United States v. Quinton Williams , 428 F. App'x 723 ( 2011 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 21 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 09-10506
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:03-CR-46-KJD-RJJ
v.
MEMORANDUM *
QUINTON WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Kent J. Dawson, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 11, 2011
San Francisco, California
Before: NOONAN and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and COLLINS, District
Judge.**
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by Ninth Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable Raner C. Collins, United States District Judge for the District of
Arizona, sitting by designation.
1
Defendant-Appellant Quinton Williams appeals from his sentence following a
jury trial and guilty verdict. The parties are presumed to be familiar with the facts,
and we do not recount them here except as necessary to explain our decision. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
I. Appellant’s sentence after re-trial
We review claims of judicial vindictiveness de novo. United States v. Peyton,
353 F.3d 1080, 1085 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on different grounds by United States
v. Contreras, 593 F.3d 1135, 1136 (9th Cir. 2010).
Where the defendant cannot show a reasonable likelihood that his harsher
sentence at a retrial was the result of vindictiveness, the Pearce presumption does not
apply and the defendant bears the burden of proving actual vindictiveness. Wasman
v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 569 (1984).
The court in this case stated affirmatively on the record its reasons for giving
Williams a higher sentence after retrial, noting that guideline recommendation in the
2003 Presentence Report did not include the career offender application. When an
increase in sentence results solely from the court's correction of an error in the original
presentence report, there is no reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness. United States
v. Garcia-Guizar, 234 F.3d 483, 489-91 (9th Cir. 2000).
Because the Pearce presumption categorically does not apply to Appellant's
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resentencing, he must prove actual vindictiveness. Id. at 490 (quoting Wasman, 468
U.S. at 569). Appellant conceded at oral argument that he could not demonstrate that
the district court was actually vindictive. 1
Therefore, the district court did not engage in vindictive sentencing, and we
affirm Appellant’s 210-month sentence.
II. Appellant’s Faretta request
Under either de novo or abuse of discretion review, Appellant’s Faretta claim
fails. See United States v. Kaczynski, 239 F.3d 1108, 1116 (9th Cir. 2001).
A court may deny a defendant's Faretta request if it cannot find “that he
knowingly and intelligently forgoes his right to counsel and that he is able and willing
to abide by rules of procedure and courtroom protocol.” McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465
U.S. 168, 173 (1984).
There is ample support in the record to sustain findings (i) that Williams did not
knowingly and intelligently waive his right to representation, and/or (ii) that Williams
demonstrated during the hearing that he would be defiant and disruptive if allowed to
represent himself.
As to the first, when asked by the magistrate judge whether he understood the
1
Appellant argued for the first time that the prosecutor was vindictive for seeking the career
offender enhancement. This argument is waived. Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 642 (9th Cir.
2008).
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charges and consequences in his case, Williams gave conflicting and nonsensical
answers. In addition, he seemed to believe that the case was a private bankruptcy
proceeding. Based on this record, the district court correctly found that Williams did
not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel.
As to the second, throughout the Faretta hearing, Williams interrupted the court
and counsel, and was rude and disrespectful to the court. His behavior was so
disruptive that the court threatened to bind and gag him, and he was finally subdued
by the Marshals. The district court correctly found that Williams was not willing to
abide by courtroom protocol and rules of procedure based on his behavior during the
Faretta hearing.
Denying Appellant's Faretta request was not an abuse of discretion.
III. Denial of mistrial
We review a district court's denial of a motion for mistrial for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Sarkisian, 197 F.3d 966, 981 (9th Cir. 1999). We review
a district court's findings of fact in connection with the motion for a mistrial for clear
error. United States v. Bonas, 344 F.3d 945, 948 (9th Cir. 2003).
We give “substantial weight” to the district court's assessment of whether a
mistrial is necessary, and presume that the trial judge “who presided at the trial and
observed the jury” is in the best position to determine if what happened was
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prejudicial. Sarkisian, 197 F.3d at 981-82. The Sixth Amendment “affords no relief
when the defendant's own misconduct caused the alleged juror partiality and the trial
judge employed reasonable means under the circumstances to preserve the trial's
fairness.” Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 626 (9th Cir. 2004).
Here, Appellant's request for a mistrial was occasioned by his own misconduct,
which was so severe it required his removal. The court acted as quickly as it could to
prevent the jury from hearing anymore of the outburst and remove Williams from the
courtroom. In addition, the court instructed the jurors to (i) not be influenced by
personal likes or dislikes, opinions, prejudices, or sympathy, (ii) decide the case based
only on properly admitted evidence, and (iii) ignore anything they may have seen or
heard when court was not in session. A jury is presumed to follow its instructions.
Mejia v. Garcia, 534 F.3d 1036, 1043 fn. 3 (9th Cir. 2008).
There was no reason to presume that the jury was influenced by Appellant's
outburst, and there was no reason to reward Williams with a mistrial. Therefore, the
court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion for mistrial.
AFFIRMED.
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