Amir Shabazz v. Jimmy Cruzen ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 20 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AMIR SHABAZZ, No. 17-16037
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 5:15-cv-02041-LHK
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JIMMY CRUZEN, Sgt; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Lucy H. Koh, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 18, 2017**
Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Amir Shabazz appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies in his 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action related to congregational prayer. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
(9th Cir. 2015). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Shabazz
failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he properly
exhausted his administrative remedies, or whether there was “something in his
particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative
remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1172
(9th Cir. 2014) (en banc); see also Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006)
(requiring proper exhaustion, which means “using all steps that the agency holds
out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits)”
(emphasis, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)). Shabazz contends that
he exhausted under a “continuing violation” theory, but even if this court were to
adopt such a theory, it would not apply in this case.
AFFIRMED.
2 17-16037