Dale Danielson v. Jay Inslee ( 2019 )


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  •                  FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    DALE DANIELSON, a Washington              No. 18-36087
    State employee; BENJAMIN RAST, a
    Washington State employee;                   D.C. No.
    TAMARA ROBERSON, a Washington             3:18-cv-05206-
    State employee; as individuals, and            RJB
    on behalf of all others similarly
    situated,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,     OPINION
    v.
    JAY ROBERT INSLEE, in his official
    capacity as Governor of the State of
    Washington; DAVID SCHUMACHER,
    in his official capacity as Director of
    Washington State Office of Financial
    Management; AMERICAN
    FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY,
    AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES,
    COUNCIL 28, AFL-CIO, a labor
    organization,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    Robert J. Bryan, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted November 6, 2019
    Seattle, Washington
    2                     DANIELSON V. INSLEE
    Filed December 26, 2019
    Before: Ronald M. Gould and Jacqueline H. Nguyen,
    Circuit Judges, and Gregory A. Presnell, * District Judge.
    Opinion by Judge Nguyen
    SUMMARY **
    Civil Rights
    The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a
    claim for monetary relief bought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
    § 1983 by public sector employees against their union
    following the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus v.
    American Federation of State, County, & Municipal
    Employees, Council 31, 
    138 S. Ct. 2448
    (2018), which held
    that the compulsory collection of agency fees by unions
    violates the First Amendment.
    Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus, public
    sector unions around the country relied on the Supreme
    Court’s decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,
    
    431 U.S. 209
    (1977), which held that the unions could
    collect compulsory agency fees from nonmembers to finance
    their collective bargaining activities, without running afoul
    of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. State laws and
    *
    The Honorable Gregory A. Presnell, United States District Judge
    for the Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.
    **
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It
    has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    DANIELSON V. INSLEE                      3
    regulations further entrenched the union agency shop into
    the local legal framework. In 2018, the Supreme Court
    uprooted its precedent by overturning Abood. Immediately
    thereafter, the defendant Union stopped collecting
    mandatory fees from nonmembers. Plaintiffs subsequently
    brought suit seeking, among other things, a refund of all
    agency fees that were allegedly unlawfully collected from
    plaintiffs prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus.
    Joining the Seventh Circuit, the panel held that private
    parties may invoke an affirmative defense of good faith to
    retrospective monetary liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
    where they acted in direct reliance on then-binding Supreme
    Court precedent and presumptively-valid state law. See
    Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31,
    
    942 F.3d 352
    (7th Cir. 2019) (“Janus II”); Mooney v. Ill.
    Educ. Ass’n, 
    942 F.3d 368
    (7th Cir. 2019). The panel held
    that the good faith affirmative defense applied as a matter of
    law, and the district court was right to dismiss plaintiffs’
    claim for monetary relief.
    COUNSEL
    Jonathan F. Mitchell (argued), Mitchell Law PLLC, Austin,
    Texas; Talcott J. Franklin, Talcott Franklin PC, Dallas,
    Texas; Eric Stahlfeld, Freedom Foundation, Olympia,
    Washington; Christopher Hellmich, Hellmich Law Group
    P.C., Anaheim Hills, California; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
    P. Casey Pitts (argued), Scott Kronland, and Matthew J.
    Murray, Altshuler Berzon LLP, San Francisco, California;
    Edward E. Younglove III, Younglove & Coker P.L.L.C.,
    Olympia, Washington; for Defendants-Appellees.
    4                  DANIELSON V. INSLEE
    OPINION
    NGUYEN, Circuit Judge:
    “Stare decisis—in English, the idea that today’s Court
    should stand by yesterday’s decisions—is ‘a foundation
    stone of the rule of law.’” Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC,
    
    135 S. Ct. 2401
    , 2409 (2015) (quoting Michigan v. Bay Mills
    Indian Cmty., 
    572 U.S. 782
    , 798 (2014)). But on rare
    occasion, even longstanding precedent can be overruled.
    What happens when the Supreme Court reverses course, but
    private parties have already acted in reliance on longstanding
    bedrock precedent?
    This question lies at the center of this appeal. For over
    40 years, public sector unions around the country relied on
    the Supreme Court’s decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of
    Education, 
    431 U.S. 209
    (1977), which held that the unions
    could collect compulsory agency fees from nonmembers to
    finance their collective bargaining activities, without
    running afoul of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
    State laws and regulations further entrenched the union
    agency shop into the local legal framework. But in 2018, the
    Supreme Court uprooted its precedent by overturning
    Abood. In Janus v. American Federation of State, County,
    & Municipal Employees, Council 31, 
    138 S. Ct. 2448
    (2018),
    the Supreme Court held that unions’ compulsory collection
    of agency fees violated the Constitution.
    Many public sector unions, including the defendant
    union here, immediately stopped collecting agency fees. But
    uncertainty remained as to whether they would be
    monetarily liable for their pre-Janus conduct—conduct that
    was once explicitly authorized under Abood and state law.
    DANIELSON V. INSLEE                      5
    Throughout the country, public sector employees
    brought claims for monetary relief against the unions
    pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Many unions asserted a good
    faith defense in response. Joining a growing consensus, the
    district court here ruled in favor of the union. We affirm and
    hold that private parties may invoke an affirmative defense
    of good faith to retrospective monetary liability under
    42 U.S.C. § 1983, where they acted in direct reliance on
    then-binding Supreme Court precedent and presumptively-
    valid state law.
    I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    A. Factual Background
    Plaintiffs are Washington state employees who work
    within bargaining units exclusively represented by the
    American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
    Employees, Council 28, AFL-CIO (the “Union”). Plaintiffs
    are not members of the Union and object to financing its
    activities. Nonetheless, until recently, they were required to
    pay agency fees to the Union. Collection of agency fees
    from nonmembers was authorized by the governing
    collective bargaining agreement, by Washington law, and by
    over four decades of U.S. Supreme Court precedent dating
    back to Abood.
    On June 27, 2018, the Supreme Court issued its decision
    in Janus, reversing course on the constitutionality of the
    traditional agency shop regime. Janus overruled Abood and
    held that the mandatory collection of agency fees from
    objectors violated the First 
    Amendment. 138 S. Ct. at 2486
    .
    It is undisputed that, immediately thereafter, the Union
    stopped collecting mandatory fees from nonmembers.
    6                      DANIELSON V. INSLEE
    B. Procedural Background
    On March 15, 2018, Plaintiffs brought a putative class
    action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Jay Inslee, in his
    official capacity as Governor of Washington; David
    Schumacher, in his official capacity as Director of the
    Washington Office of Financial Management; and the
    Union. In anticipation of the Supreme Court’s decision in
    Janus, Plaintiffs alleged that the imposition of compulsory
    agency fees violated their constitutional rights under the
    First and Fourteenth Amendments. They sought declaratory
    and injunctive relief, a refund of “all agency fees that were
    unlawfully collected from Plaintiffs and their fellow class
    members,” and an award of attorney’s fees and costs.
    In the wake of Janus and changes to the Union’s
    practices, the district court determined that the claims
    against Inslee and Schumacher (the “State Defendants”) for
    declaratory and injunctive relief were moot, and they were
    dismissed from the case. 1 Shortly thereafter, the Union filed
    a motion for judgment on the pleadings or summary
    judgment. The Union argued that the claims for declaratory
    and injunctive relief should be dismissed as moot, as the
    parallel claims against the State Defendants had been. The
    Union further argued that the claim for monetary relief
    should be dismissed because it had relied in good faith on
    presumptively-valid state law and then-binding Supreme
    Court precedent. The district court granted the Union’s
    motion as to all claims and dismissed the case. Plaintiffs
    1
    Plaintiffs sought monetary relief from only the Union, not the State
    Defendants.
    DANIELSON V. INSLEE                             7
    then sought reconsideration of the ruling, which the district
    court denied. This appeal timely followed. 2
    II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
    review de novo an order granting summary judgment or
    judgment on the pleadings. Heliotrope Gen., Inc. v. Ford
    Motor Co., 
    189 F.3d 971
    , 975, 978 (9th Cir. 1999).
    III. DISCUSSION
    We hold that the district court properly dismissed
    Plaintiffs’ claim for monetary relief against the Union. In so
    ruling, we join the Seventh Circuit, the only other circuit to
    have addressed the question before us. See Janus v. Am.
    Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 
    942 F.3d 352
    (7th Cir. 2019) (“Janus II”); Mooney v. Ill. Educ. Ass’n,
    
    942 F.3d 368
    (7th Cir. 2019). We agree with our sister
    circuit that a union defendant can invoke an affirmative
    defense of good faith to retrospective monetary liability
    under section 1983 for the agency fees it collected pre-Janus,
    where its conduct was directly authorized under both state
    law and decades of Supreme Court jurisprudence. The
    Union was not required to forecast changing winds at the
    Supreme Court and anticipatorily presume the overturning
    of Abood. Instead, we permit private parties to rely on
    judicial pronouncements of what the law is, without
    exposing themselves to potential liability for doing so.
    2
    On appeal, Plaintiffs argue only that the district court erred in
    dismissing their claim for monetary relief against the Union. They do
    not contest the dismissal of their claims for declaratory and injunctive
    relief.
    8                      DANIELSON V. INSLEE
    1. We assume the retroactivity of the rule
    established in Janus, but that does not answer the
    remedial question before this court.
    As an initial matter, Plaintiffs urge the retroactive
    application of the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus. But,
    like the Seventh Circuit, we find it unnecessary to “wrestle
    the retroactivity question to the ground.” Janus 
    II, 942 F.3d at 360
    . The Supreme Court has made clear that right and
    remedy must not be conflated, and that retroactivity of a
    right does not guarantee a retroactive remedy. Davis v.
    United States, 
    564 U.S. 229
    , 243 (2011). Therefore, we will
    assume that the right delineated in Janus applies
    retroactively and proceed to a review of available remedies.
    2. A private entity may avail itself of a good faith
    defense in litigation brought pursuant to 42
    U.S.C. § 1983.
    The Supreme Court has held that private parties sued
    under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot claim qualified immunity,
    but it has suggested in dicta that such parties might be able
    to assert a good faith defense to liability instead. Wyatt v.
    Cole, 
    504 U.S. 158
    , 168–69 (1992); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
    Co., 
    457 U.S. 922
    , 942 n.23 (1982). Although the Supreme
    Court has never squarely reached the question, we held in
    Clement v. City of Glendale that private parties may invoke
    a good faith defense to liability under section 1983. 3
    
    518 F.3d 1090
    , 1096–97 (9th Cir. 2008).
    3
    Every other circuit that has considered the issue agrees. Janus 
    II, 942 F.3d at 364
    ; Jarvis v. Cuomo, 660 F. App’x 72, 75 (2d Cir. 2016);
    Pinsky v. Duncan, 
    79 F.3d 306
    , 311–12 (2d Cir. 1996); Vector Research,
    Inc. v. Howard & Howard Attorneys P.C., 
    76 F.3d 692
    , 699 (6th Cir.
    DANIELSON V. INSLEE                             9
    Plaintiffs argue that Clement should be disregarded.
    They contend the Ninth Circuit previously reached a
    contrary outcome in Howerton v. Gabica, 
    708 F.2d 380
    (9th
    Cir. 1983), and a three-judge panel cannot overturn existing
    precedent.
    Because “we are required to reconcile prior precedents if
    we can do so,” we first assess whether Clement and
    Howerton are truly at odds. Cisneros-Perez v. Gonzales,
    
    465 F.3d 386
    , 392 (9th Cir. 2006). We find the two
    decisions reconcilable.        Howerton stands for the
    unremarkable proposition that private parties cannot avail
    themselves of qualified immunity to a section 1983 
    lawsuit. 708 F.2d at 385
    n.10. Both the Supreme Court and later
    panels of our court have adopted that reading of Howerton.
    See, e.g., Wyatt v. Cole, 
    504 U.S. 158
    , 161 (1992) (citing
    Howerton for the proposition that the Ninth Circuit has held
    that private parties acting under color of state law are not
    entitled to qualified immunity); F.E. Trotter, Inc. v. Watkins,
    
    869 F.2d 1312
    , 1318 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Howerton for
    the proposition that “the Ninth Circuit has stated that private
    defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity in section
    1983 actions”).
    Although Howerton used the somewhat less precise
    language of a “good faith 
    immunity,” 708 F.2d at 385
    n.10,
    we do not read the decision to foreclose a good faith
    affirmative defense. Indeed, Howerton cited favorably to
    
    Lugar, 457 U.S. at 942
    n.23, for the proposition that
    “compliance with [a] statute might be raised as an
    affirmative defense” to section 1983 
    liability. 708 F.2d at 385
    n.10. As the Supreme Court has explained, “a
    1996); Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 
    20 F.3d 1250
    ,
    1276 (3d Cir. 1994); Wyatt v. Cole, 
    994 F.2d 1113
    , 1118 (5th Cir. 1993).
    10                    DANIELSON V. INSLEE
    distinction exists between an ‘immunity from suit’ and other
    kinds of legal defenses.” Richardson v. McKnight, 
    521 U.S. 399
    , 403 (1997); see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 
    472 U.S. 511
    ,
    526 (1985) (holding that qualified immunity “is an immunity
    from suit rather than a mere defense to liability”). We
    assume the Howerton court appreciated that distinction and
    grappled only with the former. Thus, the Clement court
    acted well within its authority to find that, while private
    parties cannot assert an immunity to suit under section 1983,
    they can invoke a good faith defense. 4 We are bound by
    Clement, which is dispositive as to the threshold question
    presented by Plaintiffs.
    Plaintiffs also argue that an entity cannot invoke the
    good faith defense, just as a municipality cannot invoke
    qualified immunity. This argument, however, runs counter
    to Clement, in which we applied the good faith defense to an
    entity defendant. Plaintiffs’ argument is also at odds with
    the purpose underlying the good faith defense: that private
    parties should be entitled to rely on binding judicial
    pronouncements and state law without concern that they will
    be held retroactively liable for changing precedents. This
    principle applies equally to a private entity as it does to a
    private individual.
    4
    Clement is not alone in presuming that Ninth Circuit precedent did
    not foreclose a good faith defense. For example, in Jensen v. Lane
    County, we considered it an open question whether a private party could
    invoke “an affirmative good faith defense” to section 1983 liability.
    
    222 F.3d 570
    , 580 n.5 (9th Cir. 2000).
    DANIELSON V. INSLEE                     11
    3. The good faith defense is not limited by the
    availability of a similar defense to the most closely
    analogous common law tort. But, even if it were,
    the closest analogue allows a good faith defense.
    Plaintiffs contend that any good faith defense must be
    confined to claims for which the most closely analogous
    common law tort carried a similar immunity. Plaintiffs
    argue that conversion is the closest common law analogue to
    their claim against the Union, that good faith is no defense
    to conversion, and therefore that good faith can provide no
    defense to liability here. Plaintiffs derive this argument from
    the Supreme Court’s discussion of the history of qualified
    immunity in Wyatt v. Cole:
    Section 1983 creates a species of tort liability
    that on its face admits of no immunities.
    Nonetheless, we have accorded certain
    government officials either absolute or
    qualified immunity from suit if the tradition
    of immunity was so firmly rooted in the
    common law and was supported by such
    strong policy reasons that Congress would
    have specifically so provided had it wished to
    abolish the doctrine. If parties seeking
    immunity were shielded from tort liability
    when Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act
    of 1871—§ 1 of which is codified at
    42 U.S.C. § 1983—we infer from legislative
    silence that Congress did not intend to
    abrogate such immunities when it imposed
    liability for actions taken under color of state
    law. . . . In determining whether there was an
    immunity at common law that Congress
    intended to incorporate in the Civil Rights
    12                 DANIELSON V. INSLEE
    Act, we look to the most closely analogous
    torts . . . .
    
    504 U.S. 158
    , 163–64 (1992) (internal citations and
    quotation marks omitted).
    Plaintiffs’ argument fails for several reasons. First, the
    above passage applies only to Wyatt’s discussion of qualified
    immunity, not to the good faith affirmative defense on which
    Wyatt expressly reserved judgment. The rationales behind
    the two doctrines, and their limitations, are not
    interchangeable. Accord Janus 
    II, 942 F.3d at 365
    (“As
    several district courts have commented, the Supreme Court
    in Wyatt I embarked on the search for the most analogous
    tort only for immunity purposes—the Court never said that
    the same methodology should be used for the good-faith
    defense.”).
    Second, even qualified immunity is no longer
    constrained by a common law tort analogy. See 
    Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 166
    (noting that “Harlow ‘completely
    reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at all
    embodied in the common law’” (quoting Anderson v.
    Creighton, 
    483 U.S. 635
    , 645 (1987))); see also Ziglar v.
    Abbasi, 
    137 S. Ct. 1843
    , 1871 (2017) (Thomas, J.,
    dissenting) (explaining that contemporary courts no longer
    “ask[] whether the common law in 1871 would have
    accorded immunity to an officer for a tort analogous to the
    plaintiff's claim under § 1983,” but “instead grant immunity
    to any officer whose conduct ‘does not violate clearly
    established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
    reasonable person would have known’” (quoting Mullenix v.
    Luna, 
    136 S. Ct. 305
    , 308 (2015) (per curiam))). The
    Supreme Court itself has emphasized that it “never
    suggested that the precise contours of official immunity can
    DANIELSON V. INSLEE                      13
    and should be slavishly derived from the often arcane rules
    of the common law.” 
    Anderson, 483 U.S. at 645
    .
    Third, in Clement, we did not limit the applicability of
    the good faith defense to common law 
    analogues. 518 F.3d at 1096
    –97 (9th Cir. 2008). Our decision in Clement was
    driven not by the strictures of common law, but rather by
    principles of equality and fairness—which the Supreme
    Court likewise indicated could lay the foundation for a good
    faith defense to section 1983 liability. See 
    id. (applying the
    good faith defense because “[t]he company did its best to
    follow the law and had no reason to suspect that there would
    be a constitutional challenge to its actions,” and “the
    constitutional violation arose from the inactions of the police
    rather than from any act or omission by the towing
    company”); 
    Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 168
    (citing “principles of
    equality and fairness” as the basis for a potential good faith
    defense).
    Fourth, Plaintiffs’ proposed constraints are contrary to
    the principles underlying the good faith defense. As noted,
    the availability of the defense arises out of general principles
    of equality and fairness—values that are inconsistent with
    rigid adherence to the oft-arbitrary elements of common law
    torts as they stood in 1871. It would be an odd result for an
    affirmative defense grounded in concerns for equality and
    fairness to hinge upon historical idiosyncrasies and strained
    legal analogies for causes of action with no clear parallel in
    nineteenth century tort law. We would find it neither
    “equal” nor “fair” for a private party’s entitlement to a good
    faith defense to turn not on the innocence of its actions but
    rather on the elements of an 1871 tort that the party is not
    charged with committing.
    Finally, even if we adopted the common-law-analogue
    rule, Plaintiffs’ position would still fail. Contrary to
    14                    DANIELSON V. INSLEE
    Plaintiffs’ contention, conversion is not the closest common
    law analogue to the First Amendment violation alleged in
    this case. Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim arises not from
    the taking of their property, but from their compelled speech
    on behalf of a cause they do not endorse. The unprivileged
    confiscation of funds from employees’ paychecks, on its
    own, would yield no cognizable First Amendment violation.
    Moreover, unlike in a traditional conversion case, the Union
    did not collect agency fees in contravention of state law; the
    key theme underlying Plaintiffs’ section 1983 cause of
    action is that the Union collected agency fees in accord with
    state law. For these reasons, conversion bears little
    substantive similarity to Plaintiffs’ claim.
    Rather, we agree with our sister circuit that abuse of
    process provides the best analogy to Plaintiffs’ claim. 5
    Janus 
    II, 942 F.3d at 365
    . At common law, abuse of process
    “provided [a] cause[] of action against private defendants for
    unjustified harm arising out of the misuse of governmental
    processes.” 
    Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 164
    . Although the
    prototypical abuse of process claim involves the abuse of
    judicial process, the tort is not clearly so confined. Here, the
    fundamental premise for section 1983 liability against the
    Union is its alleged abuse of processes authorized by
    Washington law—the agency shop regime and its
    concomitant agency fee collection protocol—toward
    unconstitutional ends. Indeed, it is the use of governmental
    processes by the Union that supplies the “color of law”
    element required to state a claim under section 1983.
    5
    We agree with the Seventh Circuit that “[n]one of these torts is a
    perfect fit, but they need not be,” as the search for a common law
    analogue is “inherently inexact.” Janus 
    II, 942 F.3d at 365
    .
    DANIELSON V. INSLEE                     15
    Adopting abuse of process as the appropriate common-
    law analogue poses no barrier to the Union’s invocation of a
    good faith defense. This is because, at common law, a
    private party could avoid liability for abuse of process if it
    acted in good faith. 
    Id. at 164;
    id. at 172 
    (Kennedy, J.,
    concurring); 
    id. at 176
    (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
    4. Plaintiffs’ labeling of their claim as restitutionary
    does not preclude application of the good faith
    defense.
    Plaintiffs argue that any good faith defense is limited to
    liability for damages, whereas they seek restitution from the
    Union for agency fees collected in contravention of Janus.
    They contend that “a defendant’s good faith will never allow
    it to keep the property or money that it took in violation of
    another’s constitutional rights,” even if good faith might
    provide a shield to liability for additional damages.
    As an initial matter, Plaintiffs’ restitutionary premise is
    flawed. Plaintiffs’ constitutionally cognizable injury is the
    intangible dignitary harm suffered from being compelled to
    subsidize speech they did not endorse. It is not the
    diminution in their assets from the payment of compulsory
    agency fees. Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek compensatory
    damages, not true restitution, when they pray for a monetary
    award in the amount of the agency fees they paid to the
    Union. The labeling of the relief sought in restitutionary
    terms does not change the underlying nature of Plaintiffs’
    claim.
    Even accepting Plaintiffs’ restitutionary premise, the
    equities do not weigh in favor of requiring a refund of all
    agency fees collected pre-Janus. The Union bears no fault
    for acting in reliance on state law and Supreme Court
    precedent.    It collected and spent fees under the
    16                  DANIELSON V. INSLEE
    assumption—sanctioned by the nation’s highest court—that
    its conduct was constitutional. And the Union provided a
    service to contributing employees in exchange for the
    agency fees it received. Indeed, under Abood, the Union was
    required to use those fees for collective bargaining activities
    that inured to the benefit of all employees it represented—an
    exchange that cannot be unwound. It is true that, under
    current law, the employees suffered a constitutional wrong
    for which they may have no viable means of compensation
    if the good faith defense prevails. Nonetheless, it would not
    be equitable to order the transfer of funds from one innocent
    actor to another, particularly where the latter received a
    benefit from the exchange. Accord Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry.,
    Airline & S.S. Clerks, Freight Handlers, Exp. & Station
    Emps., 
    466 U.S. 435
    , 454–55 (1984) (expressing “doubt that
    the equities call for a refund” of compulsory payments made
    by employees to their union, even if the practice ran afoul of
    the law, because objecting employees received a service in
    exchange for their money); Janus 
    II, 942 F.3d at 367
    (“[T]hough [plaintiff] contends that he did not want any of
    the benefits of [the union’s] collective bargaining and other
    representative activities over the years, he received them.
    Putting the First Amendment issues . . . to one side, there
    was no unjust ‘windfall’ to the union . . . but rather an
    exchange of money for services.”). Under the circumstances
    here, the most equitable outcome is a prospective change in
    the Union’s policy and practice (which undisputedly
    occurred), without retrospective monetary liability.
    DANIELSON V. INSLEE                           17
    5. The good faith defense applies to the Union as a
    matter of law, because the Union was not required
    to anticipate the overturning of then-binding
    precedent.
    The Union’s assertion of a good faith affirmative defense
    is sound, but that does not fully answer the question before
    this court. We must next determine whether the district court
    correctly found that the good faith defense shielded the
    Union from retrospective monetary liability as a matter of
    law.
    In collecting compulsory agency fees, the Union relied
    on presumptively-valid state law and then-binding Supreme
    Court precedent. The Union now faces an assertion of
    monetary liability not for flouting that law or misinterpreting
    its bounds, but for adhering to it. Although some justices
    had signaled their disagreement with Abood in the years
    leading up to Janus, Abood remained binding authority until
    it was overruled. 6 We agree with our sister circuit that “[t]he
    Rule of Law requires that parties abide by, and be able to
    rely on, what the law is, rather than what the readers of tea-
    leaves predict that it might be in the future.” Janus 
    II, 942 F.3d at 366
    .
    The Supreme Court has admonished the circuit courts
    not to presume the overruling of its precedents, irrespective
    of hints in its decisions that a shift may be on the horizon.
    See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc.,
    
    490 U.S. 477
    , 484 (1989) (“If a precedent of this Court has
    6
    Indeed, not long before Janus, the Supreme Court affirmed the
    judgment of this court on the same question presented—albeit by an
    equally divided court. Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 
    136 S. Ct. 1083
    (2016). Although the outcome in Janus may have been the writing on
    the wall, it was not a foregone conclusion.
    18                    DANIELSON V. INSLEE
    direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons
    rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals
    should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to
    this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”);
    Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 
    646 F.3d 684
    , 692 (9th Cir. 2011)
    (“As a circuit court, even if recent Supreme Court
    jurisprudence has perhaps called into question the
    continuing viability of its precedent, we are bound to follow
    a controlling Supreme Court precedent until it is explicitly
    overruled by that Court.” (internal quotation marks and
    brackets omitted)). We decline to hold private parties to a
    different standard. It would be paradoxical for the circuit
    courts to be required to follow Abood until its overruling in
    Janus, while private parties incur liability for doing the
    same.
    The ability of the public to rely on the courts’
    pronouncements of law is integral to the functioning of our
    judicial system. After all, “[i]t is emphatically the province
    and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”
    Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). If
    private parties could no longer rely on the pronouncements
    of even the nation’s highest court to steer clear of liability, it
    could have a destabilizing impact on the judicial system.
    Because the Union’s action was sanctioned not only by
    state law, but also by directly on-point Supreme Court
    precedent, we hold that the good faith defense shields the
    Union from retrospective monetary liability as a matter of
    law. In so ruling, we join a growing consensus of courts
    across the nation. 7
    7
    See Janus II, 
    942 F.3d 352
    ; Mooney, 
    942 F.3d 368
    ; Aliser v. SEIU
    Cal., No. 19-CV-00426-VC, 
    2019 WL 6711470
    , at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec.
    DANIELSON V. INSLEE                           19
    Finally, we reject Plaintiffs’ contention that the Union
    must prove that it “fully complied with the pre-Janus
    constitutional strictures on agency shops” to avail itself of a
    good faith defense.        Plaintiffs’ argument lacks any
    grounding in the claims presented in this action. Plaintiffs
    alleged in their complaint only that the Union’s collection of
    compulsory agency fees, as a general matter, violated their
    10, 2019); Wenzig v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Local 668, No. CV 1:19-
    1367, 
    2019 WL 6715741
    , at *10 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2019); Hamidi v.
    SEIU Local 1000, No. 2:14-CV-00319, 
    2019 WL 5536324
    (E.D. Cal.
    Oct. 25, 2019); LaSpina v. SEIU Pa. State Council, No. 3:18-2018, 
    2019 WL 4750423
    (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2019); Allen v. Santa Clara Cty. Corr.
    Peace Officers Ass’n, No. 18-CV-02230, 
    2019 WL 4302744
    (E.D. Cal.
    Sept. 11, 2019); Casanova v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, Local 701, No.
    19-CV-00428 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 2019); Ogle v. Ohio Civil Serv. Emp.
    Ass’n, No. 18-CV-1227, 
    2019 WL 3227936
    (S.D. Ohio July 17, 2019),
    appeal pending, No. 19-3701 (6th Cir.); Diamond v. Pa. State Educ.
    Ass’n, No. 18-CV-128, 
    2019 WL 2929875
    (W.D. Pa. July 8, 2019),
    appeal pending, No. 19-2812 (3d Cir.); Hernandez v. AFSCME Cal., No.
    18-CV-2419, 
    2019 WL 2546195
    (E.D. Cal. June 20, 2019); Doughty v.
    State Emp. Ass’n of N.H., No. 19-CV-53 (D.N.H. May 30, 2019), appeal
    pending, No. 19-1636 (1st Cir.); Babb v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 378 F.
    Supp. 3d 857 (C.D. Cal. 2019), appeal pending, No. 19-55692 (9th Cir.);
    Wholean v. CSEA SEIU Local 2001, No. 18-CV-1008, 
    2019 WL 1873021
    (D. Conn. Apr. 26, 2019), appeal pending, No. 19-1563 (2d
    Cir.); Akers v. Md. Educ. Ass’n, 
    376 F. Supp. 3d 563
    (D. Md. 2019),
    appeal pending, No. 19-1524 (4th Cir.); Bermudez v. SEIU Local 521,
    No. 18-CV-4312, 
    2019 WL 1615414
    (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2019); Hough
    v. SEIU Local 521, No. 18-CV-4902, 
    2019 WL 1785414
    (N.D. Cal. Apr.
    16, 2019), appeal pending, No. 19-15792 (9th Cir.); Lee v. Ohio Educ.
    Ass’n, 
    366 F. Supp. 3d 980
    (N.D. Ohio 2019), appeal pending, No. 19-
    3250 (6th Cir.); Crockett v. NEA-Alaska, 
    367 F. Supp. 3d 996
    (D. Alaska
    2019), appeal pending, No. 19-35299 (9th Cir.); Carey v. Inslee, 364 F.
    Supp. 3d 1220 (W.D. Wash. 2019), appeal pending, No. 19-35290 (9th
    Cir.); Cook v. Brown, 
    364 F. Supp. 3d 1184
    (D. Or. 2019), appeal
    pending, No. 19-35191 (9th Cir.). See also Jarvis v. Cuomo, 660 F.
    App’x 72 (2d Cir. 2016); Winner v. Rauner, No. 15-CV-7213, 
    2016 WL 7374258
    (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2016); Hoffman v. Inslee, No. 14-CV-200,
    
    2016 WL 6126016
    (W.D. Wash. Oct. 20, 2016).
    20                  DANIELSON V. INSLEE
    rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
    Plaintiffs did not allege that the Union violated their rights
    under Abood or any similar pre-Janus authority. In fact,
    Plaintiffs devoted several paragraphs of their complaint to
    an effort to discredit Abood as controlling authority, so that
    their claims might prevail.
    Because Plaintiffs’ claims arise from the Union’s
    reliance on Abood, not allegations that the Union flouted that
    authority, the Union need not show compliance with
    Abood’s strictures to assert successfully a good faith
    defense. Such a requirement would be entirely divorced
    from the allegations in this action.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    When the Supreme Court delivered its decision in Janus,
    the Union was required to change its policies to conform to
    the newly-announced law of the land. And it did. But the
    shift in precedent only carries the plaintiff employees so far.
    We hold that the Union is not retrospectively liable for doing
    exactly what we expect of private parties: adhering to the
    governing law of its state and deferring to the Supreme
    Court’s interpretations of the Constitution. A contrary result
    would upend the very principles upon which our legal
    system depends. The good faith affirmative defense applies
    as a matter of law, and the district court was right to dismiss
    Plaintiffs’ claim for monetary relief.
    AFFIRMED.