Mykal Ryan v. Timothy Hyden , 708 F. App'x 319 ( 2017 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
DEC 08 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MYKAL S. RYAN, No. 14-55639
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
3:13-cv-00090-JAH-KSC
v.
TIMOTHY M. HYDEN, a California MEMORANDUM*
resident and as Trustee of the John and
Christy Ryan Family Trust; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
John A. Houston, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 5, 2017**
Before: GOODWIN, LEAVY, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
Mykal S. Ryan appeals pro se the district court’s judgment dismissing for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction Ryan’s action alleging federal and state-law
claims arising from earlier legal actions against him in connection with his role as
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
trustee of the John and Christy Ryan Family Trust. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Atwood v. Fort Peck Tribal Court
Assiniboine, 513 F.3d 943, 946 (9th Cir. 2008), and may affirm on any ground
supported by the record, Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116,
1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
Because this case was properly removed by federal officers under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1442(a)(1), we disagree with the district court’s conclusion that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction. However, dismissal of the First Amended Complaint was
proper because Ryan failed plausibly to allege facts showing that any defendant
committed actionable misconduct. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (a plaintiff must allege facts that “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”); Pareto v.
F.D.I.C., 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[C]onclusory allegations of law and
unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.”). With
respect to his federal constitutional claims, Ryan failed plausibly to allege that
defendants deprived him of a constitutional right, or that the private attorney
defendants acted under color of law. See Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334,
1338 (9th Cir. 1986) (requirements for a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). With
2
respect to his federal statutory claims, Ryan failed to identify any authority
supporting a private right of action. See, e.g., Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank of
Or., N.A., 815 F.2d 522, 533 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987) (“federal appellate courts hold that
there is no private right of action for mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341”). With
respect to his state-law claims, Ryan failed plausibly to allege facts showing that
any defendant violated state law. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend
because Ryan’s repeated filings asserting the same deficient claims indicate that
amendment would be futile. See United States v. SmithKline Beecham, Inc., 245
F.3d 1048, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 2001) (standard of review and factors to consider in
denying leave to amend).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in entering a pre-filing order
against Ryan because Ryan had notice of and an opportunity to oppose the
proposed order, the district court provided an adequate record for review and made
substantive findings as to the frivolous and harassing nature of Ryan’s filings, and
the order was narrowly tailored. See De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1147-
48 (9th Cir. 1990) (standard of review and requirements for entering a pre-filing
order).
3
We reject Ryan’s contentions that the district court was biased against him
and erred in rejecting various filings for failure to comply with local rules. See
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (“judicial rulings alone almost
never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion”); S. Cal. Edison Co. v.
Lynch, 307 F.3d 794, 807 (9th Cir. 2002) (“District courts have ‘inherent power’ to
control their dockets.” (citation omitted)).
Ryan’s Motion for Leave to Correct Record on Appeal (Dkt. No. 3) and
Appellees’ Motion to Take Judicial Notice (Dkt. No. 49) are denied.
AFFIRMED.
4