Victor Pfendler v. Liberty Dialysis-Hawaii, LLC ( 2018 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
JUL 02 2018
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
VICTOR E. PFENDLER, No. 16-16916
Plaintiff-Appellant, DC No. CV 14-377 HG
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LIBERTY DIALYSIS-HAWAII, LLC,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
Helen W. Gillmor, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 11, 2018
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: TASHIMA, W. FLETCHER, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Victor Pfendler was a Dialysis Technical Specialist
(“DTS”) employed by Defendant-Appellee Liberty Dialysis-Hawaii, LLC
(“Liberty”). Pfendler suffered a non-work-related shoulder injury and was granted
medical leave in January 2012. Between March and December 2012, Pfendler
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
asked to return to work with a lifting restriction that started at 30 pounds but
lessened to 50 pounds. Liberty rejected these proposals, relying on its written job
description that lifting 75 to 100 pounds is an “essential job function.”
Pfendler sued, arguing that Liberty violated the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., by not allowing him to return to his
DTS position. The district court granted Liberty’s motion for summary judgment,
concluding that Pfendler was not a “qualified individual” for the purposes of his
discrimination claim. Specifically, the district court concluded that “[t]here is
undisputed evidence that lifting more than 50 pounds was an essential function of”
a DTS and that Pfendler could not lift this weight after his injury.1
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review the grant of
summary judgment de novo. Smith v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 727 F.3d 950, 954 (9th
Cir. 2013). We reverse and remand.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Pfendler, the district court
erred in concluding that it was undisputed that lifting more than 50 pounds was an
essential function of a DTS.
1
The district court assumed that Pfendler was disabled, and did not
reach whether Pfendler suffered an adverse employment action.
2
Liberty “has the burden of production in establishing what job functions are
essential . . . .” Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233, 1237
(9th Cir. 2012) (citing Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 991 (9th
Cir. 2007) (en banc)). “The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
regulations interpreting the ADA explain that a job’s ‘essential functions’ are its
‘fundamental’ duties, not the ‘marginal functions of the position.’ ” Cripe v. City
of San Jose, 261 F.3d 877, 887 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)).
There is a material dispute about whether lifting more than 50 pounds is a
fundamental duty for a DTS. The district court erred by misinterpreting Pfendler’s
deposition testimony regarding the lifting requirements of the position. The
district court stated that “Plaintiff testified that the position required lifting more
than 50 pounds,” but the cited portions of Pfendler’s deposition do not support the
court’s conclusion. Rather, Pfendler testified that he only had to “tilt” the dialysis
recliners and stated that he “never had to lift one up.”2 Also, there is evidence in
the record from another DTS that “the most weight he lifts on a regular basis
would be about 40 lbs.”
2
Pfendler also testified to lifting 50-pound bags of carbon, but only
once every three years.
3
Although the job description’s characterization that lifting 75 to 100 pounds
is an “essential” function of a DTS is evidence supporting Libety’s position,
testimony from Pfendler and statements by another DTS are sufficient to create a
factual dispute on the issue. At the summary judgment stage, if lifting more than
50 pounds was not an essential function of the job, Pfendler would have been a
qualified individual, and Liberty’s refusal to allow him to return to the DTS
position may have been discriminatory. Alternatively, if the lifting requirement
was an essential function, Pfendler may have been entitled to an accommodation
that the employer waive the formal lifting condition. Therefore, the dispute about
the lifting requirement was material and the district court erred in granting
summary judgment to Liberty.3
• ! •
The judgment of the district court is REVERSED and REMANDED.
3
We need not reach the other elements of a prima facie ADA claim;
instead, we leave it to the district court on remand to analyze these issues in the
first instance.
4