” or “any occupation” test. Armani appealed
    the decision and asked for review by a second doctor. After
    being assigned to review Armani’s records, Dr. Hans Carlson
    also found that the records “[did] not support that [Armani]
    would be precluded from sedentary-level work.” Dr. Carlson
    further elaborated that “[i]t would be reasonable that
    [Armani] would have the ability to reposition from sitting to
    standing occasionally as needed.” On September 11, 2013,
    Northwestern Mutual informed Armani that it was upholding
    its claim decision.
    ARMANI V. NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL                              7
    On September 16, 2013, Armani filed a lawsuit pursuant
    to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
    seeking judicial review of Northwestern Mutual’s claim
    decision.1 Following a bench trial, during which the district
    court reviewed de novo Northwestern Mutual’s
    determination, the court awarded Armani benefits for the
    remainder of the first 24 months of disability under the Plan,
    finding that “there was no change in circumstances sufficient
    to warrant denying [Armani] the nine days of benefits at the
    end of the ‘own occupation period.’”
    However, the district court also held that Armani failed to
    show by a preponderance of the evidence that he was disabled
    from “all occupations” after July 18, 2013, reasoning that
    “[t]he Administrative Record contain[ed] scant information
    regarding [Armani’s] condition during this period.” Although
    Armani argued that he was “unable to perform any
    occupation classified as ‘sedentary,’ because, by definition,
    ‘sedentary’ requires an ability to sit for six hours,” the court
    held that Northwestern Mutual was not bound by this
    definition, and that Armani had failed to demonstrate how his
    disability prevented him from performing any of the
    sedentary occupations identified by the vocational case
    manager.
    The district court also excluded four exhibits from outside
    the administrative record that Armani attempted to introduce
    with his Reply Trial Brief, finding that the documents “[were]
    1
    The beneficiary of a disability insurance plan may bring a civil
    action under ERISA “to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his
    plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his
    rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.” 29 U.S.C.
    § 1132(a)(1)(B).
    8          ARMANI V. NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL
    not necessary to adequately conduct [the court’s] review.”
    One such exhibit included an August 7, 2013 medical
    evaluation stating that Armani was still limited to sitting for
    two to four hours a day. Armani timely appealed.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review the district court’s findings of fact for clear
    error and its conclusions of law de novo. United States v.
    Bell, 
    602 F.3d 1074
    , 1079 (9th Cir. 2010).
    ANALYSIS
    When a district court reviews de novo a plan
    administrator’s determination of a claimant’s right to recover
    long term disability benefits, the claimant has the burden of
    proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he was
    disabled under the terms of the plan. Muniz v. Amec Const.
    Mgmt., Inc., 
    623 F.3d 1290
    , 1294 (9th Cir. 2010).
    The administrative record available to the district court
    plainly showed that, between July 25, 2011, and April 15,
    2013, every physician and chiropractor who treated Armani
    determined that he could not sit for more than four hours a
    day. Nonetheless, the district court upheld Northwestern
    Mutual’s determination that Armani could perform work at
    the “sedentary” level as of April 18, 2013. The district court
    rejected Armani’s proposed definition of “sedentary” work on
    the basis that it was drawn from the Social Security context.
    Citing “the vast differences in both form and function
    between Social Security law and ERISA law,” the district
    court concluded, without further discussion or analysis, that
    “the federal criteria for Social Security claims are not
    ARMANI V. NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL                     9
    transferable to ERISA cases.”         This conclusion was
    erroneous.
    Indeed, while this Court has yet to address the question,
    other courts evaluating ERISA claims and interpreting the
    DOT have consistently held that an employee who cannot sit
    for more than four hours in an eight-hour workday cannot
    perform work classified as “sedentary.” See, e.g., Connors v.
    Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 
    272 F.3d 127
    , 136 n.5 (2d
    Cir. 2001) (“The ability to sit for a total of four hours does
    not generally satisfy the standard for sedentary work.”);
    Brooking v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co.,167 Fed. Appx.
    544, 548–49 (6th Cir. 2006); Robertson v. Standard Ins. Co.,
    
    139 F. Supp. 3d 1190
    , 1209 (D. Or. 2015) (“Since sedentary
    work, as defined by the DOL’s Dictionary of Occupational
    Titles, ‘involves sitting most of the time,’ . . . courts have
    concluded that even a four-hour sitting tolerance is
    insufficient to render one capable of performing sedentary
    work.”) (internal citations omitted). Some of these courts
    have further noted that “sedentary work” generally requires
    the ability to sit for at least six hours. See LaVertu v. Unum
    Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
    2014 WL 1224736
    , at *13 (C.D. Cal.
    Mar. 25, 2014) (“Sedentary work requires the ability to sit for
    at least six hours of an eight-hour workday.”); Wykstra v. Life
    Ins. Co. of N. Am., 
    849 F. Supp. 2d 285
    , 295 (N.D.N.Y. 2012)
    (“[T]he generally recognized definition of sedentary work is
    work that ‘involves up to two hours of standing or walking
    and six hours of sitting in an eight-hour work day.’”); Alfano
    v. CIGNA Life Ins. Co. of New York, 
    2009 WL 222351
    , at *18
    (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2009) (noting that “6 hours per day [is]
    generally recognized as the minimum [sitting] tolerance
    required for sedentary work”); Mead v. ReliaStar Life Ins.
    Co., 
    2008 WL 850675
    , at *2 n.4 (D. Vt. Mar. 27, 2008) (“A
    generally recognized standard for sedentary work ‘involves
    10         ARMANI V. NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL
    up to two hours of standing or walking and six hours of sitting
    in an eight-hour work day.’”). Accordingly, these cases
    reflect the logical conclusion that an employee who is unable
    to sit for more than half of the workday cannot consistently
    perform an occupation that requires sitting for “most of the
    time.” We agree with this commonsense conclusion and hold
    that an employee who cannot sit for more than four hours in
    an eight-hour workday cannot perform “sedentary” work that
    requires “sitting most of the time.”
    Rather than consider whether the preponderance of the
    evidence established that Armani was unable to perform “any
    occupation” while restricted to sitting for no more than four
    hours a day, the district court rejected Armani’s proposed
    definition of “sedentary” work on the erroneous basis that the
    definition was limited to the Social Security context. That
    error led the court to conclude that Armani had not
    established that he was unable to perform the four positions
    Northwestern Mutual had identified based on his functional
    capacity as of April 18, 2013, despite the fact that all four
    positions were classified as “sedentary,” and despite
    undisputed evidence that, as of that date, Armani was unable
    to sit for more than four hours a day.
    Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in
    denying Armani his long term disability benefits under the
    Plan. Because we vacate the district court’s judgment on
    these grounds, we need not decide whether the district court
    properly excluded extra-record evidence submitted by
    Armani.
    ARMANI V. NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL             11
    CONCLUSION
    We VACATE the part of the district court’s judgment
    denying Armani his long term disability benefits and
    REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with
    this opinion.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-56866

Judges: Nelson, Paez, Bucklo

Filed Date: 11/4/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024