United States v. Kenneth Medenbach ( 2018 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUL 5 2018
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    16-30189
    Plaintiff–Appellee,             D.C. No.
    1:15-CR-00407-MC-1
    v.
    KENNETH W. MEDENBACH,                           MEMORANDUM*
    Defendant–Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Oregon
    Michael J. McShane, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted on June 8, 2018**
    Portland, Oregon
    Before: GRABER and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and KORMAN,*** District
    Judge.
    Kenneth Medenbach was convicted of unlawful camping and occupancy
    arising out of his continued efforts to reclaim federal lands by “adverse possession”
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge for
    the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    on behalf of the people of Oregon. In August 2016, he was sentenced to five years
    of probation, and the district judge imposed both standard and special conditions,
    including a custodial sentence of six months. But the judge made a finding of time
    served, because Medenbach had been in custody after his arrest—during pre-trial
    release—for once again illegally camping on federal land. The judge also ordered
    $2,506.45 in restitution for costs associated with removing Medenbach’s illegal
    cabin. Medenbach did not object. He now appeals, challenging the six-month
    custodial term, the restitution order, and the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
    When a defendant does not object in the district court, we review the
    imposition of probation conditions for plain error. United States v. Forbes, 
    172 F.3d 675
    , 676 (9th Cir. 1999). We review de novo the legal issues of whether the court
    had authority to order restitution, United States v. Lazarenko, 
    624 F.3d 1247
    , 1249
    (9th Cir. 2010), and whether, as Medenbach argues, we lack the authority to preside
    over the case at all, see United States v. Kuchinski, 
    469 F.3d 853
    , 857 (9th Cir. 2006).
    1. District courts have “broad discretion” to fashion probation conditions.
    United States v. Terrigno, 
    838 F.2d 371
    , 374 (9th Cir. 1988). However, 
    18 U.S.C. § 3561
    (a)(3) prohibits a term of probation when “the defendant is sentenced at the
    same time to a term of imprisonment for the same or a different offense that is not a
    petty offense.” It is therefore plain error for a judgment to impose, as a condition of
    probation, a continuously served custodial sentence. Forbes, 
    172 F.3d at 676
    .
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    But that’s not really what happened here. The judge limited the custodial
    sentence to time served. Medenbach has therefore failed to bear his burden of
    proving how this affected his “substantial rights” when it resulted in no prison time.
    United States v. Jimenez, 
    258 F.3d 1120
    , 1126 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus the district court
    did not plainly err.
    2. A district court has statutory authority to impose restitution as a condition
    of probation. 
    18 U.S.C. § 3563
    (b)(2). Medenbach implies that restitution was
    imposed for “costs relating to the investigation and prosecution” of his offenses, but
    the record demonstrates that restitution was properly imposed “for the cabin removal
    and cleanup costs” associated with Medenbach’s occupation of federal land.
    Medenbach also asks us, without much reasoning, to overrule our decision in United
    States v. Miguel, 
    49 F.3d 505
    , 512 (9th Cir. 1995), in which we held that 
    18 U.S.C. § 3663
     provides statutory authority to impose restitution, as an additional penalty, in
    misdemeanor cases. We do not have the authority to do so, because we may only
    “overrule prior circuit authority without taking the case en banc when an
    ‘intervening Supreme Court decision undermines an existing precedent of the Ninth
    Circuit, and both cases are closely on point.’” Miller v. Gammie, 
    335 F.3d 889
    , 899
    (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (quoting Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 
    307 F.3d 1119
    , 1123 (9th Cir. 2002)).
    3. We have already rejected Medenbach’s challenges to the exercise of federal
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    jurisdiction. United States v. Medenbach, 
    116 F.3d 487
     (Table) (9th Cir. 1997). He
    is therefore precluded from raising them again here. See B & B Hardware, Inc. v.
    Hargis Indus., Inc., 
    135 S. Ct. 1293
    , 1298 (2015).
    AFFIRMED.
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