Jundou Dong v. Matthew Whitaker ( 2019 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
JAN 11 2019
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JUNDOU DONG, No. 15-73599
Petitioner, Agency No. A087-823-585
v.
MEMORANDUM**
MATTHEW G. WHITAKER*, Acting
Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 3, 2018***
Pasadena, California
Before:RAWLINSON and BEA, Circuit Judges, and BASTIAN,**** District Judge.
*
Matthew G. Whitaker has been substituted for his predecessor,
Jefferson Sessions, III, as Acting United States Attorney General under Fed. R.
App. 43(c)(2).
**
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
****
The Honorable Stanley Allen Bastian, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation.
Jundou Dong (“Dong”), native and citizen of China, petitions for review of
the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Dong
contends that he is entitled to relief on account of his Christian beliefs and because
of the suffering his wife experienced when she was forced to undergo a tubal
ligation. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition for
review.
Substantial evidence supports the denial of relief on adverse credibility
grounds due to Dong’s demeanor and inconsistencies in the record. See 8 U.S.C. §
1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Ling Huang v. Holder, 744 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2014)
(noting we review “denials of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief for
substantial evidence and will uphold a denial supported by reasonable, substantial,
and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.”) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)). Taken together, all the inconsistencies and
discrepancies identified by the IJ support its finding that Dong was not credible.
See Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1042 n.3 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he REAL ID
Act now permits an IJ to base an adverse credibility determination on any
inconsistency ‘without regard to whether an inconsistency. . . goes to the heart of
the applicant’s claim.’”) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii))).
2
The IJ’s reliance on Dong’s demeanor is afforded substantial deference. Id.
at 1042. The IJ provided specific, cogent reasons for its adverse credibility findings
by making more than just a general statement about demeanor. For instance, when
faced with the discrepancies, Dong would laugh and grin. This is a specific, first-
hand observation we are required to respect. See Manes v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 1261,
1263 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting specific first-hand observations are “precisely the
kind of credibility cues that are the special province of the factfinder”).
Finally, Dong failed to argue before the BIA that he was not given an
adequate opportunity to explain the inconsistencies in his story and as such, he has
failed to exhaust this claim. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir.
2004) (no subject-matter jurisdiction over legal claims not presented in
administrative proceedings below).
PETITION DENIED.
3