Blaisdell v. Corrections Corp. of America , 426 F. App'x 550 ( 2011 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT APR 12 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
RICHARD H. BLAISDELL, No. 09-17795 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:08-cv-00582-JAT
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF
AMERICA; B. GRIEGO,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
James A. Teilborg, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 27, 2011**
Before: HUG, SKOPIL, and BEEZER, Circuit Judges.
Inmate Richard Blaisdell filed this pro se appeal after a jury rejected his civil
rights claim alleging the prison’s policy regulating receipt of “gift publications”
violated his First Amendment rights. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1291, and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
I.
Blaisdell contends the district court erred by dismissing all but one claim in
his complaint. The Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1),
requires, however, dismissal of allegations that fail to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. See, e.g., O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir.
2008). Here, Blaisdell’s allegations are conclusory and lack an adequate factual
basis to state a claim. Accordingly, the claims were properly dismissed. See
Caviness v. Horizon Comm. Learning Ctr., 590 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 2010)
(noting conclusory allegations and unwarranted inferences in a civil rights action
are insufficient to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim).
II.
Blaisdell argues the district court erred by excluding evidence that the prison
twice changed its policy regarding gift publications. We disagree. The prison
initially amended its policy and offered to settle. Although Blaisdell refused to
settle, he agreed the former policy was no longer relevant. Just prior to trial, the
prison again amended its policy and sought settlement. Blaisdell conceded the new
policy is constitutional, but again refused to settle. Such settlement offers are not
admissible at trial. See Fed.R.Evid. 408(a) (limiting the admissibility of
compromise negotiations).
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III.
Blaisdell challenges the district court’s ruling limiting his potential recovery
to nominal damages and precluding punitive damages. That challenge must fail,
however, because the jury found against Blaisdell on the issue of liability. See
Bulgo v. Munoz, 853 F.2d 710, 716 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting in such circumstances
that any error could only be harmless).
IV.
Blaisdell contends the district court wrongly instructed the jury regarding his
right to receive gift publications. Specifically, he submits the court “never
instructed as to Crofton v. Roe, 170 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 1999), and Sorrels v.
McKee, 290 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2002).” In Crofton, 170 F.3d at 958, we affirmed a
district court’s decision barring enforcement of a prison’s blanket ban on gift
publications. We did so because there was no showing that the ban was
“reasonably related to any valid penological objective.” Id. at 959. In Sorrels, 290
F.3d at 971, we simply concluded that, for purposes of qualified immunity, the law
regarding the constitutionality of a prison’s blanket ban on gift publications was
not clearly established prior to Crofton.
Here, the district court instructed the jury that “[u]nder the First
Amendment, inmates have the right to receive mail and gift publications.” The
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court then explained that if Blaisdell proved he was denied this right, the jury
should consider whether the prison’s policy is reasonably related to legitimate
penological or correctional goals. The court explained what factors the jury should
consider in making this determination.
These jury instructions do not misstate the law. Crofton clearly turned on
the lack of evidence regarding that prison’s legitimate penological interests in
prohibiting gift publications. Here, the jury was provided with evidence of the
prison’s security and administrative interests and could have reasonably decided
the prison’s policy was necessary to promote those interests. See Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (noting prison may adopt regulations that impinge on an
inmate's constitutional rights if they are reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests).
V.
Blaisdell contends he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We
disagree. As noted above, neither Crofton nor Sorrels held that all prison
restrictions on gift publications violate an inmate’s First Amendment rights.
Rather, such restrictions are subject to review to determine if they are reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
AFFIRMED.
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