Pamela Owen v. Chuck Atkins , 695 F. App'x 338 ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 16 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PAMELA S. OWEN, No. 16-35398
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:15-cv-05375-BHS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CHUCK E. ATKINS, in his official capacity
as Clark County Sheriff; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 9, 2017**
Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Pamela S. Owen appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in her 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims arising out of
foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo. Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 911 (9th Cir. 2012)
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
(dismissal for failure to state a claim); Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County of
San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011) (cross-motions for summary
judgment). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Owen’s § 1983 claims against Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation and MTC Financial, Inc. because Owen failed
to allege facts sufficient to show that these defendants acted under color of state
law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (to state a claim under § 1983 a
plaintiff must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting
under color of state law); see also Apao v. Bank of N.Y., 324 F.3d 1091, 1094-
95 (9th Cir. 2003) (non-judicial foreclosure was not state action and therefore did
not implicate due process); Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 444-45 (9th Cir. 2002)
(a private individual acts under color of state law only when there is significant
state involvement in the action).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Owen’s § 1983
due process claim against Atkins because Owen failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether Atkins violated her constitutional or statutory rights.
See West, 487 U.S. at 48 (“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege
the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States,
and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting
under color of state law.”).
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The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Owen’s
Washington Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”) claim with prejudice after Owen
failed to comply with the district court’s order to file an amended complaint
despite being warned of the consequence for failing to file it and receiving an
extension to do so. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir.
1992) (setting forth standard of review and listing factors to be considered in
dismissing a case as a sanction for failure to comply with a court order requiring
submission of an amended complaint). Because we affirm the district court’s
dismissal of Owen’s CPA claim as a sanction for failure to comply with a court
order, we do not consider the district court’s interlocutory orders regarding Owen’s
CPA claim. See Al-Torki v. Kaempen, 78 F.3d 1381, 1386 (9th Cir. 1996)
(“[I]nterlocutory orders, generally appealable after a final judgment, are not
appealable after a dismissal for failure to prosecute[.]”).
We reject as meritless Owen’s contention that the district court was required
to determine whether qualified immunity applied.
We do not consider arguments or facts that were not presented to the district
court, or matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening
brief. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999).
AFFIRMED.
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