Garcia Ex Rel. Estate of Acosta-Garcia v. Clark County , 428 F. App'x 706 ( 2011 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 18 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARIA GARCIA, Special Administrator No. 09-17745
and Guardian ad Litem on behalf of Estate
of Genesis Acosta-Garcia, on behalf of D.C. No. 2:07-cv-01507-RCJ-PAL
Sandra Acosta-Garcia; SANDRA
ACOSTA-GARCIA; GENESIS
ACOSTA-GARCIA, MEMORANDUM*
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA; CLARK
COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY
SERVICES; RICK HORNER; VICTORIA
HORNER,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 13, 2011**
San Francisco, California
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Before: THOMAS and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and CARNEY, District
Judge.***
Maria Garcia (Maria), as Special Administrator to the Estate of her deceased
granddaughter, Genesis Acosta-Garcia (Genesis), and as Guardian ad Litem to her
minor daughter, Sandra Acosta-Garcia (Sandra), brought claims pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and state negligence claims against Clark County, Nevada and its
Department of Family Services (collectively, County), and Genesis’ foster parents,
Victoria and Rick Horner (Horners), arising from Genesis’ death while she was in
protective custody. Maria appeals the district court’s denial of her request pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 56(f)1 to continue discovery and amend
the complaint to identify Doe defendants. She also challenges the grant of
summary judgment in favor of all defendants.
***
The Honorable Cormac J. Carney, District Judge for the U.S. District
Court for Central California, Santa Ana, sitting by designation.
1
The amendments to FRCP 56 effective December 1, 2010 moved the
provisions of subdivision (f) to subdivision (d), without substantial change.
Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) (2009), with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) (2010); see Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(d) (advisory committee notes regarding 2010 Amendments). We
refer to FRCP 56(f) because the district court entered summary judgment in
November, 2009, before the effective date of the amendments.
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1. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Maria’s
request to conduct additional discovery because the request failed to specify the
essential facts Maria hoped to obtain and how those facts would preclude summary
judgment. See Tatum v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th
Cir. 2006). Moreover, Maria “failed diligently to pursue discovery in the past.”
Chance v. Pac-Tel Teletrac Inc., 242 F.3d 1151, 1161 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation
omitted).
Neither did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Maria leave
to amend the complaint to identify the Doe defendants. Maria had ample
opportunity prior to the time defendants moved for summary judgment to conduct
reasonable discovery, identify these defendants, and seek leave to amend the
complaint to name them properly. Cf. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642-43
(9th Cir. 1980) (holding that the district court abused its discretion when it denied
the opportunity to conduct reasonable discovery to identify the Doe defendants).
2. The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the
County on Maria’s claims alleging deliberate indifference to the liberty interests of
Maria, Sandra, and Genesis as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s
substantive due process clause. See Tamas v. Dep’t. of Soc. & Health Servcs., 630
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F.3d 833, 842 (9th Cir. 2010) (recognizing that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process clause protects a foster child’s liberty interest in social
worker supervision and protection from harm inflicted by a foster parent”)
(citations omitted).
Maria failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether Sandra’s,
Maria’s, or Genesis’ constitutional rights were violated, and whether a County
policy or custom was the moving force behind the violation. See Wallis v.
Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000), as amended; see also Monell v.
Dep’t. of Soc. Servcs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (articulating the standard for
municipal liability). Although the record reflects that the County’s child welfare
system had systemic shortcomings, Maria failed to raise a genuine issue of material
fact that these shortcomings caused Genesis’ death. See Harper v. City of Los
Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1024 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the plaintiff must
demonstrate a link between the defendant’s conduct and the claimed injury).
Maria’s contention that County policies authorize unconstitutional conduct in the
abstract is “quite beside the point[]” with respect to the County’s liability pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. McSherry v. City of Long Beach, 584 F.3d 1129, 1147 (9th
Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
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3. The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the
County on Maria’s negligence claims because Maria failed to present a genuine
issue of material fact concerning her allegation that the County breached its duty of
care or proximately caused Genesis’ death. Although Genesis’ death was tragic,
Maria could not point to a specific action or inaction on the part of the County that
caused Genesis’ death. The County also was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity
for performing functions connected with the judicial process of placing Genesis in
protective custody. See State v. Second Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Cnty. of
Washoe, 55 P.3d 420, 426 (Nev. 2002) (per curiam).
4. The Horners were entitled to summary judgment. The record
evidence demonstrates that the Horners fulfilled their duty of reasonable care
throughout Genesis’ placement in their home, and that Virginia Horner acted
reasonably in monitoring Genesis’ health and attempting to secure prompt medical
attention for Genesis.
AFFIRMED.
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